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The research is an empirical study of the transitions from 
adolescence to adulthood in Britain. Transitions in work, family 
formation and housing are all examined in the context of the social 
class and mobility of young people who are in the process of 
achieving. social identity in their own right. Differentiation of 
the experience of youth occurs according to gender, class of 
origin, educational level, whether an individual is socially 
mobile, and the means of mobility. A typology of "youth class" is 
developed as a conceptual framework for understanding 
stratification in youth and as an analytic tool for measuring 
different life experiences of the young. 
The study finds that class reproduction is a complicated process, 
particularly for the middle class. Inter-generaticnal mobility is 
often achieved only through a complicated process of intra- 
generational mobility in the young generation. Middle class 
families give active help during this process. Upward mobility of 
the working class is more of an individual achievement. Many of 
the transitions to adulthood in work and at home are affected by 
the social mobility of the young. The entry into work and 
subsequent movement in the labour market should be seen in the 
context of social mobility both inter-generational and intra- 
generational. Family formation transitions are also affected in 
their timing and spacing by the social mobility and work career 
patterns in youth. 
The research involves secondary analysis of two large data sets: 
the General Household Survey and the National Child Development 
Study. 
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Chapter 1 
Young people are often in the headlines, not as individuals, but as 
a group. They are sometimes represented as victims, but more 
usually as offenders. They thus have a public image unlike that of 
any other age group: children and the elderly are generally 
represented as victims. The middle aged get no attention as a 
group, perhaps because they are the media, they are the general 
public, and they thus set the standard by which other groups are 
judged. Media and public attention to "the problems of youth today" 
(meaning the problems to society of youth) has spilled over into 
the sociology of'youth. It is tempting to suggest that` 
sociologists are attracted to-the study of young people because of 
this romantic image of defiance of the social order and visible, 
sometimes flamboyant, challenges made by the young in the form of 
youth cultures and sub-cultures. 
whatever the motivaticn of sociologists, the sociology of youth has 
had a large following amp those who have sought to explain young 
people as a threat to the social order, as a force for change, as 
oppositional to the dominant ideology, as deviants. The public 
image of youth has resulted in social policies directed at the 
young, aimed at reducing their visibility (for example by removing 
them from unemployment statistics) as much as at improving their 
circumstances. Thus, in a parallel stream to the sociology of 
youth, social policy research has considered the effectiveness of 
state provision for the young, such as the Careers Service or the 
Youth Training Scheme. 
The emphasis on youth as a problem for society has been associated 
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of late with a functionalist approach to the sociology of youth. 
Concern for the problems that society causes for youth tend to be 
broadly Marxist, and expo rents of this position have ocr xitrated 
mainly cn youth sub-cultures. The Sociology of Youth seems to have 
been identified with the former stance, and been branded as 
c nseivative and reactionary. In general, there has been a lack of 
concern in sociology with basic issues relating to youth, and 
although much useful and interesting research has been completed, 
our knowledge of youth remains piecemeal and fragmented. Many 
questions remain unanswered. 
What is youth? It is time to define the concept, since it has 
become so value laden. Youth is defined here as the process by( 
which young people become economically and socially independent by, 
entering employment and leaving their families of origin, usually 
to form families of their own. Youth is largely defined and 
achieved through the age-related social institutions of education, 
work, housing and marriage. Because the ages at which people enter 
and leave these institutions varies, then the ages which define 
youth must vary between social groups. Youth is an age-related 
process, but not of itself an age. 
Youth is the process of transition to adulthood. What does this 
transition consist of, how is it achieved and how is it modified by 
the social structure? Is there one process of transition or many? 
Do people follow a linear progression from leaving school, through 
entering work, to leaving hone, marrying and having children? Are 
these transitions inter-related, and if so, what is their 
relationship? What does the transition mean in practical terms? 
The process of becoming adult can be observed in terms of the` 
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changing relationship between the individual and the social 
structure in which each person glows up. The social structure may 
be in the form of the institutions of work and tune, production and 
consumption: the labour market, the family, the housing market, 
etc. Young people become adult in their relations with each of 
these institutions. Becoming adult is thus not merely an 
individual (physical or psychological) achievement, but also a 
social one and an ecc omic one. 
Do people from different social groups have different experience of 
youth? The young person growing up is interacting with the 
institutional structures of society, and the transition to 
adulthood is thus modified and changed as a result of each 
interacticn. But young people vary in their social backgrounds and 
their personal characteristics: different types of young people 
start from different positions, and modify their positions 
differently as they grow up. Furthermore, the institutions with 
which they interact are themselves stratificatory, providing 
unequal access and opportunity. There are therefore many aspects 
to stratification in youth 
When the transition to adultix od is seen in socio-economic terms, 
then differences in the nature of transition can be explained in 
terms of social and economic stratification. But this set of 
concepts is problematic. here are many dimensions to 
stratification in society which determine the structure of 
inequality and which further the interests of capital over labour, 
of male over female, of white over black. 
Youth is represented here as, a process of transition through which r-, 
people move, during which they are allocated to or strive for 
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different positions, before reaching adult status in society. 
Stratification in youth is a concept which must therefore be 
amenable to an awareness of process. Whereas stratification in 
adulthood is generally represented in a structural way, based on 
cross-sectional evidence of a person's social and economic 
position, stratification in youth needs to take account of the many 
changes in the individual's socio-economic position which are 
related to growing up. Class trajectories are as significant as 
current class to the study of stratification in youth. 
How difficult is it to become adult in social and economic terms? 
Is it easier for some groups than others? How subject is the 
transition to canstraint? These questions too need to be answered. 
Social groups vary, particularly by class, gender, race, ethnic 
background, the region in which they live. Transitions are: likely 
to vary'according to all these factors (though only class and 
gender will be considered here). If access to institutions (such 
as the labour market and the housing market) which are associated 
with transition is, limited, then different groups will experience 
particular difficulties; some people may be helped while others are 
hindered by the structure of these institutions. How is opportunity 
structured during youth? 
Associated with this question are others: what compensatory 
measures can be taken to overcome o c[ aints? , In growing up and 
leaving their" families, to what extent does the family help or 
hinder the process? How much do official public institutions and 
the unofficial private ones interact? Does one supplement the 
other? Can the private institution of the family help, those whom 
the public' institutions of the school or the work place have 
failed? These questions too need to be addressed. ' 
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And the transition itself - we may have a view of an orderly 
process of transition to adulthood, according to which people leave 
school and then start work; people leave home and then marry; 
people marry and then have children. But is this what really 
occurs? Is there any evidence that middle class normative values J 
about becoming adult are equally shared? From what sectors of 
society do the "deviants" from this supposedly linear progress to 
adulthood come? And finally, we should ask to what extent are the n 
transitions to adulthood subject to trend over time, and changes 
between social contexts? If youth is a social construction, howv 
much is it constructed on a local level in a particular historical 
context? 
This research cannot hope to answer all the relevant questions'-\ 
fully and comprehensively, but takes as a starting point the need 
to reconsider youth conceptually, and to understand the process of 
youth in a clearly-defined theoretical framework. The aim has been 
to provide a broad framework for studying youth, which can be built 
on in further research on specific aspects of the lives of young 
people. It seeks to achieve this aim by locating youth in the 
social structure. 
Qrganisation of the Thesis 
The thesis starts with an introductory section, of which this 
chapter is part. Chapter Two is a review of the sociological 
perspectives which have been taken in the sociology of youth. 
Further literature relating to aspects of the transition is 
discussed in subsequent chapters. The literature review deals with 
the concept of youth and how the sociological treatment of the 
subject has changed over the years, dealing with different aspects 
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of youth at different times. The review shows that a full 
comprehensive study of youth in the social structure has been 
lacking despite many calls for such research to be undertaken. The 
current research is a first step towards filling this gap. Chapter 
Three is a discussion of the methodology used in the study, which 
in particular draws attention to some of the methodological 
problems encomtered. 
In Part Two, the problem of social class and stratification in 
youth is addressed. Social mobility is examined, and a model is 
produced for understanding and analysing stratification by social 
class. A multi-dimensional approach is taken to class in youth, 
comprising class of origin, educational level, and class 
trajectory, as well as current occupational class. A typology of 
youth class is developed at the end of this section, and is used 
both as a conceptual tool and as a means of measuring 
stratification in the later analysis. Gender differences are 
considered throughout the thesis, and the typology is designed to 
be as relevant to the study of women as of men. 
Part Three is concerned with employment. Chapter Six is a brief 
review of literature relating to choice and constraint in the 
labour market, and provides a basis for examining transitions both 
into and within work. Chapter Seven examines the entry into work, 
while Chapter Eight looks at occLzpational mobility. Chapter Nine 
briefly examines some of the work routes to upward mobility which 
might be used, and examines both their effectiveness and 
differential access to these routes. 
Part Four of the thesis is concerned with non-work transitions, 
based in the home. First, in Chapter Ten a review of the 
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relationship between home and work provides a theoretical basis for 
examining transitions in the home in terms of class and work 
careers. Then, Chapter Eleven is an analysis of endogamy in 
marriage, and indicates how the choice of spouse may perpetuate the 
social structure, by ensuring continuation of class culture. 
Chapter Twelve examines the different timing and spacing of 
transitions to adulthood in terms of age at marriage and age at 
childbirth, according to class and gender. chapter Thirteen is an 
analysis of patterns of leaving home and early housing careers. 
The thesis is concluded in two ways. First, Chapter Fourteen 
describes the different ways in which different social groups grow 
up, taking in turn each type described in the typology which was 
developed for the research. The relationship between different 
aspects of transition are thus highlighted. Chapter Fifteen 
concludes the thesis, by considering some of the issues raised: the 
usefulness of studying youth in the context of social class and 
mobility, and what has been learned about the. transitions to 
adulttyood. The chapter ends with suggestions for fur her research. 
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Chapter 2 
Generation, Class and Gesxler: A Review 
Youth is eighty years old. As a sociological and psychological 
concept, youth had its birth at the beginning of"the twentieth 
century, though concepts of youth and adolescence have had currency 
throughout history. Since its conception, the sociology of youth 
has alternated between successful exploration and unsuccessful 
foray, so that while some progress has been made towards a 
sociological understanding of youth, many facets of the lives of 
the young still await research. 
Youth is not so much a stage in life, as an age-related process of 
transition. Becoming adult is part of a continuum, part of a life 
course from childhood to old age. In some pre-industrial 
societies, the moment of becoming adult is marked by a ceremony, 
and youth, like other ages, is a distinct phase in life; in such 
societies, stratification is largely thrcxagh the simple system of 
age-grading, with social status accorded to age. In industrial 
socities, youth has a different meaning. First, it is not a 
clearly-defined stage in an aging process bounded by ceremonial: 
the process to adulthood in industrial society is complex. 
Secondly, since societies such as ours are stratified by social 
class and gender as well as by age status, the transition of the 
young to adulthood in our society depends not only on reaching 
adult age, but also on attaining adult status in terms of social 
and economic activity. The transition thrasgh youth to adulthood 
in Britain is marked not by a status transition ceremony, but by 
gradual gains in status at work and at home. There is no one 
process: of-becoming adult,, " though there are basic elements in the 
processes (such as settling into steady employment, having one's 
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own accommodation and getting married or starting a family); the 
transition to adulthood is modified according to the socialI 
circumstances of the young person involved. In other words, the 
process is differentiated according to class and gender, the 
primary bases of stratification in our society. . 
It is therefore misleading to emphasise the qualities or otherwise 
of "Youth", since the young are neither a homogeneous group nor a 
static one. For the sociology of youth to provide an explanation of 
the situation of the young, these two issues need to be faced. It 
seems, however, that sociologists have failed to do so. 
The following pages describe the "careee' of the sociology of youth 
over the last eighty years, and illuminate a basic problem in the 
concept of youth in sociology: the relative importance of class, 
gender and generation. Is youth incorporated- into the social 
structure through an age stratification system, or through class or 
gender? Over the years, sociologists have argued that youth is 
classless, that youth is a class in itself, and even that youth is 
a meaningless ocncept. Following a similar pattern to other recent 
reviews (Roberts, 1983; Frith, 1984; Griffin, 1986), this chapter 
will clarify both the calceptual confusion about youth, and how the 
ccmfusion has come about. 
Developnent of the Concept of Youth 
It has been said (Aries, 1962) that the first typical adolescent of 
modern times was Wagner's Siegfried, who with his silver horn 
symbolised hope for the future! While it is unlikely that 
Siegfried is in any way typical, even of Victorian youth, it does 
seem that it was this ocnoept of youth-which prevailed by the end 
of the nineteenth century. The period before the First World War 
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saw increasing tension between Britain and Germany, and developing 
nationalism on both sides. It was in a spirit of nationalistic 
fervour that, in response to already existing German youth 
movements, the Bay Scout movement was founded in Britain in 1908. 
Youth became the embodiment of patriotic hope, the 'spirit of the 
age', or 'zeitgeist' in the terminology of the German romantics. 
G. Stanley Hall's seminal work "Adolescence", published in 1904, 
furthered the symbolic significance and preciousness of youth. An 
American, Hall saw the adolescent as analogous with the 
youthfulness of the United States itself: 
In vigour, enthusiasm, and courage we are still young, and our 
faults are those of youth. 
(Hall, 1904=viii). 
He saw youth as a turning point, a perilous age: 
Suggestive of some ancient period of storm and stress when old 
moorings were broken and a higher level attained, 
(Hall, 1904: xviii). 
Couched in the terms of Victorian romanticism, Hall this introduced 
the theme of adolescence as "storm and stress" which was to 
dominate much of the later literature on youth. Describing 
adolescence as "a marvelous new birth", he warned that it was also 
the age "when most vicious careers are begun" (p. 325). The age of 
adolescence was thus both idealised and rendered problematic by 
Hall. The two strands can be seen in the later literature, with on 
the one hand the generation theorists emphasising the "zeitgeist" 
aspect of youth, and cri the other hand the psychologists dwelling 
largely on the ration of "storm and stress". 
For many psydboanalysts, adolescence was a time when instability 
and disruption were to be expected. Anna Freud described 
adolescence in vivid terms: 
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Adolescents are excessively egoistic, regarding themselves as `VI 
the centre of the universe and the sole object of interest, 
and yet at no time in later life are they capable of so much 
self-sacrifice and devotion They form the most passionate 
love relations, only to break them off as abruptly as they 
began them., On the one hand, they throw themselves 
enthusiastically into the life of the community, and on the 
other they have an overpowering longing for solitude. They 
oscillate between blind submission to some self-chosen leader 
and deviant rebellion against any and every authority. They 
are selfish and materially minded and at the same time full of 
lofty idealism. They are ascetic but will suddenly plunge 
into instinctual indulgence of the most primitive character. 
At times, their behaviour to other people is rough and 
inconsiderate, yet they themselves are extremely touchy. Their 
moods veer between light-hearted optimism and the blackest 
pessimism. Sometimes they will work with indefatigable 
enthusiasm and at other times they are sluggish and apathetic. 
(A. Freud, 1937: 149-50). 
The explanation for the contradictory pulls of the "storm and 
stress" period, so persuasively described here by Anna Freud, was 
seen by many to lie in the increase in sexual and aggressive drives 
which followed puberty. For Bios, adolescent instability was 
caused by regression, which he saw as än essential feature of the 
period of adolescence and a threat to the integrity of the 
personality (Blos, 1967: 162-86). Erikson, though he does not 
wholly subscribe to "storm and stress" theory, does describe the 
possibility of "identity diffusicn" occurring in adolescence, when 
the young may become bewildered by their own incapacity to assume 
the role forced by society upon them (Erikson, 1968: 121); hiss 
position is thus very close to the functionalist view of 
socialisation and anomie, which will be discussed below. 
psychoanalysts and psychologists debated the causes of disrupticl 
in adolescence, some seeing the outside world as the root of the 
internal conflicts-of the-adolescent, and others regarding them as 
psychologically or biologically caused phenomena, but most agreed 
cif its existence. _. There were, however, criticisms that the view of V 
adolescence as a period of instability was grossly exaggerated and 
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supported only by the characteristics of the writers' patients, 
(see, for example, Bandura, 1959), and these criticisms came to be 
upheld in the sociological literature of the 1960s. 
The first criticism of the "storm and stress" description of"` 
adolescence came from anthropologists. From her study of 
adolescent girls in Samoa, Margaret Mead concluded that adolescence 
was not necessarily a time of turbulence, but that cultural 
conditions made it so: thus while young people in America displayed 
the upheavals described by psychoanalysts, those in Samoa did not 
(Mead, 1943: 187). Similarly, in his later study of the Nuer tribe 
of East Africa, Evans-Pritchard (1951) found the transition to 
manhood to be smoothly achieved by Nuer boys. Reuter compared 
anthropological and sociological accounts of the position of youth 
in industrial and pre-industrial societies, and concluded that: 
In the still existing primary groups where the unified 
attitudes and opinions support the social definitions, 
transition from the child to the adult status seems to be made 
with ease and completeness, 
(Reuter, 1937) 
while in industrial societies, where "there is no consensus on' 
values and no consistency in adult behaviour", a wide range of 
behaviour patterns is open to adolescents, who thus face a 
difficult adjustment problem. According to Reuter, -the situation 
is exacerbated because although the stage of adolescence was 
created in Western society by the education system -and laws 
preventing child labour, "no body of training appropriate to the 
modern need has been developed or utilised", with the result that, 
having created adolescents, industrialised urban society made no 
position for them, and they moved into a "marginal" world, 
(Reuter, 1937: 419-421). 
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Fran these and other studies it might be ccncluded that the "storm 
and stress" approach to adolescence may only be valid in some 
social contexts, and that the adolescent experience may vary 
according to the degree of consensus in a society, its social 
structure or the local meaning of the concept of adolescence. If 
this were the case, then youth could only be understood in its 
historical and social context. 
In the sociological theory of the between-war period, youth was 
seen as a force for change in society. The emphasis was on youth 
framing society, rather than society framing youth "Zeitgeist" had 
its counterpart in Britain after the First World War: youth was 
seen as a force for regeneration and renewal in a devastated and 
depressed world. The war increased generational feeling, leaving 
the troops who had fought in the trenches opposed to the older 
establishment who had not. This feeling of shared experience among 
those who had taken part in the war was described by Vera Brittain 
in her autobiography "Testament of Youth" (1933), and is perhaps a 
feature of all wars. Shared consciousness as a feature of 
generations was also explored in the academic world. 
Sociological interest in youth between the wars was prompted less 
by an interest in the young per se, and more by an interest in the 
development of theories of social change other than Marx's 
explanation of change through class struggle. Following the war 
and the Russian revolution, a gradualist explanation of social 
change was more likely to find favour in the Western world. 
Generation theorists saw the young as the force for change in 
society, presenting only a gentle threat to the established order, 
sirre they were seen at the time to enshrine the norms and values 
of the middle classes. Ortega, the Spanish philosopher, described 
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the generation as "the pivot responsible for the movement of 
historical evolution", (Ortega, 1931: 15). The idealisation of 
youth had resulted in the young generation being seen as a unitary 
force, a homogeneous and classless group. 
Karl Mannheim's essay "The Problem of Generations" written in 1927, 
has had a profound effect on the sociology of youth. Mannheim 
considered the problem of generations, groups of people identified 
as sharing life experiences through being born in a particular age 
and living through particular historical events. He refuted the 
unity of the generaticn, since 
... within each generation 
there can exist a number of 
differentiated antagonistic generation-units 
(Mannheim, 1952: 306). 
With this proviso, he too explained the relationship between 
generation and social change: 
Every age allows to arise (in differently located social 
groups) those ideas and values in which are contained in 
ocndensed form the unrealized and the unfulfilled tendencies 
which represent the needs of each age. These intellectual 
elements then become the explosive material for bursting the 
limits of the existing order, leaving it free to develop in 
the direction of the next order of existence. 
(Mannheim, 1952: 304). 
Mannheim's perspective was Marxist-historicist: the concept of 
generation described an individual's location in society, in a way 
analogous to class, as well as a dynamic for social change. The 
concept was not unitary, however; generations were divided into 
generation-units which could be distinguished socially and 
intellectually from one another. Generational consciousness 
arising out of generation-units, could affect action and attitude 
in the same way as class ccnsciousness. 
According to Maa im: 
The generation unit represents a much more cczxzete bond than 
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the actual generation as such. Youth experiencing the same' 
concrete historical problems may be said to be part of the 
same actual generation; while those groups within the same 
actual generation which work up the material of their common 
experience in different specific ways, constitute separate 
generation units. 
(Mannheim, 1952: 304). 
Generational ccnsciousness was thus not an inevitable ocnsequence 
of belonging to a generation, and the actions of the young cannot 
be explained exclusively in terms of their generational context. 
It is through the understanding of the generational unit and its 
specific location and experience in society that its specific 
respcnses to outside events can be interpreted. 
The Post-War Sociology of YoutJh 
Following the Second World War, the sociology of youth budded and 
in the 1960s it blossomed. During the 1950s the young became more 
visible. Whereas prior to the war "adolescence" had been a concept 
largely limited to academics, in the post-war period the young 
asserted their difference from the older generation, who were 
forced to notice. As with the First World War, generational 
differences were heightened between those who had experienced the 
war and those who were too young or too old to have done so. But 
the war was the fore-runner to an explosion of social and 
technological change which further emphasised generational 
differences. Just as the computer society of the present day is 
differentially experienced by the young who are competent and the 
old who are baffled, so the technological advances of the post-war 
society, with the increase in mass communication, contributed to an 
awareness of age differences. The age of the crystal set had given 
way to the age of the television. 
The Education Act of 1944 had perhaps the major impact on the 
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young. With the extension of state secondary education, the period 
of dependence was also extended, and more adolescents were 
ocxigregated into formal institutions. More than any other single 
factor, education has influenced our attitudes to youth through the 
ages; the development of secondary education resulted in the 
institutionalisation of adolescence as a concept. Secondary 
schools "created the pre-conditions for the emergence of a 
specifically 'adolescent society"', (Clarke et al., 1976: 21). The 
increasing expressiveness of youth, made possible by the burgeoning 
fashion, music and leisure industries and the developments in mass 
communication, and stated in a youth style of clothes, speech and 
music, became known as "Youth Culture". J. S. Coleman, in his study 
of high school students in the United States, described the school 
as taking over the "natural processes" of education in the family, 
and setting the adolescent apart from the rest of society, 
(Coleman, 1961). As a result, he says, the adolescent is 
... forced inwards towards 
his own age group. With his 
fellows, he comes to constitute a small society, one that has 
its most important interactions within itself, and maintains 
only a few threads of connections with the outside adult 
society. 
(Coleman, 1961: 3). 
Coleman may have exaggerated the importance of schools in 
segregating the young from adult society, and thus point will be 
discussed below; nevertheless, schools undoubtedly had a major role 
in focusing adolescent experience and providing a forum for the 
development of peer group activities. In consequence, adolescents Li 
became more visible. 
The cericratton war 
The increased visibility of the young and apparent decline in the 
influence of the family gave further credence to generation 
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theorists. Increasingly, though, the emphasis was cri generational 
conflict: far from representing the nation's hopes for the future, 
the young were seen to constitute a threat to the established 
order. 
The suggestion of Margaret Mead and other anthropologists that 
adolescence was a social phenomenon had been taken up by 
contemporary sociologists. Reuter (1937) had developed the notion 
that industrial societies created a disjuncture between childhood 
and adulthood. Studies of youth culture after the war, such as 
that of Riesman (1950), suggested the relative omnipotence of the 
adolescent peer group, and with the appearance of Teds, Rockers, 
Hippies and other youth groups in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
apprehension of the "older generatien" increased. The "generation 
war" had begun. 
The 1960s provided the climate in which theories of generational 
ccnflict could easily take root. We were living, we were told, in 
"The Affluent Society" and class distinctions were said to be 
disappearing. In the words of Harold MacMillan, we had "never had 
it so good". The embou geoisement thesis prevailed. Abrams' study 
of "The Teenage Consumer" in 1959 helped uphold the view of the 
young as affluent and classless. By 1970, some academic writers 
were echoing public opinion with pronouncements that the generation 
war was replacing the class struggle. Friedmann (1971) studied the 
post-war student movements of Europe and occluded that "the great 
divide of today" did not lie between classes or even races, 
... but between an aesthetic awareness and critical, political 
consciousness on one side and a certain obtuseness on the 
other, 
(Friedmann, 1971: 56); 
in other words, the ocnflict was between, the your 's perception of 
the need for change, and the resistance to change of the old. 
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Wilson's study of "The Youth Culture and The Universities" 
confidently stated that: 
The conflict between generations is, today, more pronounced 
than the conflict between races, and, as a source of popular 
disturbances, it has eclipsed the class struggle 
(Wilson, 1970). 
it was the student movements of the late sixties which tipped the 
scales and so appealed to the romantic imaginations of social 
commentators. Even John Rex was persuaded to claim that: 
The power of the British ruling class is being challenged, 
both in defensive and offensive terms, in the seventies. Its 
legitimacy is denied as a new generation of highly educated 
young men and women comes into existence outside the power 
class, bearing its own counter-culture and values. 
(Rex, 1972) 
Since the student movements were predominantly middle class, and 
apparently offered political and social alternatives to the 
existing order, the label Counter Culture was applied to them, and 
since the Marxist explanation of class struggle did not apparently 
explain their revolt against the establishment (to which, after 
all, their parents belonged), alternative explanations were sought. 
Musgrove (1974) suggested that "the Counter Culture is a revolt of 
the messed" and was thus: 
... not a revolutionary 
ideology, but (... ) an exploratory 
curriculum. 
(Musgrove, 1974: 19). 
Studies of radical youth (for example, Bensman, 1973) and of the 
alternative society proposed by hippy communes (Mills, 1973) 
abounded. For some writers, the explanation of the Cxxinter Culture 
lay in the concept of generational class. Among the generation 
theorists, Musgrave saw youth develcping as 
... in effect a 
'social class', a class, relatively independent 
of the stratification system of adults. 
(Musgrove, 1969: 50). 
r1 
v 
18 
Other sociologists reached similar conclusions from quite different 
starting points, since neo-Marxists also adopted the expression 
% bunter culture". Rowntree and Rowntree, for example, argued that 
although the working class were no longer oppressed in the United 
States, there had been a class shifting, and the new oppressed 
classes were "the masses of the backward countries" and "the young 
of the united States", (Rowntree and Rowntree, 1968: 26). 
Friedenberg also considered the young to be oppressed by adult 
society. From a study of adult attitudes to teenagers, he 
concluded that teenage irresponsibility was the result of such 
oppression: "Adolescents", he said, "are among the last social 
groups in the world to be given the full colonial treatment", 
(Friedenberg, 1963: 4). He seems to cOnCur with Musgrove, however, 
is seeing the young as a unitary group: for Friedenberg, 
generational conflict was inevitable, since 
... adolescence is oxriflict - protracted ccnflict - between the individual anti society, 
(Friedenberg, 1973: 116). 
These analyses seem to have been based on a mis-interpretation of 
Mannheim's essay "The Problem of Generations", which though written 
in 1927, did not appear in English translation until 1952. Many of 
the writers of the 1960s were adopting a concept of generational 
unity which was never present in Mannheim's analysis, and had 
returned closer to the concept of "zeitgeist". Perhaps also they 
were confusing the issues of age and generation, as later writers 
were to do. It was in this vein that Charles Reich, in "The 
Greening of America", declared that: 
Always before, young people felt -themselves tied more to their `n 
immediate situations than to a 'generation'. But now, an 
entire culture, including music, clothes and drugs, began to 
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distinguish youth. As it did, the message of consciousness 
went with it. 
(Reich, 1972: 253). 
And as late as 1974, Musgrove continued to insist that the Counter 
Culture was "the pervasive spirit of a new generation", (Musgrove, 
1974: 35). Class issues seem to have been ignored by the generation 
theorists, despite the obvious class differentiation between the 
various youth cultures and despite the growing awareness during the 
1960s, thanks to the work of Titmuss (1958,1962), Goldthorpe et 
al. (1969), and others, that affluence and embourgeoisement were 
largely myths. 
By the late 60s, generational analysis was being increasingly 
criticised, in particular for omitting the question of class 
differences. As Sheila Allen pointed out in an important paper, 
It is not the relations between ages which explain change or"' 
stability in societies, but change in societies which explain 
relations between different ages. 
(Allen, 1973: 53). 
The concept of generation war, deriving out of theories of social 
change and psychoanalytic studies of adolescence, had failed to 
take into account the effect of the social structure on the 
adolescent. 
In the sociology of youth there was growing awareness of the 
relevance of social class. Feuer, a follower of Mannheim, pointed 
out that although the concept of generation was important, 
"generational consciousness (was) not strong enough to bind 
students and workers of the same age", (Feuer, 1969: 33). (Critics 
could argue, however, that this was precisely what did happen when 
students and workers joined in protest in France in May 1968! ). 
Some studies of inter-generational conflict found class differences 
in the nature of the conflict. Hoggart had earlier suggested that 
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inter-generaticnal conflict might occur within those working class 
groups where parental and filial aspirations were at variance. 
(Hoggart, 1957); Pitts had concluded that within middle class 
families, conflict might be expressed particularly in disputes over 
money and leisure time (Pitts, 1961); and Hatch, in a study of 
student protesters, found differences between protesters and their 
oppcnents which were class-related: 
The protesters clearly put greater value on education and 
ideas as ends in themselves, whereas the oppcnents of protest 
were much more likely to see a university education as a means 
towards certain extrinsic ends 
(Hatch, 1972). 
Thus generation conflict where it exists can be differentially 
experienced by members of different social classes. 
Cbntj, m q Soci al i satiai Theory: A Consensus View 
Although the generational conflict theories persisted during the 
1960s, the bulk of sociological work on the young at the time came 
from a more moderate functionalist perspective. The theory of 
primary socialisation, deriving from Durkheim (1956), had 
emphasised the importance of families as "the 'factories' which 
produce human personalities" (Parsons, 1956: 16). Taloott Parsons, 
following Durkheim, saw social change occurring through slow but 
continuous reorganisation of the normative system of society, 
rather than through conflict. Conformity to social norms was seen 
to develop through education, with the family as the principal 
agent: "the central focus of the process of socialisation lies in 
the internalisation of the culture of the society into which the 
child is born" (Parsons, 1956: 17), but for the process to occur, 
according to Parsons it was essential for the child to become 
dependent an its family, at least temporarily. The setting up of 
secondary education threatened the family's role, especially in 
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socialisation, and many writers were commenting on this. According 
to Parsons, however, the family had become more specialised, rather 
than weakened, (Parsons, 1956: 9). 
Eisenstadt brought some of Reuter's earlier arguments into the 
debate, suggesting that in post-industrial societies, primary 
socialisation is inadequate preparation for the change to adult 
status, and a further period of socialisation, outside the family 
and in age-segregated institutions is necessary. Like Reuter, he 
suggests that in consequence the adolescent inhabits a marginal 
world, not integrated into the economic structure, (Eisenstadt, 
1956). The theory of continuous socialisation of the young was 
developed particularly in the writing of Parsons, and later of J. S. 
Coleman. 
It would seem that by setting up age-specific institutions for 
adolescents, such as schools and clubs, the young were becoming 
more and more segregated from adult life (the life for which they 
were supposedly being prepared). Conflict between the young and 
the adult worlds might therefore seem to be inevitable, since: 
Society is cocif=nted no longer with a set of individuals to 
be trained towards adulthood, but with distinct social 
systems, which offer a united front to the overtures made by 
adult society. 
(Coleman, 1961) 
From his study of American high school students, Coleman concluded 
that a distinctive adolescent society existed, with its own sub- 
culture, norms and status system, which diverted the energies of 
the young from the academic goals of the school. If Coleman was 
right, then the differing normative values of the young might 
constitute a threat to the dominant ideology. Increasingly, 
though, the notion of inter-generational conflict was challenged. 
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Berger, in 1963, argued that the distinctive sub-culture of the 
young observed by Coleman was based on normative values which were 
also held by adults; adolescent styles were not self-generated, but 
reflected social processes in the larger parent culture. Berger 
suggests that in deriding young people's emphasis on beauty and 
athleticism as irrelevant to academic accomplishment, Coleman 
failed to see that these "irrelevant" values were also held in the 
adult world. In other words, Coleman failed to understand that"-" 
Youth culture is "rooted in the parental soil" (Berger, 1963: 399). 
Where Coleman suggests that adolescents are segregated from the, 
adult world, he is taking an uncritical view of adult society and 
neglecting the relation of adolescents to it, (Berger, 1963: 400). 
Much the same point was later taken up by Friedenberg. To 
Friedenberg, as to Erikson, the main task of adolescence was the 
development of a stable ego-identity. In his later work "The 
Vanishing Adolescent" (1973), he suggested that the "stormy decade" 
of identity-seeking adolescence was disappearing, because schools 
were prematurely co-opting the young into adult society. In his 
view, schools represent the adult in-training programme aimed at 
producing conformists suited to the "Organisation Society" of 
today: whatever the youth culture, the norms remain those of the 
adult world, and the adults remain in control. 
Increasingly, researchers were finding evidence of the basic 
conformity of youth to the status quo. Bell (1966) and Walsh 
(1970) found that although the younger generation were generally 
seen as permissive, there was considerable convergence between 
their attitudes to sex and those of their parents. Schofield 
(1965) found that the majority of the sample, male and female, 
23 
agreed that the greatest loyalty was to one's family. Fogelman's 
(1976) study of "Britain's Sixteen Year Olds", later confirmed that 
most sixteen year olds held similar views to those of their parents'-- 
and got on well with them. Even political activists, ' according to 
Abrams and Little, were basically conformist: they found the 
perceptions of militant students to be organised in an older- 
established frame of reference, and discovered that young activists 
were likely to have activist parents (Abrams and Little, 1965). 
Nor was militancy inevitable or universal among students, 
particularly in the early 60s: Zweig's study of English University 
students in 1962 found them to be anxious, unadventurous and 
conformist. "They are not angry ytxir men", Zweig tells us: 
The students I interviewed did not strike me as young and 
carefree, on the contrary, they struck me as old, laden with 
respoonsibility, care and worry, with nightmares and horror 
dreams. 
(Zweig, 1963: xiii-v). 
Such findings proliferated, so that by 1973, Parsons was able to 
ccrx 1ude that 
The general crientaticn appears to be, not a basic alienation, 
but an eagerness to learn, to accept higher orders of 
responsibility, and to 'fit', not in the sense of passive 
ocnformity, but in the sense of their readiness to work within 
the system, rather than in basic opposition to it. 
(Parsons, 1973: 50). 
The increasingly visible youth cultures came to be seen not' as 
threats to the social system or the institution of the family, but 
as taking over the role of socialisation agent from the family when 
'primary socialisation' has ended, and acting in conjunction with 
formal institutions, like the school, in this respect. The theory 
of 'continuous socialisation', or socialisation continuing beyond 
the period of childhood and the influence of the-family, " was 
developed by Parsons. Through membership of the school class or 
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peer group, the adolescent: 
Both transcends his familial identification in favour of a 
more independent one and comes to occupy a differentiated 
status within the new system. His personal status is 
inevitably a direct function of the position he achieves, 
primary in the formal school class and secondarily in the 
informal peer group structure. (... ) To an important degree 
this process of differentiation is independent of the socio- 
economic status of his family in the community, which to the 
child is ascribed status. 
(Parsons, 1961: 446). 
Eisenstadt, from his study of formal youth organisations in Israel, 
Germany and the USSR, also concluded that peer groups had a 
socialisation role. Youth groups, he saw, shared many of the 
values of the social strata to which they belonged, though with a 
st crag difference in emphasis. They: 
... evolve a status system of their own, which allocates 
prestige according to their own specific goals and value 
enip basis. 
(Eisenstadt, 1973: 227-30). 
The notion is of status as individually achieved, rather than 
ascribed from family membership. 
The functionalist explanation of the occasionally oppositional 
stance of youth lies in the Durkheimian concept of anomie, 
according to both Parsons and Eisenstadt. Parsci- s described anomie 
as "areas of freedom in which autonomous decision is expected", 
together with lack of guidance where it is needed, or where "the 
individual is subject to conflicting pressures that are impossible 
to fulfill all at once" (Parsons, 1973: 41). For the young, there 
may be role confusion between being expected to act like an adult, 
while being treated like a child; or in the education system, being 
expected to compete while lacking the ability or opportunity to do 
so. In such circumstances, youth cultures might arise with a re- 
integrating function, as further agents of the process of 
socialisaticn and assimilaticn. 
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Although Parsons was attempting in his explanation of youth to 
locate the young in the social system, he shared the failure of the 
generation conflict theorists and the majority of psychologists to 
examine the differential experiences of the young. He tried to 
show the means by which they might be assimilated into the social 
roles of a complicated industrialised society and gave an 
explanation for the protracted nature of youth in such societies, 
but he failed to ac3ciowledge fully the structural constraints which 
might - prevent the youryj from reaching their goals. One difficulty 
for the young might be that, as Alvin Toff ler pointed out in his 
book "Future Shock", in a rapidly-changing world the young might 
find, on reaching adulthood, that the roles for which they were 
socialised no longer exist (Toffler, 1970). This is particularly 
true for many school-leavers today who, socialised into the work 
ethic, find that there are no jobs available for them. In 
functionalist terms, though, failure to achieve implies fault on a 
local rather than structural level. A young person's inability to 
get a job might be blamed on inadequate socialisation. 
The extension of secondary education after the war was later 
followed by a proliferation of social policies relating to youth. 
The setting up of the Youth Service and other leisure or advisory 
services for youth in practice contributed to the 
institutionalisation of the concept of youth as problematic 
(particularly working class youth, for whom the majority of the 
services were designed). Policy-related research, usually intended 
as an evaluation of these services, necessarily took a problem- 
centred approach to the study of youth, sometimes in terms of 
generational conflict, but more frequently adopting (though often 
not explicitly) ccntirwous socialisation theory. 
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The transition from school to work was stressed as an area for 
social concern, and many studies examined this aspect of youth, in 
relation to the effectiveness of the youth services. The work 
focussed on the influence of the home and the school: did they 
prepare the young adequately for the transition to working life, a 
transition which was assumed to be traumatic? Studies of the 
relationship between home, school and work factors, in the 
functionalist vein, include those by Ferguson and Qunniscn (1951), 
Carter (1962) and Douglas (1964), all identifying social class 
factors which might affect achievement at school and the smoothness 
of the transition to work. The failure to make a smooth transition 
was related to inadequate socialisation (Ginzberg, 1951) or the 
level of parental aspiration (Kahl, 1961). Attempts to understand 
the situation of youth in terms of their location in the overall 
social structure were hampered by the lack of a conceptual 
framework for analysis which included social class and other 
structural factors. Failure in socialisation did not, for 
example, explain the discrepancy between job aspirations and 
opportunities noted by Maizels (1970). Research was beginning to 
conclude that occupational choice was not only related to 
aspirations, but was also the product of a differential opportunity 
structure (Roberts, 1968), and there was some evidence of a 
separate youth labour market (Carter, 1975; and more recently, 
Ashton et al., 1982). 
Allen commented in 1968 that: 
The existing work on youth tends to present us with an ever- 
growing list of factors which seem to be influential but 
little or no attempt is made to specify their interrelation. 
(... ) If empirical work is to be relevant, then structural 
relationships must be recognised and some overall model 
developed which specifies these in terms of their hypothesised 
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significance. 
(Allen, 1973: 56-7). 
She criticised both the "crude empiricism" and the "naive 
functionalist approach" of the bulk of existing studies, and went 
on to stress that: 
It is necessary to reject problem-solving perspectives in 
order to carry out an analysis of the causes and ocrsequences 
of interrelations between social groups 
(Allen, 1973: 58). 
Functionalism can be a useful tool for the sociologist seeking to 
understand the existence of social phenomena, but it can also be a 
dangerous weapon when its analysis of the social structure and 
roles within it become crystallised in the mind of the researcher. 
Weber warned against the reification of functionalist concepts 
which are intended to be an explanation of rather than a 
prescription for society (Weber, 1971: 136). There is a constant 
danger that those working with "problem youth" will adopt a'crude 
functionalist perspective, and locate problems in youth rather than 
in the social and economic infra-structure. ' Youth work is 
consequently often directed towards helping the adolescent make a 
harmonious transition into the adult world as defined by the youth 
worker, without regard for the structural realities of unemployment 
and poverty. However, as Sheila Allen points out, the ideological 
and legal contexts of social workers, educationalists and youth 
workers do not bind the sociologist's analysis (Allen, 1973: 58). 
Over the last few years, the sociology of youth has been moving 
increasingly away from a functionalist perspective, of which there 
are now few proponents in Britain, Marsland being the most active, 
(see, for example, Marsland, 1978). 
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The Rediscxwery of Class 
During the 1970s attempts were made to bring class back into the 
sociology of youth as a central concept. The New Wave (Smith, 1981; 
Brake, 1980) theories of sub-cultural analysis were a result of 
these attempts. Drawing initially on a merging of deviancy 
theories of the sixties with a Marxist or neo-Marxist class 
analysis, the New Wave came to dominate the sociology of youth. 
Deviancy theories 
Over the previous decades, deviancy theories had been evolving, 
initially in the United States, as a radical alternative approach 
to that of conventional criminology which had the aim of reforming 
the deviant. The years of the Depression in the United States led 
to an increased concern about crime in the ghetto, and the "Chicago 
School" of sociologists responded by going into the ghettos and 
developing ethnographic methods of enquiry. Whyte's study of 
"Street Corner Society" (1943) was an early example of studies 
which took a social ecology model of deviancy, seeing-deviant acts 
as a function of the relationship between the neighbourhood, the 
family and the young. 
Most of the deviancy perspectives of the 1960s stemmed from a 
functionalist view of society, seeing deviance as the product of 
anomie. Merton (1964) developed Durkheim's definition of anomie 
thus: 
In this same society that proclaims the right, and even the 
duty, of lofty aspirations for all, men do not have equal 
access to the opportunity structure. Social origins do 
variously facillitate or hamper access to the forms of success 
represented by wealth or recognition of substantial power. 
Confronted with contradiction in experience, appreciable 
numbers of people become estranged from a society that 
promises them, in principle, what they are denied in reality. 
(Merton, 1964: 218). 
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Merton, though he stressed the differential access to success, saw 
the criteria for success as shared by all; in other words everyone 
wants the same things, but not ever cne can get them. Where there 
is a discrepancy between aspiration and opportunity, arxxmie occurs. 
A. K. Cohen (1955) criticised Merton's consensual notion of success, 
and suggested instead that motivation for delinquency arose out of 
adolescent status problems. Working class youth brought up in a 
working class culture, face a paradox in the middle class value 
system: socialised to accept middle class values, on growing up 
they are excluded by the opportunity structure from middle class 
success. They consequently resort to a delinquent sub-cultural 
solution, (Cohen, 1955). The location of youth in the class 
structure is therefore critical for the explanation of deviancy. 
11 Social ecology studies in ' Britain seemed to confirm A. K. Cohen's 
view that there was no societal consensus on values. Studies of 
delinquent boys showed that the values of the delinquent sub- 
culture were based on working class norms, arising out of a 
rebellion against an achievement-oriented society (Willmott, 1966); 
Mays' 1954 study of youth in Liverpool Concluded that delinquency 
was: 
... not so much a problem of maladjustment as adjustment to a 
sub-culture which was in conflict with the culture of the city 
as a whole. 
(Mays, 1954: 147). 
The main way in which deviancy theories diverged from the 
functionalist approach was in combining anomie theory with a theory 
of social reaction. Thus deviancy may arise through-anomie, but it 
is through societal reaction that the deviancy is consolidated, 
(Becker, 1963; Young, 1971; S. Cohen, 1973, for example). 
According to the structural-fu cticnalist perspective, youth sub- 
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cultures were the result of the segregation of youth into 
institutions and were therefore produced by the adult world (J. S. 
Coleman, 1961). According to the deviancy theories, youth sub- 
cultures represented the solutions achieved by youth in response to 
structural problems (Downes, 1966). Working class sub-cultures 
could not therefore be adequately explained within a functionalist 
analysis (cf Wadsworth, 1979). It had become necessary to explain 
the class origins of youth sub-cultures, and to see how youth was 
integrated into the social structure by class as well as by age and 
generation. 
The late sixties and early seventies saw an increased political 
awareness among many sociologists. The "New Criminologists", 
Taylor, Young and others, 'not only applied a Maixian perspective to 
deviancy theories, but became politically committed to action and 
practice (Taylor et al., 1973). 
Sub-cultural Studies 
It was in this climate that the "New Wave" sociology of youth sub- 
cultures developed out of the Naticnal Deviancy Conference debates. 
The movement, emanating largely from the Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies (OGYS) at B rmingham University, and the work of 
Murdock and his colleagues-at Leicester University, came to 
dominate the sociology of youth, although there were many areas of 
disagreement within it (Smith, 1981). 
Empirical work was limited to studies of sub-cultural youth groups 
with "reasonably tight boundaries, distinctive shapes, which have 
cohered around particular activities, focal concerns and 
territorial- spaces", (Clarke et al., 1976: 14), and within this 
brief, they were principally concerned with ephemeral (and thus 
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less commercialised) styles. The focus was narrow, to look at 
youth sub-cultures as responses to different class constraints cn 
young people who are trying to express their independence. 
Examples of empirical work are to be seen in the studies by Willis 
(1977 and 1978), which looked at how working class culture was 
regenerated in sub-cultural groups "representing for us the most 
durable, extreme creative variants of these class cultures within 
the youth-cultural mode" (Willis, 1978: 8); and in the work of Frith 
(1978) and Marsh (1978), though there are many others. 
Perhaps the most influential work was that of Paul Willis, whose 
book "Learning to Labour" (1977) looked at the question of class 
reproduction, examining why working class boys obtain working class 
jobs. Willis argues in this bock that occupational choice is not 
the issue; instead, a sense of manual labour power, and a decision 
to apply it to manual work, is produced in the workirxg class sc =l 
culture: 
It is their own culture which most effectively prepares some 
working class lads for the manual giving of their labour 
power. 
(Willis, 1977: 3). 
According to Willis, it is class culture which mediates patterns of 
success and failure, makes manual labour acceptable, and ensures 
the oontinuation of working class identity. 
The main achievements of the New Wave have been in the development 
of cultural analysis, through the study of closely-defined groups. 
According to their analysis, there is no such thing as a "Youth 
Culture", standing in direct relation with the dominant culture of 
society. Instead they describe a system whereby youth sub-cultures 
are articulated to the dominant culture via their own particular 
parent culture. Since classes are the most fundamental groups in 
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modern society, 
the major cultural configurations will be, in a fundamental 
though often mediated way, 'class cultures', 
and so youth sub-cultures co-exist within 
the more inclusive culture of the class from which they 
spring. 
(Clarke et al., 1976: 13). 
Clarke explains the relationship between youth sub-cultures, class 
and problem-solving behaviour thus: 
The young inherit a cultural orientation from their parents 
towards a "problematic" common to the class as a whole, which 
is likely to weight, shape and signify the meanings they then 
attach to different areas of their social life. 
(Clarke et al., 1976: 13). 
Far from being cut off from society, as the functionalists had 
suggested, the young are very much part of the social system, 
since: 
(... ) through the insistent mediation of the family, the 
neighbourhood and the school class inequalities penetrate 
deeply into their everyday lives, structuring both their 
social experience, and their respcnse to it. 
(Murdock and Mccr , 1976: 18). 
The position also varies from that of Phil Cohen (1972), who, 
Clarke argues, 
(... ) by concentrating on the imaginary, ideological relation 
in which sub-cultures stand to the life of a class (... ) may 
(... ) have gone too far in the direction of reading sub- 
cultures ideologically, 
so that insufficient account is taken of the 
(... ) material, economic and social coryditions specific to the 
'sub-cultural solution' 
(Clarke, 1976: 33). 
According to Clarke, the post-war sub-cultures have represented 
only symbolic resolution of their class problematics, rather than 
any real negotiation: 
They 'solve', but in an imaginary way, problems which at the 
ccx c cete material level remain unresolved. 
(Clarke, 1976: 47-8). 
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There is, however, disagreement within the New Wave regarding the 
degree of emphasis which should be placed on 'problem resolution' 
on the one bard and 'class' on the other. Murdock and Mccrcn place 
more emphasis on sub-cultural solutions than does Clarke. ` 
Dick Hebdige's study "Subculture: the Meaning of Style" (1979) sees 
sub-cultural style as an oblique challenge to cultural hegemony 
(which requires the consent of the dominated classes, according to 
Gramsci, 1971). The sub-cultural challenge is at the level of 
signs, rather than explicit, and thus does little to alter the 
social structure, so that subordination continues. Sub-cultural 
styles, such as the wearing of safety-pins and razor blades by 
Punks in the early 80s, are signs-of resistance. 
Style in subculture is, then, pregnant with significance. Its 
transformations go 'against nature', interrupting the process 
of 'normalisation'. As such, they are gestures, movements 
towards a speech which offends the 'silent majority', which 
challenges the principle of unity and cohesion, which 
contradicts the myth of consensus. 
(Hebdige, 1979: 18). 
In studying youth sub-cultures and uncovering the hidden meanings 
of such signs, the sociologist is therefore, according to Hebdige, 
destroying the object of his study, (p. 140). 
Corrigan's 1979 analysis of the relationship between deviant 
behaviour and secondary education, "Schooling the Smash Street 
Kids", has produced a more conventionally Marxist explanation of, 
deviant behaviour. Failing to find evidence to support Willis's 
theory of cultural reproduction, Corrigan concludes that far from 
expectations of job satisfaction or career trajectory, 
Instead we see what has been described as the instrumental 
working-class attitude to work, or alternatively the 
expectation of alienated labour. 
(Q-urigan, 1979: 80). 
The actions of the young, according to Corrigan, cannot be 
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understood as a rejection of or an attack upon 'middle class 
values'; but are instead a consistent reacticn to the use of power 
by teachers and by the state in the form of law (p. 142). The 
emphasis is thus cn the power relations in capitalist society, with 
the social relationships of exploitation and domination continuing 
because of a lack of class consciousness, or awareness of 
subordination, and a preoccupation with local, short-term and 
instrumental factors. 
Jenkins' (1983) study of youth in Northern Ireland has introduced 
the issue of power relations into subcultural analysis, criticising 
Willis's "Learning to Labour" for overestimating the degree to 
which the working class colludes in its own domination. Jenkins 
sLxmests that: 
It would be completely misleading (... ) to ignore the 
axiomatic acceptance by much of the working class of the 
taken-for-granted legitimacy of their class position. One of 
the central issues which must be grasped in the analysis of 
cultural reproduction is the manner in which power may be 
mobilised and legitimated simultaneously in consensus and 
legitimation, on the one hand, and resistance, coercion and 
grudging accomodaticn, on the other. 
(Jenkins, 1983: 7). 
Jenkins attempts to examine cultural reproduction without recourse 
to the determinism of which he accuses Willis, and he sees class 
identity as reproduced as much through labelling decisions in the 
institutions of education, social control and the labour market, as 
within the working class itself. 
In many respects, the New Wave concurs with the traditional 
sociology of youth The OOCS see youth cultures as oppositional, 
just as generation conflict theorists did, trough they interpret it 
differently. They see youth sub-cultures as the response to a 
class problematic which they describe in much the same way as 
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earlier writers described anomie (the discrepancy between 
aspiration and opportunity, the contradictory expectations and 
rules of adult society). They similarly see with sub-cultures as 
means of resolving frustrations. The main difference between the 
functionalist and the New Wave perspectives is that of emphasis: 
should youth be seen to be linked to the social structure through 
generation or through class? 
The New Wave clearly and unequivocally emphasise integraticn into 
the social system through class. Hall and his colleagues 
vehemently argued against what they saw as the functionalist 
"obsetsion" with age as the most significant factor of social 
stratification (Hall et al., 1976b: 17). Disputing the suggestion 
by Havighurst and Dreyer (1975) that youth is a stage in life, they 
argue, or attempt to argue, that "there can be no sociology of 
, 
drim 
-... groups (... ) ' differently positioned in - the society by 
virtue of their class, race or sex, experience very different 
types of youth in their trajectory to adulthood (and to very 
different adulthoods at that). 
(Hall et al., 1976b: 19) 
They go an to insist that 
Youth as a concept is unthinkable. Even youth as a social 
category does not make much empirical sense. 
(P. 19). 
Yet somehow their assertion that 
For different class based groups, 'youth' occurs at different 
stages, has different meanings, happens in different 
institutional locations, is experienced through the use of 
different sets of cultural resources and has different 
consequences 
(P. 19), 
sounds-very much like an echo of Mannheims's argument for the 
existence of generation-units described earlier. Structural 
cauplexity has never been an argument for the abarxkocunent of study. 
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There have been a number of criticisms of the New Wave sociology, 
mainly relating to conceptual problems. Marsland and Hunter offer 
a functionalist criticism of Hall's 1976 paper, quoted above, 
criticising the CCCS for its "over-compensation for earlier 
weakness in the analysis of youth". In seeking to bring class into 
the analysis, they have not given due attention to age and 
generation. The assertions of Hall and his colleagues, Marsland 
and Hunter say, 
Seem to us to represent an account of youth which is 
constrained to deny falsely the significance of one set of 
farces in social life - the psycho-social forces organised in 
the age system, out of fear that their recognition may 
challenge the determinative pre-eminence of another set of 
such forces - those of class. 
(Marsland and Hunter, 1976: 10). 
Among to Marsland, both Havighurst and Eisenstadt had dorre no, 
more that produce a programme for incorporating age, and therefore 
youth, coherently into sociological analysis, and he warns against 
the danger of ignoring the concept of youth as part of an aging 
process, since it is necessary to conceive of youth as a period of 
transition in order to understand its nature. 
Smith (1981) posits other criticisms of the COOS work. Firstly, he 
says, the CCCS in identifying ephemeral types of youth style are 
bound to answer the question why some young people adopt these 
styles and others do not. As Murdock and McCron have themselves 
said: 
The problem is not only to explain why styles such as the mods 
or the skinheads developed within particular class strata at 
the times and in the forms they did, but also to explain why 
adolescents in essentially the same basic location adopted 
other modes of negotiation and resoluticn. 
(Mar ck and McCron, 1976: 25). 
So far, they have not answered this question, and have not 
differentiated between members of sub-cultures and conventional 
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youth other than in the form of expression. Furthermore, as Smith 
says, they have not explained why working class culture can produce 
such a variety of distinctive, even competing, youth styles. Nor 
(and perhaps most importantly) have they explained the difference 
in response of the young and of adults, to what they have described 
as a class problematic. 
This area of their work is indeed confusing, since despite Hall's 
refutation of the concept of youth, the CCCS explanation of the 
difference between youth and adult responses lies in the 
"specifically generational experience of the young" (Clarke et al., 
1976: 49). Smith criticises the CCCS for a conceptual confusion 
over age and generation, which he suggests they use 
interchangeably. His argument is that they are really referring to 
generation in the sense of "age status", a stage which is passed 
through, rather than in the sense of "cohort", which is a life-time 
characteristic, bounded by time. 
The CCCS are not, in any case, united in their views on age. 
Murdock and McCron acknowledge that 
Clearly age is an important factor in structuring the social 
situation of young people. Some experiences (... ) are youth 
specific. (... ) It is not therefore a question of simply 
substituting class for age at the centre of analyses, but of 
examining the relations between class and age, and more 
particularly the way in which age acts as a mediator of class. 
(Murdock and McCrcn, 1976: 10). 
There is, however, a further conceptual difficulty in the work of 
the CCCS, and that is with regard to the concept of class. The 
approach claims to be Marxist, in so far as youth sub-cultures are 
seen as the expression of class consciousness in a capitalist 
society. Brake (1980) in his study of "The Sociology of Youth 
Culture and Youth Sub-cultures", which provides a useful discussion 
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of the work of the CCCS, attempts to explain their application of a 
Marxist framework to the sociology of youth, but admits that "class 
is itself a problematic area empirically" (Brake, 1980: 67). Smith 
points out that a Marxist analysis requires us to understand 
society in terms of the relation to the means of production (Smith, 
1981: 246). These arguments are in fact echoes of an earlier debate 
between the New Criminologists and their critics; when the 
legitimacy of the Marxist analysis of Taylor, Young and others was 
challenged by Paul Hirst, who argued that 
There is no "Marxist theory of deviance", either in existence, 
or which can be developed within orthodox Marxism, 
(Hirst, 1973: 204) 
since the objects of Marxist theory are specified by its own 
concepts (the means of production, the class struggle and so on) 
and to Marx, the thief (for example) was an economic parasite on 
the capitalist system, rather than a political rebel. 
The New Wave has not really addressed these conceptual problems, 
and, given their methodology, this is not surprising. By focusing 
so narrowly on ephemeral styles, they have both avoided facing, and 
succeeded in hiding, many of the conceptual difficulties relating 
to class and generation. Their work has predominantly been'in the 
form of descriptive study of small groups, and-the work they have 
drawn on in their critical analyses has been that of Gramsci 
(1971), rather than Marx or Mannheim. 
Murdock and McCron (1976) recognised that the sociology of youth 
sub-cultures should become more comprehensive and include 
previously ignored youth groups and adults; that empirical 
examination was needed of the work and non-work contexts through 
which class inequalities are mediated into everyday experience; and 
that a macro level of analysis was needed, in the form of a 
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structural and historical analysis of the relations between shifts 
in the social and cultural position of youth and changes in the 
structure of class relations and class-based meaning systems 
(Murdock and McCron, 1976). 
The "New Wave" sociology of youth sub-cultures has made an 
important contribution to the sociology of youth, but the emphasis 
needs to be broadened once more. 
Youth can be Female: The Re-introduction of Gamer 
The proverbial alien sociologist might be forgiven for making the 
assumption, on reading the sociology of youth, that young people 
are male. There is indeed very little evidence in the literature 
for the existence of a female of the species. The 'zeitgeist' of 
the generationalists, the militant student representing 'Counter 
Culture', the Rocker, Ted, Hell's Angel and Punk of youth sub- 1 
cultures, and the 'lads', 'kids' and 'rebels' of sociological 
typologies of youth are all essentially masculine in character. 
Where females exist, they are the pillion passengers, the hangers- 
on, groupies. They are nearly always portrayed as marginal to 
youth cultures, an the fringe of the central issues pertaining to 
youth. In short, youth appears to be the prerogative of males. 
In studies of sub-cultural styles, it is generally the masculinity 
of the style which is stressed. Thus Hell's Angels or Rockers are 
described as sexually aggressive, and the female members of such 
sub-cultural forms are represented as subordinate to the sexual and 
status needs of their partners or the group. Studies of Hippies, 
as Angela McRobbie has pointed out, describe the female Hippy as 
'Earth Mother' or 'Pre-Raphaelite lady', thus furthering the 
stereotyping of gender roles, (McRobbie and Garber, 1976). It is 
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clear from reading "Learning to Labour" (Willis, 1977), that the 
masculinity of the counter-school culture is stressed and indeed 
forms the basis for the validation of manual labour; but the 
masculine imagery is so extensive that one begins to question the 
impartiality of the researcher. In such a sexist climate, girls are 
"naturally" dismissed. 
In recent years, gender roles seem to have become less stereotyped 
in youth sub-cultures. While early Punk, for example, was built 
around a theme of sado-masochism, oppression and bondage, it is 
nowadays as likely for youth style to emphasise sexual ambiguity 
(as represented for example by Boy George) as aggressive 
masculinity. Even in the 1970s this had occurred, with David Bowie 
as the most enigmatic exponent. But then, as now, the masculine 
emphasis of students of youth sub-cultures handicapped their 
ability to deal with such phenomena. They accepted a patriarchal 
view of youth cultures, and thus largely avoided the issues of 
gender, non-masculine style and ambivalent sexuality. (See Brake, 
1980, for a fuller discussion of this theme). Their analysis did 
not allow for a study of the position of girls in sub-cultures, and 
girls were therefore relegated to the margins of youth society. 
It would seem that sociologists have relegated young women to a 
level of invisibility which may not be justified empirically. The 
question put by McRobbie arnd Garber is: 
Are girls, in fact, for reasons which we could discover, 
really not active or present in youth sub-cultures? Or has 
something in the way this kind of research is done rendered 
them invisible? 
(McRobbie and Garber, 1976: 209). 
Angela McRobbie has effectively taken up the cudgel on behalf of 
feminist sociology arxd exposed the male bias of the oGCS and other 
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work on youth sub-cultures. At the same time she has made her own 
studies of female youth, from a feminist perspective. 
According to McRobbie and Garber, 'girls retreat from male 
researchers, who may reproduce their own chauvinism in their 
studies of male sub-cultures. In some respects, girls are rendered 
invisible by the researcher: the marginalisation of female youth 
therefore reflects male researcher bias. There is, however, some 
justification for claiming that girls are absent from sub-cultures. 
Girls have less access to sub-cultural activity: they earn less 
money, they are more home-centred, and when they do become involved 
in sub-cultures, they run more risk - that of getting pregnant. 
Girls are not only home-centred in terms of-their future 
orientaticns and preparaticn for the roles of wife and mother (as 
research by, for example, Joseph, 1961 and mast and Pro*it, 
1980, has shown), but their leisure activity is also more likely to 
be based on the home rather than on the streets. Thus while girls 
may be peripheral to street culture, they are central to the 
culture of the home. Typical of girls' activity is the "culture of 
the bedroom", a phrase first coined by McRobbie and Garber, but 
later taken up and used, if not abused, by many others. 
If "bedroom culture" is an important aspect of female youth 
activity, 
It may, then, be a matter, not of the absence or presence of 
girls in the sub-cultures, but of a whole alternative network 
of responses and activities through which girls negotiate 
their relation to the sub-cultures or even make positive moves 
away from the sub-cultural option. 
(McRobbie and Garber, 1976: 216). 
In a later study of teenage girls, McRobbie develops the notion of 
an alternative female response, which though invisible to male 
researchers, nevertheless exists. Bedroom culture, consisting of 
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exclusive best friend relationships, "feminine" concern with 
fashion, beauty and learning the latest dances, and the "Ideology 
of Romance" on which it is based, is the female equivalent of the 
masculine ideology of male youth. Just as the emphasis on, 
masculinity serves to validate manual labour for boys, so the 
emphasis on femininity serves to validate for girls their future 
lives as wives and mothers. 
Marriage, family life, fashion and beauty all contribute 
massively to this feminine anti-school culture and, in doing 
so, nicely illustrate the contradictions inherent is so-called 
oppositional activies. Are the girls in the end not doing 
exactly what is required of them - and if this is the case, 
then could it not be convincingly argued that it is their own 
culture which itself is the most effective agent of social 
control for girls, pushing them into compliance with that role 
which a whole range of institutions in capitalist society 
also, but less effectively, directs them towards? 
(McRobbie, 1978: 104). 
All girls are subjected to the ideology of romance, but there are 
class differences. Just as working class boys are more involved in 
the culture of masculinity, so the culture of femininity tends to 
be more the province of working class girls. McRobbie (1978) 
suggests that middle class girls are less drawn into feminine 
culture, since they tend to spend less time in domestic labour, 
have more money to spend on leisure, and are more likely to be 
steered towards jobs rather than the home. With more outside 
opportunities, middle class girls are likely to be less home- 
centred. 
For working class girls, lacking educational qualifications, 
training possibilities or labour market opportunities, a commitment 
to marriage becomes a necessity rather than a real choice (Leonard, 
1980). The ideology of romance has a function beyond that of 
making the future bearable for schoolgirls. it is therefore not 
43 
restricted to the bedroom or the school-room, as Pollert's (1981) 
study shows. The culture of the shop floor, in a tobacco factory, 
reveals very similar forms of expression of the ideology of 
romance, and shows that its function varies little. Just as 
Willis's boys made 
a creative attempt to make the best of hard and brutalising 
conditions, 
(Willis, 1977: 107) 
so the women in the tobacco factory developed a shop floor culture 
as a creative attempt to overcome boredom: 
The dreams of escape were cushioned in a feminine culture as 
the girls tried to 'feminise' the ruthless atmosphere of the 
production line. Romance permeated the factory. 
(Pollen, 1981: 101) 
The importance of the culture of femininity lay in its secret 
defiance of the patriarchal sexism of the factory supervisors (all 
men) with which the women were forced overtly to collude. Its 
impotence derives from its purely symbolic level. of resistance: it 
remains fragmentary and in reality poses no threat. 
Male researchers have now incorporated the theory of the culture of 
femininity into their research. Stuart Hall has acknowledged that 
the work of the feminist sociologists at the CCCS has "sent 
certainties and orthodoxies back to the drawing board", and has 
agreed with the hitherto feminist view that 
A theory of culture which cannot account for patriarchal 
structures of dominance and oppression is, in the wake of 
feminism, a non-starter. 
(Hall, 1980: 39) 
Recently, following criticisms made of his work by McRobbie (1980), 
Willis has admitted that he 
... did not specify clearly enough the oppression of girls in the male counter school culture 
(Willis, 1981: 67) 
and that he may have been biased as a male researcher sharing with 
his respondents a structure of masculinity. Frith (1978) has 
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incorporated McRobbie's analysis into his "Sociology of Rock". 
The danger though for male researchers is that the notion of 
bedroom culture can become a justification for not examining gentler 
differences in youth sub-cultures. Jenkins (1983) set out to study 
boys and girls in a Northern Ireland township, but finding girls 
"unreachable" because so much of their conversation took place in 
exclusively female environments, such as toilets, his analysis 
became virtually restricted to boys. Jenkins' typology of youth 
inevitably reflects the limitations of his research - he calls them 
"Lads, Citizens and Ordinary Kids" - but how much does it really 
tell us about youth'as a whole? Jenkins' analysis once again 
relegates girls to peripheral roles. 
To feminist sociologists such as McRobbie, the culture of the 
bedroom and the ideology of romance suggest that girls are not 
marginal to male youth sub-cultures, but are in a structurally 
different position as a result of the dominant male ideology. 
Gender differences in youth reflect inequalities in society as a 
whole, and in the institutions of society such as the family and 
the school. 
Rosemary Deem's (1980) study "Women, Work and Schoolir4' looked at 
differences in the educational experience of boys and girls and 
ccricluded that 
It is clear (... ) that the reproduction in schooling of gender 
categories, of class, of the sexual division of labour, or the 
relations of patriarchy, plays a significant part in the 
maintenance of the subordinate position of women in our 
society, whether in paid work, public life or the family. 
(Deem, 1980: 11) 
Deem makes an important and clear distinction between the 
oppression of the working class, as a product of capitalism, and 
the oppression of women, which results from a pre-existent ideology 
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of patriarchy. 
The sub-cultural studies of the 1970s which celebrated the 
masculinity of the male working class were therefore also 
celebrating the patriarchal status quo. It is small wonder that 
girls were made invisible by male researchers, or that it has been 
the role of female sociologists to make them visible again. How 
true, though, is the view that female activity takes place in the 
bedroom rather than on the street, and that female friendship is 
exclusive and passive? 
Female delinquency has generally been described in sexual terms. 
While male delinquents fight and steal, girls who are delinquent 
are more usually seen as sexually promiscuous. Crime figures strew 
that girls do become involved in the same kinds of offences as 
boys, including burglary, and may be more involved than boys in 
offences such as theft and fraud (Social Trends 13,1983: 192). 
Feminist sociologists have dorre little to explain female deviance. 
Anne Campbell, in her 1981 study of "Girl Delinquents", suggests 
that there is a need to review feminist assumptions, so that 
delinquency can be seen as a social phenomenon, rather than an 
exclusively male activity. She points out that female sociologists 
have failed to apply relevant theories about males to the situation 
of females: 
Dizzy with monomania, women become obsessed with their total 
uniqueness -their alienation, their frustration, their 
powerlessness. 
(Campbell, 1981: 1) 
Thus, by emphasising Patriarchal oppxessicn, feminists fail to see 
women as victims of the whole eoo omic system, seeing them only as 
the victims of men. Female delirx ueixy can only be understood from 
the broader viewpoint. 
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It sounds, from an article published in 1980, that Angela McRobbie 
agrees that an extreme feminist stance would hinder the 
understanding of female youth cultures. She suggests that the aim 
of feminist sociologists wishing to study female sub-cultures 
should be 
To combine a clear commitment to the analysis of girls' 
culture with a direct engagement of youth culture as it is 
constructed in sociological and cultural studies. 
(McRobbie, 1980: 37) 
It is perhaps in this context that a recent study of young women 
should be seen. Griffin's (1985) study, was based on Willis's 
"Learning to Labour", and examined the way in which young women 
approach adult life and accept the reality of a gender-segregated 
labour market. The study looked at girls in the contexts of both 
work and home, examining the way in which early aspirations and 
career plans were revised or abandoned in the face of the actual 
experience of growing up, and the conflicting pressures on girls to 
get a job and to find a marriage partner. The study is thus 
comparable with Willis's study of the constraints facing male 
school leavers, and highlights gender differences. 
The issue becomes whether female sub-cultures should be seen as a 
response to the same structural class constraints facing males, or 
whether there are real structural differences between the 
situations of men and women. Campbell would appear to favour the 
former view, as most male sociologists have dame, while McRobbie 
proposes the latter. The issue of marginality is complex, but it 
may be that marginality is not an adequate explanation either of 
the situation of girls in youth, or of youth in society. As Powell 
and Clarke pointed out in their attempted exploration of this 
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problem: 
Women do not inhabit a separated and invisible part of the r' 
social formation, but are engaged in exactly the same 
institutional structures as men, but in different relations. 
It is the dominant ideological division between Home and work 
which structures the invisibility of women, and not their real 
absence from the world of work.  
(Powell and Clarke, 1976: 226) 
In the sociology of youth subcultures, there has been a dual lack 
of awareness which has permitted the relegation of women to the 
invisible: cn the aye hand, the emphasis has been on the masculine 
culture of the street scene, with no ccnsideraticn of the male at 
home; on the other hand, the emphasis cn the female culture of the 
bedroom has allowed little room for study of the female peer group. 
In between these two biases, there exists a reality of youth, male 
and female, in the contexts of work, the home and the streets, in a 
relaticn to deviance and conformity, and in a close relation to the 
world of adults to which they will soon belong. 
Youth as Transition 
The 1970s emphasis on male working class sub-cultures has more 
commonly now been extended to include women, and occasionally the 
middle class (see, for example, Griffin, 1985). In recent years, 
the sociology of youth has been undergoing a further change in 
perspective, due largely to two major influences. One has been the 
need in Britain for sociology to examine the social consequences of 
wide-spread youth unemployment, and the other is the recent focus 
in some American sociological research on the life course, 
Research Q the transition to adulthood has been undertaken in the 
United States for some time. In recent years, the life-course 
perspective has gained favour in Britain as well (and was the theme 
of the British Sociological Association Conference in 1986). 
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However, the research in the United States has typically taken a 
functionalist perspective rather than a class one, and differential 
experience of transitions has been put down to "socio-economic 
factors", rather than rooted in a clear framework. 
The work of Modell and his associates, for example, comes within 
this category. They have studied transitions to adulthood in a 
historical framework and examined variability over time, but trough 
they explain that they seek the "determinants of 'social 
timetables"' (timing of life events), they make no attempt to 
understand the relationship between social class, culture and 
economic status and therefore fail to explain in an oanprehensive 
way the differences they have observed. (See, for example, Modell 
and Hareven, 1978; Modell et al., 1976). Other American research 
has suggested that transitions vary in their timing and spacing 
according to factors such as educaticrzal level and gender (Marini, 
1984), factors which, in British sociology, might be associated 
with social class. 
Studies of transitions in Western, rather than "age-set", societies 
clearly show the effect of the social structure on the transition 
Life course transitions are far more than an individual 
matter; they involve an interplay between the individual and 
what he or she oaif=nts as society or the social structure. 
(Fcc x and Kertzer, 1978: 1081) 
Instead it has been the anthropological emphasis on "rites of/1 
passage" which has been applied to most studies of transition, an 
emphasis cn age-relaticns rather than class structure. In Western 
society, there is no one route to adulthood, since elements of the 
transition are likely to be formed in different ways for different 
social groups. 
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During the 1980s, the major emphasis of the sociology of youth in 
Britain has moved back to the study of transitions in youth in 
relation to the labour market This has been partly in respazse to 
the rapid increase in unemployment amcxx3 school leavers, and the 
recent government schemes aimed at keeping young people out of 
unemployment statistics. There are currently numerous studies of 
the effectiveness of the Youth Training Scheme. Alongside these 
policy-related studies, however, there are studies of the 
consequences of unemployment in youth, which focus an the effect 
that extensive unemployment is likely to have on the transitions to 
adulthood of the present young generation. 
This represents a new direction for the sociology of youth. Young 
adults in the period between starting work and family formation 
have previously received little attention. A notable exception has 
been Wallace's work an yong adults in the Isle of Sheppey (1985), 
which almost for the first time has sought to look at both the work 
and home situations of young people as they grow up. Current 
concern about the effects of wide-scale youth unemployment has now 
led to interest in the transitions to adulthood, since it is 
considered that failure to achieve a successful transition into 
work may affect other areas of the lives of young people, in 
particular their patterns of leaving hone and marriage. Hutson and 
Jenkins (1986) and Wallace (1986) have begun to explore the social 
consequences of youth unemployment in this way. 
v 
Research of this kind is handicapped, however, by the lack of any 
wide scale analysis of youth in the social structure. In order to 
understand the effects of unemployment, it is important to 
understand how transitions are achieved in times of high 
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employment; in order to understand the transitions to adulthood of 
the working class, it is important to study middle class 
transitions. 
Clonclusims 
It would seem that, despite its name, the Sociology of Youth has 
not so far provided an adequate explanation of youth. With its 
continuing emphasis on the problematic aspects of youth, it has 
failed to examine the circumstances of those young people who are 
not seen as problems, or those aspects of youth which might be 
related to a 'normal' transition process rather than an inability 
to adjust. The functionalist approach to youth provides a 
theoretical framework for the study of the trajectory from 
childhood to adulthood, but fails to examine the structural aspects 
of the transition. The New Wave sociology of youth sub-cultures 
attempts to examine the articulation between the sub-culture and 
the social structure through class, but fails to account for female 
or conventional youth, or allow more than a superficial 
acknowledgement of the existence of an aging process in youth. 
What is youth? Any answer to this question must explain the way in 
which the young achieve adult status in our society, must explain 
the experiences of all young people in the process of achievement, 
and must account for the ways in which the process varies. It is 
after all the process of becoming adult which is central to the 
concept of youth, as most sociologists would agree, and it is thus 
only by first seeing what the process entails in practice that 
later theoretical extrapolations can be made. If we wish to 
understand the extent to which gender, class and age mediate the 
social experience of the young, we must define what the social 
experience of the young is, and so far this has not been dare. 
51 
secondly, it is necessary to locate youth in the social structure, 
through an analysis of stratification in youth. The following 
chapters are intended to fufill this aim, to produce a model of 
stratification in youth and use this to examine the transition to 
adult status. In order to achieve this aim, it will be necessary to 
look beyond the literature of the sociology of youth, to studies of 
class and social mobility, which can help provide a framework for 
analysis; then to draw on studies of specific aspects of 
transition, in employment, in family formation and in housing, 
which will inform on the complexity of the transition to adulthood, 
the many elements involved, and the ways in which they may inter- 
relate. 
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Qiapber 3 
Research Matlxx logy 
Research Design 
It has been noted that previous studies of youth have frequently 
been problem-centred or based cri youth sub-groups. Such studies do 
not have to find a sample which is representative of the whole 
youth population: a study of youth unemployment may need only to be 
representative of a group of young unemployed, while a study of a 
street corner gang will have no need for random sampling methods. 
The present study, however, aims to produce a description of the 
process of youth which is generalisable to the whole youth 
population in Britain, so the sample must be representative, and 
also large enough for an analysis of the heterogeneity of youth. 
Such a study requires large scale survey analysis. 
The research involves secondary analysis of two large data sets, 
the General Household Survey (GHS) and the National Child 
Development Study (NODS), in an empirical study of the transitions 
to adulthood of young people in Britain. Findings from previous 
studies, many of them qualitative, help to interpret the data, and 
allow the study to offer explanations as well as descriptions. _0 
Secondary Analysis 
Traditional British sociology has often been resistant to the idea 
of large scale quantitative work, and the bulk of work which 
comprises the sociology of youth is small scale and qualitative. 
There appears to be an emphasis among many of those who research 
aspects of youth that it essential to "get one's hands dirty", 
through direct and personal involvement with the subjects under 
study. sociologists have traditionally valued qualitative oocx: epts 
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higher than statistics: 
Unlike traditional economics which takes the world as 'given' 
and unquestioningly. accepts that officially collected 
statistics-cn, for instance, QNP can give a true picture of a 
nation's wealth, sociologists have sought to question both the 
basis on which data are collected and also the meanings which 
can be attributed to data. 
(Dale et al., 1984: 1) 
The argument is that survey research presents the world as "facts", 
which are then interpreted as reality without any awareness of the 
context in which the data were collected or the meaning of the 
questions to the individual respondent. The researcher will 
probably have had little experience of administering the 
questionnaire and therefore no awareness of the different 
interpretations and constructions of the questions in it. Social 
construction of the meaning of words is thus lost. So have the 
data any meaning in the abstract, when they are distanced from the 
point of collection? 
Secondary analysis is even more distanced from the subjects and the 
design and administration of the questionnaire. It has been 
defined thus: 
Secondary analysis is any further analysis of an existing 
*dataset which presents interpretations, conclusions, or 
knowledge additional to, or different fron, those presented in 
the first report on the enquiry as a whole and its main 
results. 
(Hakim, 1982: 1) 
In addition to the arguments levelled against survey analysis in 
general, some particular criticisms have been levelled at secondary 
analysis. Sine the secorr3aiy analyst has no control aver the way 
in which the data are collected, it is argued that the data is 
likely to control the research questicn, rather than the research 
problem framing the data. It is certainly true that the researcher 
can be handicapped by the coding and phrasing of the questions, and 
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whether questions are asked at all. These problems do not, 
however, argue against secondary analysis, but rather show its 
limitations. 
Secondary analysts of large scale data sets need to recognise 
the constraints imposed by their data and to ensure that the 
questions which they ask of the data are appropriate to its 
nature. 
(Dale, et al., 1984: 8) 
In other words, the secondary analyst must make the best of what is 
available, while the qualitative researcher can obtain data more 
closely suited to the original research problem. Both experience 
constraints: the qualitative researcher is faced with the problem 
of limiting the data, while the quantitative researcher faces the 
problem of expanding it and making imaginative use of what is 
available. 
Nor is it only a question of overcoming the constraints of a pre- 
existent data set. seoaydary analysis has positive advantages, in 
allowing the analysis of individuals in their social context: 
... secondary analysis helps researchers to overcome the narrow focus on individuals and their characteristics, which is so 
prevalent in much primary analysis of new survey data, in 
favour of a broader ocncern with the socio-economic structure 
and social change. 
(Hakim, 1982: 16) 
An ideal research project might make use of both survey data and 
case studies, so that the disadvantages of both can be overcome, 
and capital can be made of their advantages. Case studies can show 
the meaning to individuals of aspects of the survey questionnaire; 
the survey can locate the small scale research in the social 
structure. Qualitative and quantitative can be usefully combined. 
The present study makes use of existing qualitative research to 
assist in the interpretation of the findings from secondary 
analysis of survey data. The otherwise and findings from 
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quantitative research are thus expanded into a 'story' of the 
transitions to adulthood for different social groups. The 
qualitative work provides possible explanations for phenomena which 
have been shown in terms of numerical patterns. 
Data Sets 
Two cn-going large scale studies, the General Household Survey and 
the National Child Development Study, have been used in the 
research, both fulfilling basic requirements of size of sample, 
representativeness of the population under study, and research 
topics covered. 
1 The General HaIsekxold Survey 
The General Household Survey (Q-IS) is a large multi-purpose survey 
and has enorxmous potential for secondary analysis (Gilbert et al., 
1983; Hakim, 1982). Its use, however, has been limited. In recent 
years the C-IS has become more accessible to analysts, since it has 
been distributed in rectangular form for analysis with SPSS. 
Household level variables have been attached to the individual, 
making it easier to create data subsets of individuals within 
households. 
The GHS is a continuous annual survey based on a sample of the 
general population living in private households in Great Britain. 
Information is gathered throughout the year from around 12,000 
households, by interviews with all household members aged 16 and 
over (OPCS, 1979: 1). Individual level data is obtained from 
household members themselves and not by proxy, and so the respcx ses 
are likely to have a high level of reliability (Gilbert et al. 
1983: 256). The response rate to the GHS was 86% of households in 
1979: this includes partial respcnse, where some information was 
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missing. Non-response would appear not to have a significant 
bias effect for the subgroup iux3er study (OPCS 1979: 7). 
Since the GHS is a survey of people in private households, people 
who do not live in households, and those who do, but do not 
register as electors, will be under-represented. Young people aged 
20-24, movers, and New Commonwealth citizens are less likely to 
register as electors (Butcher and Dodd, 1983: 18). Students living 
in hostels, and those living in penal or therapeutic institutions, 
are excluded from the sample. In 1981 attempts were made to obtain 
proxy information an students from a questionnaire administered at 
their parental home (Gregory and Cardy, 1984), but the 1979 and 
1980 surveys did not include this proxy data. 
The subset of young people obtained from the GHS 
is therefore 
likely to under-represent students and frequent movers, 
but will be 
representative of young workers. The survey 
has other 
disadvantages when it comes to identifying ethnic minority grasps, 
so race and ethnic origin as dimensicns of stratification are not 
covered in this research. 
The GHS has been running since 1973 as a continuous survey, and 
contains an annual sample of approximately 6000 young people aged 
16-29 years, with details of their work, housing, marital and 
parental situations, class of origin and many other areas of their 
lives. The survey is valuable for the present analysis in 
containing a broad range of data, and because it is continuous, 
allowing for aggregation of two consecutive years so that larger 
cell frequencies can be obtained in multi-variate analysis. For 
the research, data from the 1979 and 1980 surveys were combined to 
produce a subset of over 12,000 people aged 16-29. Use of a 
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single year's survey would not have provided a sufficiently large 
sample for analysis. The age range was deliberately broad so that 
transitions to adulthood of those who received an extended 
education could be examined. 
2 'I National Child Development Study 
The National Child Development Study is a lorxjitudinal study of a 
cohort of individuals who were born in the week 3-9 March 1958. It 
began as"a perinatal study of around 17,000 children, and has been 
developed through the years under the aegis of the National 
Children's Bureau, moving in 1986 to its current base at the City 
University. The aims of the study have changed as the cohort has 
grown up, as have methods of data collection. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 3.1: RESPONSE TO THE NODS FOLLOW-UPS 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
COHORT AGE TARGET SAMPLE* SC 1E DATA REFUSED OTHERS WIT=JT 
IN YEARS 
-------------- 
(n=100%) $ $ DATA $ 
----------- 
BIRTH (1958) 
--------------- 
17,773 
------- 
98 
------------------- 
- 2 
7 (1965) 16,883 91 1 8 
11 (1969) 16,835 91 5 4 
16 (1974) 16,915 87 7 6 
20 (1978) 16,906 85 - 15 
23 (1981) 
----------- 
16,457 
--- 
76 7 
----- 
17 
----------- --- 
* 
------------------- 
Number from previous stage plus 
-------------- 
known immigrants, less }mown 
deaths and emigrations 
(Reprinted from Shepherd, 1985: Table 3) 
-------------------------------------- 
The responses to the NC DS follow-ups are shown in Table 3.1. The 
response to the Fourth Sweep in 1981 was 12,537 subjects, 
representing 76-W of the target sample for the sweep. The original 
birth sample has lost subjects because of death and emigration, and 
gained sinne, as immigrants born in the same week were added to the 
cohort. The target sample takes these changes into account 
(Shepherd, 1985). 
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The present study is concerned mainly with data from the Third, 
1974 Sweep, when the cohort were 16 years old and data were 
collected from parents, schools, medical services and the subjects 
themselves, and from the Fourth Sweep, in 1981, when the subjects 
were 23 years of age and data were collected from the subjects 
alone (see Table 3.2). 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.2: NUMBERS OF SURVEY INSTI TS AVAILABLE 
FOR NODS FOLLOW UPS 
COHORT AGE SURVEY INSTRTJ INP/aMER DATA 
IN YEARS Parental Educational 
-------------- 
Medical 
--------- 
Individual 
----------- ----------- 
BIRTH 
---------- 
17,414 - - - 
7 14,746 15,414 14,398 - 
11 13,879 14,205 13,207 13,865 
16 11,691 12,762 11,675 12,098 
20 - 14,370 - - 
23 - - - 
12,537 
(Reprinted from Shepherd, 1985: Table 4) 
--------------------------------------- 
One advantage of a longitudinal cohort study is that some 
characteristics of non-responders can be traced from the earlier 
data, and the representativeness of the current response can 
therefore be ascertained. Table 3.3 shows the bias that has 
resulted from loss of 24% of the target sample in 1981. Attrition 
has affected mainly those of low social class background, poor 
housing background, and low educational achievement (Iyer, 1984). 
The NODS Fourth Sweep in 1981 has information on many of the 
subject areas of the QiS and was designed to be compatible with it. 
Areas of particular interest are retrospective data on employment 
and housing histories. Some information about the family of origin 
is available from the Third Sweep when the respondent was 16 and 
likely to be living in the parental home, as is some information 
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about the household in which the subject is living at 23 years. 
Unlike the GHS, the NCDS is based on the individual and not the 
hansehold, and young people living in institutions, including those 
in hostels, hospitals and prisons, are included in the cohort. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.3: ANALYSIS OF RESP(JSE TO NmS4 ON ICY VARIABLES 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
VARIABLE TARGET ACHIEVED BIAS 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
VALE SEX 51.5 50.1 -2.7% 
ETHNIC CROUP (Assessed by Eye) 
Caucasian 97.9 98.5 
Afro-Caribbean 1.1 0.7 -36.4% 
Irxiian/Pakistani 0.7 0.5 -28.6% 
Other Asian 0.1 0.1 
Other 0.2 0.2 
FATHER'S RG SOCIAL CLASS at age 16 
Non-manual 33.7 34.8 +3.3% 
Manual 58.8 58.5 -0.5% 
TENURE at age 16 
Owner-oc pied 49.7 51.3 +3.2% 
Public rented 41.0 40.0 -2.49 
Private rented 5.3 4.8 -9.4% 
Other 4.1 3.9 -4.9% 
Also tr er-represented: 
Low achievement groups 
Physically and mentally handicapped 
People with origins in lower social classes 
People brought up in poor housing conditions 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
NOT S: 
Target population = original sample - loss due to death/emigration 
achieved %- target % 
Bias = --------------------- X 100 
target % 
(Derived frrm Iyer, 1984) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Qxit1 ned use of the data sets 
As Hakim (1982) suggests, it is possible, where definitions and 
classifications are compatible, to combine the use of two data 
sets, so that the limitations of the one are overcome by 
supplementing it with data from another. The NCAS Fourth Sweep was 
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designed to be compatible as far as possible with the G HS and many 
of the questions are phrased and coded in the same way. 
The advantage of making use of both data sets for this analysis 
lies in the scope of the GHS to provide a cross-sectional picture 
of respc dents in an age ocntext, allowing age comparisons within 
the 16-29 age range, while the NCDS provides more information on 
individual transitions up to the age of 23. The transitions to 
adulthood cannot be completely studied with the NCDS as so many are 
still incomplete at the age of 23; the CHS can thus help by placing 
the findings from the NC)S in the ccntext of a wider age range. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.4: ABORT AND QUASI-CXHORT ANILYSIS 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
AGES 
IN YEARS 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
CHS Sample 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 - 
17 17 17 17 17 17 - 
18 18 18 18 18 - 
19 19 ' 19 19 - 
20 20 20 - 
21 21 - 
22 - 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
rS art 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
WIES : 
The 1980 GHS sample is represented by the bold vertical line 
stowing the cross-secticnal age cairpositicn. 
The bold diagonal line stows the years in which 22 year olds in the 
1980 survey reached other ages. 
when age comparisons in the G HS are Compared with the actual cohort 
data in the NCDS, the diagonal line is being compared with the 
horizontal line representing the I DS cohort. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 3.4 shows how the two samples are drawn. The GHS 1980 sample 
contains information about people of different ages from 16 to 29 
years, represented in the vertical line in bold type, collected at 
one point in time (the survey date). The NODS contains information 
gathered as the cohort becomes older in historical time and this is 
shown in the horizontal line at the bottom of the figure. Thus, 
the NODS cohort were all 16 in 1974, and are all 23 in 1981. 
Similarly, people in the GHS who will be 23 in 1981 were 16 in 
1974, but people at other ages were 16 in different years. 
A study of transitions to adulthood using only the NCDS would, 
until any subsequent Sweep takes place, be only a partial exercise, 
since family formation, for example, only begins in the early 
twenties. The GHS can be used to build a hypothetical picture of 
transitions over a longer period, through age comparisons at one 
point in time; the hypotheses thus derived can then provide a 
framework within which to examine transitions up to the age of 23, 
with the S. The methodological problems are discussed below. 
Problems of Time Trend, Gbhooct and Age Effects 
The concept of "generation" formulated by Mannheim (1952) oonfaaids 
the notions of age, time and cohort, by referring to people born at 
a particular time who grow up in a particular historical context. 
Three concepts are thus combined in the one. On a methodological 
level as well as conceptual level, this causes confusion, as 
Kertzer (1983) has pointed out, suggesting that the concepts at 
least should be disaggregated. The methodological confusion is 
more difficult to solve. 
Life events occur at an intersect between individual time and 
historical time. Table 3.5 shows how this can be represented 
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graphically. The diagcnal "cohort effect" slows life events for a 
particular cohort of individuals. The problem in cd ort analysis 
is that historical and individual time become confused with the 
characteristics of the cohort itself and are inseparable from it. 
Each cohort has a particular life course, in which age and 
historical time have an effect 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 3.5: TIME TREND, aH)I T AND AGE EFFECTS 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
EFFECiS 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
AND AGES 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
16 TIME TREND > 16 
17 
18 
19 I 20 G 
21 E 
2 22 
23 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
In addition to examining the experiences of an actual cohort in the 
Na)s, the analysis makes use of age compariscns in the CGS in order 
to construct a notion of process. Such a study of an aging 
process, using cross-sectional data, raises interesting 
methodological problems. Though the problems endemic in the 
approach have been frequently discussed, age comparisons from 
Gross-sectional data are frequently used to study an aging process. 
The problem is best illustrated thro-O an extreme example: say for 
example, that the attitudes of young, middle aged and elderly 
people were compared and it was surmised from the results (the 
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oldest showing the most conservative attitudes) that a hardening of 
attitudes comes with age. Apart from the possible effect of age on 
attitude, a number of other factors are present, which might be 
overlooked. It is possible that across all sectors of society, 
young and old, there has been a hardening of attitude over the 
years. It is also possible that a particular event, or series of 
events, may have occurred to affect the attitudes of the elderly, 
such as living through a war or the Great Depression of the 
Twenties - events which may have affected this particular cohort of 
elderly people, but not all elderly people always. The hardening 
of attitude which was originally attributed to aging may thus have 
been due to the combined effects of aging, time trend and cohort. 
This example is derived from Gergen and Back's (1966) work on 
disengagement with aging, and later comments questioning the 
validity of cohort analysis using cross-sectional data (Glenn, 
1969; Hyman, 1972). 
In the case of the present research, age groups will be 
considerably smaller than in this extreme example, and will range 
only between 16 and 29 years in the (-is. Nevertheless, the effects 
of time trend, cohort and age will be confounded. For example, 
among 24 year olds in 1980 there may be higher unemployment than 
among 16 year olds eight years before, but this is likely to be 
caused by a general trend towards higher general unemployment, 
rather than the likelihood of unemployment increasing with age. 
The cohort effect may be seen in the numbers of young people in the 
labour market: there are currently more young people available for 
work and this may affect the employment prospects of school leavers 
now more than school leavers ten years ago. On another level, 
social policies affect particular cohorts: for example, YOP and YTS 
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have affected some age cohorts and not others. It is only if 
cohort and time trend effects can be separated out in the analysis 
that effects can be said to be the result of an age process. 
In a purely descriptive study, these problems might not matter. A 
straightforward age oompariscn between proportions of 16,18 and 20 
years olds living in the parental home would be perfectly feasible. 
It is when, on the basis of age comparisons, predictions (such as 
are implicit in the notion of process) are made, that the problem 
occurs. It would therefore not be possible to state purely on the 
basis of age comparisons that a process occurs, since age groups 
are not equivalent in the experience they will have lived through 
by the time they reach a certain age. 
Mason et al. (1973) attempted to disentangle the effect of the 
variables age, cx rt and time trend, but cxrx hided that: 
Age, period and birth cohort are clearly variables which can 
be manipulated only in the statistical sense. Even in this 
sense, however, it is logically impossible to hold constant 
the effects of, say, both age and period and then vary birth 
cohort. 
(Mason et al., 1973: 243) 
It will probably never be possible to separate out the effects of 
age, cohort and time trend, despite statistical attempts to do so. 
Glenn (1976), commenting on Mason et al., called these a "futile 
quest". He goes on: 
Successful cohort analysis depends as much on knowledge of 
theories of aging and of recent history as on technical 
expertise. 
(Glenn, 1976: 903) 
Nevertheless, cross-secticnal studies can be "bent", so that sets 
of descriptions associated with age can be treated as though the 
study were a continuous picture, producing "quasi-longitudinal 
data" (Hyman, 1972). Hyman has described how this might be 
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feasible, with careful use of dependent variables, the use of 
refined age groups, appropriate time sampling, and by ensuring as 
far as possible the equivalence of the age groups by controlling 
for social factors. Any attempt at cohort analysis using cross- 
secticnal data therefore requires a sound theoretical framework and 
careful choice of variables. 
The thesis develops hypotheses from age comparisons in cross- 
sectional data, and then tests them as far as possible with the 
longitudinal data in the NCDS. This allows some check of the 
validity of the findings from the GIS. Findings cannot be expected 
to be identical for the two data sets, however. This is because 
time trend effects are likely to affect the two data sets in 
different ways. For example, school leaving of the NC DS sample 
occurred mainly in 1974; the GIS sample of early school leavers may 
have left school at any time between 1966 (29 year olds in the 1979 
Survey) and 1980 (16 year olds in the 1980 Survey). There has been 
considerable historical change between 1966 and 1980, including an 
increase in unemployment, a change in the school leaving age, and 
various policies (TOPS, YOPS, YTS etc. ) to combat unemployment 
among the young. People at different ages in the GHS will 
therefore have had different experience of leaving school, and 
their experience will be different from that of the NCDS cohort. 
Nonetheless, the similarities will be seen to outweigh the 
differences between the experiences of the two samples. 
The research seeks to overcome the difficulties described above in 
three ways: firstly, through the use of a cross-sectional data set 
in conjunction with a longitudinal data set, which allows the 
testing of longitudinal inferences from age comparisons; sect xily, 
through the use of small age groups where age comparisons are 
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unavoidable; thirdly, through use of a typology, which allows 
comparison between carefully defined groups which can be identified 
for all age groups and in both data sets. 
Developing and Usizx3 a Typology of Youth Class 
CohDrt analysis does not necessarily involve the study of a group 
I 
as though it were homogeneous. Ryder (1965) says 
The cohort record, as macro-biography, is the aggregate 
analogue of the individual life history. 
(Ryder, 1965: 859) 
The present study examines the transitions to adulthood of a 
cohort, but seeks to identify the social groups of which it is 
comprised. The cohort is thus examined in terms of "cohort units", 
or subgroups similar perhaps to Mannheim's "generation units" 
(1952), which have specific locations in the social structure. In 
this way, though the study makes observations about transitions to 
adulthood in general, it is more concerned with disaggregating the 
experience of young people. The aim is to examine transitions to 
adulthood in terms of the ways in which the transition experience 
is stratified. 
Measures of stratification are problematic when applied to any 
sector of society, but particularly so in the case of young people, 
who are in the process of achieving social class in their own 
right. The research has developed a typology of youth class, 
applying to both men and women, to take into account the class 
trajectories of young people as well as their current occupational 
class. The development of the typology is described in Chapters 
Four and Five. 
The typology is used in much of the analysis which follows, 
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wherever there is a need to examine stratification according to 
social class. This multi-dimensional approach to social class in 
youth has involved incorporating a notion of process and change 
(social mobility) into the notion of structure (in the form of 
current occupational class). Process and change are thus 
integrated in the concept of youth class, as well as in the nature 
of the data itself, with the NCDS showing process through 
longitudinal data and the COLS showing structure through its cross- 
sectional data. 
The production of a typology of youth class which can be used for 
both the GAS and the NODS allows greater comparability of the two 
data sets and also allows the present findings to be related to 
earlier research on specific groups of young people. 
Statistical Measures 
The analysis of the GHS and NCDS is, for the most part, cross- 
sectional, involving crosstabulaticns of variables. Such analysis 
cannot identify causal relationships, but only describe an 
association between two variables, sometimes controlling for the 
values of other variables as well. Summary statistics, describing 
the strength of association, and the level of statistical 
significance were computed for each table. 
The measure of statistical significance for the analyses, is 
computed by SPSS from Chi-square, which measures the probability 
that a relationship exists in the population from which the sample 
is drawn (and thus shows the probability of an observation existing 
by chance). It is important to remember, however, that Chi-square 
is affected by sample size, so that with a large sample, 
significance levels of less than 1% will be common, whether or not 
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a substantively significant relationship exists between the 
variables (Nie, 1975: 224). 
As Moser and Kalton (1971: 444) point out, the results of 
significance tests should be approached with caution, since the 
"power" of a significance test relates directly to the size of the 
samples. They criticise over-interpretation of significance test 
results, and point out that it is the magnitude of effects which is 
ultimately the more important. 
In the present case, the samples produced by the two data sets are 
very large, and this affects the statistical significance levels 
produced. Significance levels are generally below the 1% level, 
because of the large sample size, but this should not automatically 
imply that findings are substantively interesting. The 
significance level is not therefore particularly helpful to this 
analysis. 
Some further points should be made about the tables in the 
following analysis. The data source is given at the bottom of each 
table. Unless otherwise stated, the 1JS data applies to the whole 
subset of respondents aged from sixteen to twenty-nine. Also given 
at the bottom of each table are references to the computer jobs on 
which the figures are based; these should be ignored. Lastly, in 
all the tables, decimals have been rounded to the nearest whole 
number; totals do not always add up to 100%, therefore. 
axx i. usiari 
The combined use of the two data sets provides a great deal of 
information about the lives of ring people as they become adult. 
Both samples are national. In combination, the two data sets 
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produce a representative sample of ycxir people. The findings from 
the study therefore provide a view of youth in Britain. Use of a 
typology of youth class allows equivalent groups to be identified 
in both the CAS and the 1 )S and thus increases the compatibility 
of the data sets. 
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Chapter 4 
Towards a Typology of Youth 
The study of youth should face two issues: firstly, the notion of 
youth as a transition, and secondly, the place of young people in 
the social structure. Research on the young has tended towards one 
approach or the other, and there seems to have been no success in 
integrating the two. Eighteen years after Allen's admonishment to 
social scientists who failed to locate the young in the social 
structure (Allen, 1968), and ten years after Murdock and McCron's 
(1976) recognition of the need to examine the relations between 
class and age, there still seems to be missing from the sociology 
of youth a ccn eptual framework which integrates the two approaches 
and sees age and class as twin dimensions of stratification. 
The concept of youth will be re-examined here, in a way which will 
incorporate both its cross-secticnal and its lcr itudinal elements. 
The current occupational situations of the y urxj will be looked at 
in relation to their class of origin and their occupational 
careers, thus introducing age into a class perspective. The high 
degree of social and occupational mobility during early working 
life, the major problem facing sociologists looking at 
stratification in youth, will thus become a focus rather than a 
deterrent, allowing us to study young people, male and female, in 
terms of their class "trajectories" or careers. 
This chapter will provide a framework for devising a typology of 
youth class. The aim is to develop a means of looking at the 
transitions to adulthood in a class context which is relevant to 
the study of young people. Before this can be da )e, however, it is 
necessary to consider some of the basic concepts underlying the 
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study. In the following pages, social class and social mobility 
will be considered in relation to occupational class and gender; 
and some problems of measurement will be addressed. In the next 
chapter, analysis of social mobility will be further developed and 
finally a typology of youth class will be devised. This will form 
the basis for the analysis of transitions to adulthood in later 
sections of this thesis. 
The Measurement of Social Class 
young people enter the adult world carrying the "baggage" of their 
family identity, based on the social class of their family of 
origin and the belief systems they have acquired at home and at 
school. In their early work years, they achieve occupational 
status in their own right and gradually cease to have their class 
identity ascribed to them from their fathers' class. The movement 
from ascribed class to achieved class is perhaps the fundamental 
dynamic underlying the transition from education to employment, and 
is the main feature of the move to adult independence in terms of 
the establishment of social identity. The starting points of 
gender, class of origin and educatiaýal level determine to a large 
extent the subsequent occupational class of the young persm. To a 
large extent, but not completely, since in addition to the 
advantages or disadvantages brought from class background, and the 
benefits or otherwise of achieved educational status, there remains 
variation in the class of the respondent which results from the 
social mobility which they achieve through their work careers. 
The main reason for studying social class in sociology as a whole 
is to examine persisting inequalities in society, and the 
relationship between different social groups. Though it is 
necessary to develop means of measuring social class, it should 
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always be seen as leading towards a more meaningful understanding 
of the social structure, and should not become a rigid 
categorisation. The meaning of social class in its widest context 
should constantly be informing the analysis of class in the 
narrower confines of the occupational structure. The purpose of 
defining a class schema which is appropriate to the study of youth, 
is thus to examine inequalities in youth, in terms of access to 
opportunities for advancement in the settings of work and of home. 
In the United States, high levels of social mobility led liberal 
sociologists like Blau and Duncan to conclude that social 
stratification was far from rigid, as Marx had suggested, and that 
the mobility in American society would eventually lead to 
universalism, or social equality (Blau and Duncan, 1967: 429). 
Social class is thus treated as a question of achievement rather 
than ascription. Marxist. and Weberian explanations of 
stratification have generally been rejected in favour of a schema 
which produces a hierarchical ordering of socio-economic groups 
along a continuum, with no implication of a class struggle, or even 
division between manual and non-manual workers ("rcci-egalitarian 
classnessness", according to Ossowski, 1963). 
Most European analyses of stratification tend to emphasise the 
rigidity rather than fluidity of the class structure. Post Marxist 
analyses of class stress the relationship between labour and 
capital, but many also emphasise the juxtaposition of manual and 
non-manual occupational classes. Some Marxian class analysis 
therefore sees manual and nun-manual workers in opposition to one 
another, rather than as part of the same hierarchy. E. O. Wright 
(1976) has extended the definition of the capitalist class to 
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include managers, who have power over the working class though they 
do not own capital, while manual and other non-manual workers form 
the proletariat. He has been criticised for paying undue attention 
to the class affiliation of intermediate non-manual workers, by 
Goldthorpe, who points out that this is a highly mobile and 
fluctuating group (Goldthorpe, 1980: 258). 
Most British approaches to class analysis produce a roughly 
hierarchical ordering of social class according to socio-economic 
criteria, on the basis (following Weber) that the categories 
reflect life chances. There is some agreement among sociologists 
about the relatively stable upper and lower ends of the 
occupational hierarchy (professions and senior managers at the top, 
and unskilled manual workers at the bottom), but disagreement over 
the treatment of the more mobile intermediate classes. Hall and 
Jones (1950) perceive junior non-manual workers to be in a lower 
position than foremen but on the same level as skilled manual 
workers. Goldthorpe (1980: 39-41), on the other hand, defines four 
distinct intermediate classes (clerical workers, small shopkeepers, 
foremen and skilled manual workers) movement between which would 
not constitute upward mobility. Broadly, as Heath (1981) points 
out, class schemata vary according to the use to which they are to 
be applied, as well as to theoretical considerations. 
Women and Class Theory 
It is only in recent years that any serious attempt has been made 
to incorporate women into class theory directly. Hitherto, social 
class was only seen as ascribed to a woman through her father's or 
husband's occupational class, and the woman's own occupational 
class was not considered to be of sociological interest. Women have 
thus been excluded from most studies of social mobility and social 
74 
class on the grounds that they are economically dependent on their 
husbands even if they work (there has been little consideration of 
the possibility that husbands may be equally dependent upon them) 
and that gender differences tend to underline class differences 
rather than cut across them. Goldthorpe excluded women from his 
study thus: 
Whatever current trends of change in women's work and. family 
life may portend - during the decades preceding our enquiry, 
and to which our data relate, it has been thrcugh the role of 
their male members within the social division of labour that 
families have been crucially articulated with the class 
structure and their class "fates" crucially determined. 
(Goldthorpe, 1980: 288); 
and some years earlier, Westergaard and Resler arrcluded that 
The inequalities of the female labour market - internally and 
in regard to the male labour market - in no sense take away 
from or cut across the general pattern of class inequality. 
On the contrary, they sharpen class divisions. 
(Westergaard and Resler, 1975: 104). 
Erik Olin Wright's position was not dissimilar, though his comments 
are restricted to housewives and do not include women in the paid 
labour force. He considered that - thousewives held a "contradictory 
class locaticn" since their class interests were essentially those 
of their husband, the worker: 
This does not in any way imply that the sexual division of 
labour is unimportant, that women are not oppressed within 
that division of labour, but simply that the sexual division 
of labour does not create a division of fundamental class 
interests between husbands and their Yx usewives. 
(Wright, 1978: 92) 
The suggestion that the class fates of women are determined by 
their menfolk has only recently been more fully debated. There has 
been criticism of intellectual sexism among sociologists (Oakley, 
1974; Delphy, 1981), which is likely to influence both orientation 
to research and findings. In contrast, Heath and Britten have 
shown that a woman's own occupational class crucially affects 
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fertility and voting behaviour (Heath and Britten, 1984). Studies 
of the domestic division of labour and inequalities within the home 
(J. Pahl, 1983) and improvements to the classifications of women's 
occupational class (Dale, et al., 1985), all provide additional 
counter-arguments. In a society where for most women work is the 
norm, where the woman's income may be crucial to a household (in 
dual earner as well as in single-parent families) then it is 
important to study the occupational structure and careers of women, 
and there can be no justification for their exclusion from the 
analysis of class and social mobility. 
The study of housewives goes beyond the scope of this research, 
which is ca erned primarily with the period before marriage and 
childbirth. The study of young women in employment in following 
chapters will be largely restricted to those without children. The 
analysis will show, however, the importance of a woman's own 
occupation in determining her social class and lifestyle. 
How can a class schema which was devised for the male occupational 
structure be applied to women? The problem, at its simplest, is 
shown in Table 4.1. The table shows occupational class 
distributions by sex for young people aged 16-29 in the GHS. The 
socio-economic group and social class allocation described in the 
Classification of Occupations (1980) is used with some 
modifications (see Appendix 1 for full details). The table shows 
that while most men are skilled manual workers, most women are in 
junior non-manual work. Most women are therefore nominally in a 
higher class than the majority of employed men; nevertheless, they 
are likely to have lower occupational prestige, earnings, and so 
on (Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn, 1980; Heath, 1981; Crompton and 
Juries, 1984). The occupational distribution also means that many 
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women who are in non-manual work will have fathers and husbands in 
manual work. 
----------------------------------------------- 
Table 4.1: OCCUPATIONAL CLASS STRUCTURE BY SFB{ 
----- 
Among all males, and among waren without children, 
aged 16-29 years 
------------------------------ ----------------- -- 
C JPATIONAL MALES FE 
--- 
MALES 
CLASS 
------ -------- 
$ 
------ 
% 
--------------- - 
1 HIGHER NON-MANUAL 
----------- 
5 
----- 
2 
2 INTERMEDIATE NON-MANUAL 12 18 
3 JUNIOR NON-MANUAL 16 53 
4 SKILEID MANUAL 41 5 
5 SEMI-SKILLED MANUAL 20 20 
6 UNSKILLED MANUAL 6 1 
ALL (=100%) (5405) (2569) 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Q{579&80 
-------------------------------------------------- 
The gender structure of occupations can be taken into account by 
grouping occupational classes into higher ncn-manual classes (1 and 
2), intermediate classes (3 and 4) and lower manual classes (5 and 
6). Where gender comparisons are needed in the analysis, this 
basic formula will be applied. 
Young People and Class 
Measures of social class are even more problematic where the young 
are concerned. Many young people are students, at school or at 
college, or may be unemployed; where people have never been 
economically active, classical measures of occupational class 
cannot be applied. Eric Olin Wright has devised a means of 
cc )ceivi. ng a life-time structure of class positions, which enable 
us to examine the class of those who are not in work. Thus the 
long-term unemployed can be categorised as "marginalised working 
class", but those who are students and the temporarily unemployed 
can be classified according to their "class trajectories". 
According to Wright, the young, and students in particular, are in 
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pre-class positions, linked with greater or lesser certainty to 
specific class destinations or "class trajectories" (Wright, 
1978: 92-4). 
This study is, however, chiefly concerned with young people who 
have been employed. The CIS data analysed cover the period 1979 to 
1980, and the NCDS data cover the period between 1974 and 1981, 
when unemployment was nowhere near its present (1986) high level; 
very few of the young people under study had never had a job and 
their class positions could therefore be partially based on their 
own occupational class. Those who are in "pre-class positions" and 
those who have achieved a degree of "oocupaticnal maturity" can be 
identified. 
Even where the young are in employment, there are difficulties in 
measuring their social class, sirre for many young workers, their 
current occupational class provides little indication of their 
lifestyle, and represents only a stepping stone in a class career. 
consequently, their fathers' class might for some provide a better 
indication of their social class than their own occupational class 
can do. Many young workers, as well as students, are in pre-class 
positions, to use Olin Wright's terminology. 
Social Mobility 
The existing literature on the transition into employment has not 
typically been informed by sociological theories of social class 
and mobility. This may be partly because of the orientation of 
youth studies towards social policy and the evaluation of youth 
provisions such as the Careers Service, rather than towards a more 
sociological stance. Equally, studies of social mobility have 
excluded young people precisely because of the high level of their 
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mobility. Glass (1949) and Goldthorpe (1980) both concentrated 
their analysis on men who were older and could be regarded as 
"occupationally mature", displaying less occupaticnal mobility than 
younger men. Though there has been recent study of women's 
occupational careers (Dex, 19S4, for example), there has been 
little consideration of women's early class transitions. The 
present study therefore looks at a group whose mobility has 
received little attention, but will draw cn Goldthozpe's analysis, 
testing some of his findings on mobility in youth both male and 
female. 
It is of greater relevance to the study of social mobility if 
upward or downward mobility in terms of occupational class is 
reflected in other aspects of the lifestyle, in terms of social 
relationships, social prestige, general standard of living 
(consumption patterns), class affiliation and so on; otherwise the 
study of class changing becomes a sterile study (Miller, 1975; 
Bell, 1968). If an individual has been socially, rather than 
purely occupationally, mobile, then changes in these other aspects 
relating to social class should be visible as well. These and 
other social pointers indicate the overall significance to society 
and to historical change of movement which might be occupational in 
origin. 
young people are occupationally more mobile than older workers, 
changing jobs more frequently despite the greater risk of 
unemployment. The lack of job stability amc g YW g people is the 
main reason that they are generally excluded from studies of social 
mobility. The aim here, however, is to understand the transitirn 
to adultix)od" the movement between jobs must therefore be examined, 
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and explained in terms of social mobility in the wider sense. 
The Routes to Upward Mobility 
It is essential that the sociologist studying young people defines 
-their social class according to both their occupational careers and 
their overall class mobility patterns. A purely cross-sectional 
analysis based on one dimension of class, without any awareness of 
the longitudinal dimension of career patterns over time would give 
little indication of life style or class affiliation. This chapter 
will show that a cross sectional sample of yaaxg non-manual workers 
might well include people from very different groups, yet may be 
attributed with homogeneity and middle class lifestyles. With 
longitudinal data, however, the group will be found to be 
heterogeneous. It may only be by determining their "class 
trajectory" and locating their current class in a career 
perspective that the heterogeneity of origin and of class identity 
of the "group" can be seen. 
What are the routes to upward social mobility? Heath (1981), and 
Goldthorpe (1980) have suggested three main routes to the higher 
professional and managerial classes in society: inheritance of 
privilege, the scholarship ladder, and promotion from the shop 
floor (Heath, 1981: 68). Direct inheritance of privilege occurs 
rarely in the present day, and class of origin is more likely to 
affect social outcomes for the child in indirect ways, such as 
through providing access to better educational, health and housing 
facilities, all of which may assist in inter-generational 
transmission of social class from father to child. The scholarship 
ladder, or educational route, is perhaps the chief means through 
which the working class may gain upward social mobility and succeed 
despite the disadvantages of their birth. Achievements through 
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work careers can help those who lacked educational success or class 
advantage to gain social mobility intra-generationally. Evidence 
from the GHS is used to illustrate a fuller discussion of these 
points below. 
The Education r4oute 
The education system provides the major possibility of enhancing 
one's life chances. Success in the educational sphere will often 
be followed by success in the occupational sphere, sometimes 
involving upward class mobility, as the following chapters will 
show. Conversely, lack of educational success may lead to low 
prestige work and downward social mobility. But it is not simply 
the effects of education which are stratificatory; the system 
operates as a stratificatory system directly as well as indirectly. 
Bowles and Gintis argued that: 
The education system is an integral element in the 
reproduction of the prevailing class structure of society. 
(Bowles and Gintis, 1976: 125-6). 
Education, according to them, is not merely a matter of personal 
development; its values are based in the nature of the class 
structure, and its aims are to perpetuate the pOälcticn of labour 
power and the reproduction 
... of those 
institutions and social relationships which 
facilitate the translation of labour power into profits 
(p. 129). 
Bernstein too has ccr cluded that 
Education is a class-allocatory device, socially creating, 
maintaining and reproducing non-specialized and specialized 
skills, and specialized dispositions which have an approximate 
relevance to the mode of production. 
(Bernstein, 1975: 185). 
In ox sidering the relaticnship between education and production, 
Bernstein oocmcluded that the fit produced was an approximate one, 
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with contradictions and discrepancies, and that contrary to the 
findings of Bowles and Gintis, far from producing ideal 
personalities, 
The school in this respect is highly inefficient in creating a 
docile, deferential and subservient work force. 
(Bernstein, 1975: 188) 
This thesis will stow that education is a crucial factor in social 
mobility both inter-generaticnal and antra-generaticnal. It helps 
those of working class origin gain upward mobility to the middle 
class, and where the educational level is lower, its lack can 
result in downward mobility of the middle class as well. 
Stratificaticn can be seen in the extent to which people continue 
in education, as well as in its effects later in terms of 
occupational class. Analysis of the CAS shows the extent to which 
access to education is associated with class of origin. , 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 4.2: AGE RFSPONDB'ZF LEFT FULL-TIME EDUCATION BY SEX 
AND OCCUPATIONAL CLASS OF FATHER 
---------------------------------------------------- 
OOüJPATIOIAL CLASS OF FATHER 
NON-MANUAL MAIDUAL 
SEX OF RESPCN ENT: MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE 
AGE LEFT F-T EDUCATION $$%t 
---------------------------------------------------- 
UNDER 18 65 61 87 87 
18 OR OVER 35 39 13 13 
---------------------------------------------------- 
ALL (=100%) (1626) (1619) (3318) (3276) 
---------------------------------------------------- 
File: ED(2) 
Source: CIS (79&80 ) 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Table 4.2 shows the effect of class of origin and gender on the age 
the respondent completed full-time education. Nearly three times 
as many middle class children stay in full-time education beyond 
the age of 18, c mpared with the children of worsting class fathers. 
The educational route to upward social mobility is therefore 
restricted in its access for the majority of working class 
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children. This suggests that the education system is more 
successful in ma3ntainirng the social structure than in encouraging 
change. 
However, as Halsey et al. (1980) point out, though the 
effectiveness of the educational system may vary for people from 
different social backgrounds, educational opportunity (and 
ultimately therefore mobility through education) is now both more 
accessible and more extensive than ever before. 
Many young people undertake part-time education after leaving 
school, as a means of increasing their qualificaticns and improving 
their work chances. In Chapter 9, part-time further educaticri will 
be considered as an "alternative route" towards inter-generaticrial 
stability of the middle class and upward social mobility of the 
working class. 
Analysis of the GI-1S shows the effects of class of origin (based on 
father's current occupational class), educational level, and 
gender, on the respcr . nts' current occupational class, among those 
who have had employment. Table 4.3 shows that 59% of men of 
working class origin who stayed in education beyond the age of 18 
are in non-manual work, compared with only 16% of working class 
early school leavers, indicating the importance of education as an 
aid to upward social mobility. The effect of class of origin can be 
seen when males of the same educational level but different classes 
of origin are compared: thus, while 16% of the less educated 
working class males are in non-manual work, 35% of less educated 
middle class males are non-manual workers. 
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Table 4.3: OOQJPATI L CLASS BY FATHER'CLASS, ID1CATI L 
Row percentages 
-------------------- --------- -------------- -------- - 
FATHERS AGE LEFT C1JRRENF OCCUPATIONAL CLASS 
---------- 
TOTAL 
CLASS F-T EDUC 
-------------------- 
AGDC tOUP 
--------- 
NON-MANUAL 
------- 
MANUAL (=100%) 
1 UNDER 18 16-19 
------- 
26 
-------- 
74 
----------- 
(336) 
20-24 37 63 (349) 
25-29 43 57 (334) 
MIDDLE ALL 35 65 (1019) 
----------- 
CLASS 2 18 & OVER 
-------- 
18-19 
-------------- 
68 
-------- 
32 
----------- 
(38) 
20-24 76 24 (225) 
25-29 86 14 (294) 
ALL 81 19 (557) 
--------------------- 
3 UNDER 18 
-------- 
16-19 
-------------- 
14 
-------- 
86 
----------- 
(780) 
20-24 16 84 (971) 
25-29 18 82 (1011) 
WORKING 
---------- 
ALL 
------- 
16 
- 
84 (2762) 
-- 
CLASS 4 18 & OVER 18-19 
------------- 
34 
-------- 
66 
----------- 
(29) 
20-24 59 41 (184) 
25-29 63 37 (209) 
ALL 59 41 (422) 
--------------------- 
TOTAL 
------------- 
-------- -------------- 
---- ---- 
-------- 
-------- 
----------- 
(4760) 
------- -- ------ 
Significance levels: 
-------- ---- -- ---- 
1 p=< . 001 2 p=< . 01 
3p (NS) 
4 p= < . 05 
Fi1e: TAB2(1) 
Source: c1S 79&80 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Analysis of women's positions in relation to their father's class 
(inter-generational mobility) cannot be readily assessed with a 
manualfficn-manual dichotomy, since women are likely to be in non- 
manual work as a function. of the female occupational structure, and 
therefore likely to enter an occupational class which is nominally 
higher than that of their fathers. A modified class schema is 
needed to examine inter-geneeratic al mobility amcng women and to 
make gender canparisons. 
There is, however, a further problem in comparing data for men and 
women, which can be rectified. It has been found elsewhere, from 
84 
analysis of the Women in Employment Survey (Dex, 1984) that women 
tend to be downwardly mobile following childbirth, as they may move 
into lower-grade and part-time jobs on their return to the labour 
market. If upward mobility anuxxg women is to be measured, then it 
will be most visible among those "career women" who delay marriage 
and/or childbirth and remain lodger in full-time work. 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 4.4: OOQJPATIC L CLASS BY FATHER'S CLASS, E 1XJCATIC L 
LEVEL AND AGEGK UP - WOMEN WITHOUT CHILDREN. 
Row percentages 
FATHERS AGE LEFT CURRENT OCCUPATICNAL CLASS ALL 
CLASS F-T IDUC AGEGROUP NON-MANUAL MANUAL (=100%) 
--- ------ ----------------- 
1 UNDER 18 
--- 
16-19 
-------------- 
74 
-------- 
26 
-------- 
(261) 
20-24 78 22 (220) 
25-29 77 23 (105) 
MIDDLE 
- --- 
ALL 76 24 (586) 
------- 
CLASS 2 18 & OVER 
-------- 
18-19 
-------------- 
71 
-------- 
29 
-------- 
(41) 
20-24 90 10 (230) 
25-29 97 3 (178) 
ALL 91 9 (449) 
-------------------- 3 UNDER 18 
--------- 
16-19 
-------------- 
59 
-------- 
41 
-------- 
(638) 
20-24 65 35 (528) 
25-29 69 31 (227) 
WORKING ALL 63 37 (1393) 
----------- 
( SS 4 18 & OVER 
-------- 
18-19 
-------------- 
71 
-------- 
29 
-------- 
(34) 
20-24 85 15 (152) 
25-29 94 6 (97) 
------------------- 
ALL 
--------- 
86 
-------------- 
14 
------- 
(283) 
--------- - 
TOTAL 
------------ --------- ---- - 
(2711) 
-------- 
Significance levels: 
- -------- ------- --------- 
1p (NS) 
2 p=(. 001 
3 p=C. 05 
4 p=. -, '. 005 
Saure: GHS79&. 80 
Fi1e: TAB1F 
Table 4.4 shows the data for women without children. There are 
considerable gender differences, due largely to the difficulty in 
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measuring social class for women and their segregation in the 
occupational structure. Nevertheless, the effect of education can 
be seen, particularly for the working class, where 86% of those 
with longer in education are in non-manual work, compared with 63% 
of those who left school early. The effect of class of origin can 
be seen among those who left full-time education early: 769 of 
middle class daughters are in non-manual work, compared with 63% of 
working class daughters. 
The Work Raste 
Class transmission through privilege or via education cannot wholly 
account for class stability between generations. Class stability 
may result from intra-generational mobility where more direct 
(inter-generational) means of transmission have failed. This would 
appear to be the case for-many of the sons of middle class fathers 
who are in manual occupations. According to Table 4.3, as many as 
65% of sons of middle class fathers but low educational levels were 
in manual work. The lack of fit between the child's and the 
father's occupational class has occurred since neither direct 
inheritance nor education has reproduced the class of origin. In 
such cases, promotion from the shop floor, the third means of class 
improvement, comes into play as a means of achieving inter- 
generational class stability. 
"Counter mobility" is the term used by Goldthorpe to describe the 
process whereby the young of middle class origin who lost their 
class status on entry into the labour market subsequently regain it 
through upward occupational mobility. Contrasted with the counter- 
mobile of middle class origin are the upwardly mobile working 
class, who may use similar routes to the higher social classes 
(Goldthorpe, 1984: 125). Both groups appear to achieve upward 
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mobility through occupational change and promotion, training, 
apprenticeship and part-time further education. The latter may, 
however, be predominantly associated with the counter-mobile; 
Raffe's study of the "alternative route" to mobility through part- 
time further education suggests that successful take-up is largely 
associated with the middle class (Raffe, 1979). This point will be 
examined in greater detail in Chapter 9. 
The G-1S lacks suitable longitudinal data which would allow a study 
of actual counter- or upward mobility, but does allow age 
comparisons, from which some longitudinal inferences can be drawn. 
Caution is needed here, since there is a confusion of cohort and 
time effects with the effect of age (see Chapter 3). Table 4.3 
shows that among middle class sons who left full-time education 
before the age of 18,74% of those in the youngest age group are 
manual workers, reducing to 63% in the middle age group and 57% in 
the oldest age group of 25-29 year olds. The decrease in 
proportions in manual work suggest that a process, in this case of 
counter-mobility, is occurring. 
It should not be assumed that middle class stns who become manual 
workers will regain the class of their families of origin in time, 
with age and with experience in the labour market. Many sons of 
non-manual workers (57% of those with less full-time education) are 
still in manual work in their late twenties. With age, this group 
may become more working class than middle class in its patterns of 
social relationships, and a label of downwardly mobile can be 
applied with increasing aptness. 
Blau and Duncan (1967) considered manual and Hoe-manual occupations 
to be divided by a "one-way screen" allowing upward mobility of the 
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working class, but protecting non-manual workers from downward 
mobility into "blue Dollar" work: 
The unskilled white-collar occupations tend to absorb most of 
the downwardly mobile from the higher non-manual strata, which 
makes these occupations a boundary that creates relative 
protection against the danger of downward mobility from the 
higher white-collar to the blue-collar class. 
(Blau and Duncan, 1967: 63). 
This theory has been refuted by Goldthorpe (1980: 53) with regard to 
British data. The more generally held "buffer zone" theory (see 
Goldthorpe, 1980: 47) seems not in any case to apply to young 
workers, many of whom are apparently downwardly mobile on entry 
into the labour market. It would seem that the market in junior 
non-manual occupations is not large enough to contain both the 
less-educated of middle class origins and the more educated working 
class, who might both be competing for places in it. 
Class stability is generally in the interests of the ruling class, 
and is controlled by it through mechanisms of closure and self- 
recruitment. It is clearly in the interests of the ruling class 
that their sons and daughters should not be downwardly mobile, and 
that only a limited proportion of working class children should be 
admitted to the higher social classes. It is therefore likely that 
where direct inheritance of privilege and educational routes both 
fail to provide for class inheritance, then intra-generational 
mobility, the route of work careers, will help to maintain the 
status quo. It is thus, according to Goldthorpe, that counter 
mobility occurs. 
Age comparisons (Table 4.3) also suggest a process of upward 
mobility through work careers among the middle class and working 
class who stayed in education beyond the age of 18, though on a 
smaller scale (and the results are ocnfused because many who will 
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fall into this category by the age of 20, are still in education 
below this age). It seems, though, that upward mobility is 
sometimes achieved through a combination of education and work 
routes. In contrast to the other groups, it is interesting to note 
that the working class who lack further education show no evidence 
of upward mobility through work routes, as the proportions in 
manual work remain static across all age groups. 
Table 4.4 shows the data for women without children. With age, 
proportions in manual work decrease among the more educated groups, 
by 26% among those of middle class origin and by 23% among those of 
working class origin. Among the less educated of working class 
origin, there also seems to be some possibility of movement from 
manual to non-manual work with age. In general, it seems that women 
are less likely than men to achieve upward mobility through work, 
and there is no evidence here that there is a female equivalent of 
the male counter-mobile middle class. Middle class daughters who 
leave school early show no signs of movement with age into non- 
manual work (percentages in manual work varying between 22% and 26% 
in the three age groups). Education routes rather than work routes 
seem the most effective means of upward mobility or middle class 
stability for women. 
Table 4.5 compares current occupational class with father's class. 
It shows the overall direction of movement away from the class of 
origin, by sex and age, controlling, in the case of women, for 
marital status and whether or not they have children. For gender 
comparison, the three-class schema described above (and fully in 
Appendix 1) has been used, and smaller scale class movement is 
therefore visible. The table allows us to look at inter- 
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generational class transmission and to form further hypotheses 
about antra-generational mobility, by comparirxj age gr &ips- 
------------ 
Table 4.5: I 
------------------------- 
NTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY 
----------- ------------------ 
SUMMARY TABLES SFIOWIW3 DIFFERENCES AOCORDI? M COMER 
MARITAL AND PARENTAL STATUS 
------------------------------------- 
The table shows respondents' class 
----------------------------- 
in comparison with fathers' 
occupational class on a three class schema, where collapsed socio- 
economic groups have been regrouped thus (1+2)(3+4)(5+6) for 
purposes of inter-gender comparison. Mobility is defined as 
movement by one class upward or downward between father's 
occupational 
- 
class and that the the respondent. 
---- ------- 
DIREGTION 
---------------- --------- 
SINGLE 
----------- 
MARRIED 
------------------- 
WOMEN 
OF ALL CHILDLESS CHILDLESS WITH 
MOBILITY MALES WOMEN WOMEN CHILDREN 
------ - ----- 
A(E 16-19 
---------------- --------- ----------- ----------- 
UPWARD 13 15 15 14 
STABLE 42 43 38 41 
DOWNWARD 45 42 46 45 
------------- 
ALL (=100%) 
------ 
--------------- 
(1481) 
----- 
--------- 
(1246) 
----------- 
(65) 
----------- 
(78) 
- ------ 
M23 20-24 
---------- --------- ----------- ----------- 
UPWARD 19 19 23 19 
STABLE 52 46 49 45 
DOWNWARD 
----- 
29 
--------------- 
35 
------ 
28 36 
-------- 
ALL (=100%) (1810) 
--------------- 
--- 
(735) 
--------- 
----------- 
(463) 
-- 
----------- 
(589) 
------------- 
KE 25-29 
--------- ----------- 
UPWARD 27 30 28 19 
STABLE 52 45 48 45 
DOWNWARD 22 
------------ 
25 
-------- 
24 36 
------------- 
ALL (=100$) 
-- 
--- 
(1875) 
--------------- 
-- 
(225) 
-------- 
---------- 
(393) 
----------- 
(1203) 
----------- 
File: M MC13 & F MOD(6,7) 
-- ---------- ----------- 
Sore: als 79&80 
---------------------------- ---------- ---------- ----------- 
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Among men, 45% in the 16-19 year old group (mainly those with less 
full-time education) are in occupations which were of lower status 
than those of their fathers. However, among the oldest group, only 
22% are downwardly mobile in comparison with their fathers. Upward 
mobility is significantly higher at this age as well (27% compared 
with 13%). Women without children are also increasingly likely to 
be upwardly mobile and less likely to be downwardly mobile with 
age. There is little variation according to marital status: upward 
mobility increases from 15% to 30% among the single and from 15% to 
28% among the married, suggesting that upward mobility is not 
impeded by marriage without children. In contrast, women with 
children are the most likely to have been downwardly mobile, 
particularly in the highest age group (36%). In general, the table 
shows similar patterns for males and childless females, despite the 
earlier evidence in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 that men and women showed 
different career patterns. The apparent lack of career mobility 
among women may therefore have been an artifact of the class 
schema. 
summary 
What, then, can be deduced from these tables? Most importantly, 
the data suggest that the point of entry into the labour market is 
only a starting point for a working career which among some young 
people at least may often involve upward mobility over time. It is 
possible that these career patterns are spurious findings resulting 
from questionable usage of cross-sectional data, and that 
longitudinal data would show that such patterns do not occur. The 
trends in the occupational and industrial structure in recent years 
have, however, been towards a reduction in manufacturing industry 
and loss of manual jobs, in combination with an increase in service 
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industry and non manual jobs (Department of-Employment, 1984). The 
older age groups might therefore be expected to be in manual work 
to a greater extent than the younger age gr ps. The fact that the 
findings show the opposite, with the younger age groups more, not 
less, involved in manual work, suggests that time trend effects are 
not distorting the results, and that the inference of upward 
mobility through work careers in certain groups might be valid. 
Although hypotheses about processes, drawn from cross-sectional 
data, should be treated with caution, the relatively small age 
groups used do reduce the risk of time trend and cohort effects 
distorting the findings. 
It has become clear that there is a high degree of class mobility 
among males in the age group under study, but not all groups 
display intra-generational mobility with age. There are groups 
which can be defined as the "stable middle class" and the "stable 
working class" which show up on these tables as reproducing the 
class of origin without movement across the manual/non-manual 
boundary in the majority of cases. The stable middle class, from 
middle class backgrounds and with full-time education beyond 18 
years, appear to move directly into non-manual work; the stable 
working class, early school leavers from working class backgrounds, 
move directly into manual work (or, in the case of women, into 
junior non-manual work) and appear to remain there. These two 
groups represent the two extremes in the class structure, and will 
be seen to reproduce extreme class effects in further analysis of 
employment patterns and non-work life patterns. 
In contrast to the stable groups, there are also groups which 
display cxx siderable mobility either inter-generaticnally or in the 
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course of working careers. The counter-mobile middle class achieve 
inter-generational class stability only through work careers 
involving upward mobility. Some middle class scns and daughters 
though downwardly mobile at 23 years in comparison with their 
fathers, may be on a class trajectory which will allow them to 
regain their class of origin in time. Inter-generational stability 
of the middle class appears therefore to be a complicated process, 
and as Goldthorpe has pointed out, it cannot be assumed that 
counter-mobility will follow the downward mobility of many of the 
middle class (Goldthorpe, 1981: 5). 
upward mobility of the working class appeared from Tables 4.3 and 
4.4 to occur mainly among those had longer in full-time educaticn. 
The extent to which work careers result in upward mobility for the 
working class will become clearer when longitudinal data in the 
NCDS is analysed in the next chapter. In the meantime, it can be 
said that education appears to alter substantially the class 
chances of the working class, and is a major raute towards upward 
mobility. Equally, education appears to protect most middle class 
from downward mobility. 
There is some evidence here that women follow similar class career 
patterns to those of men. Women with education stowed evidence of 
movement from manual to non-manual work (Table 4.4) and Table 4.5 
showed women without children to have mobility patterns similar to 
those of men. It is therefore necessary to understand the current 
occupational class of both men and women in the context of their 
class careers. 
This chapter has thrown some light on the dynamic underlying much 
of the occupational movement during youth, and has suggested that 
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inter-generational transmission of class is strung, though its full 
effect is long-term rather than immediate. The next step is to 
look at this process in more detail, to see which occupational 
classes are the most stable or allowing of inward and outward 
movement, and to develop some theoretical conclusions about the 
concept of class and occupational careers in youth. 
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thapber 5 
Social Mobility and Youth Classes 
It was suggested in the previous chapter that any apparent 
homogeneity of class among young people might disappear if their 
current occupational class was examined in the light of their 
father's class and their own class careers. Age comparisons drawn 
from the General Household Survey allowed a preliminary examination 
of inter-generational and infra-generational class career patterns 
in terms of movement across the manual/non-manual divide. The 
conclusion was drawn that intra-generational mobility can be best 
understood in the light of inter-generational stability. 
In this chapter, occupational mobility will be examined in greater 
depth. Data from the GHS provides information about both inter- 
generational (between father's and respondent's occupational 
classes) and intra-generaticnal mobility (through age cocnpariscns), 
and will help us examine the decrease in mobility (both inter- and 
intra-generational) with age, and the notion of occupational 
maturity. The NODS data allows comparison between the rerpcndent's 
occupational class in first job and his/her current occupaticnal 
class, and thus provides an indication of work-life career 
movements and the routes through which inter-generational stability 
is achieved. The analysis will allow development of a typology of 
youth class. 
Int eraticnal. WI il i fty in the QiS 
The division of the occupational classes into manual and nan-manual 
or into a three-class schema has provided a useful but simplified 
view of inter-generational and intra-generational mobility. It 
loses sight of smaller range movement within each group and 
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neglects the possibility of careers within the middle class or 
working class. 
The following analysis of data from the GHS looks at inter- 
generational mobility across six classes, for different age groups, 
and both sexes. Data is initially presented as percentages derived 
from observed frequencies, and then as standardised residuals fron 
fitting a model of no association between father's occupational 
class and that of the son or daughter. Analysis of standardised 
residuals rather than column or row percentages allows the unequal 
distributicns of occupational classes between father and child to 
be taken into account, when comparing the observed data with the 
data expected if there were perfect inter-generational mobility, 
i. e. if every member of the younger generaticn had an equal chance 
of entering every occupaticnal class. 
Stability 
Inter-generational stability can be defined as the phenomenon 
whereby successive generations of the same family tend to stay in 
the same occupational class. It may seem like a contradiction in 
terms to talk of inter-generational stability being achieved 
through career mobility, but this appears to be what frequently 
happens. Some children enter the same class as their fathers only 
after a process in which they have changed from one occupational 
class to another. In other words, inter-generational stability is 
not a matter of simple and direct class reproduction, but may be 
achieved through mobility on an antra-generational basis. 
Table 5.1 compares stns' cc upaticnal classes with those of their 
fathers and seems to confirm earlier findings by Glass and Hall 
(1954) that inter-generatirnal Stability is strongest among skilled 
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Table 5.1: INTER-GIIERATIOhL MOBILITY - MEN 
OOCUPATIa L CLASS DESTINATIONS BY AGDGROUP 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
OOCJPATIOIAL CLASS OF FATHER 
OCCUPATIONAL 123456 ALL 
CLASS OF SON %$%%%$% 
ACE 16-19 
1 HIGHER PROF 3 1 1 1 0 0 1 
2 INTERNS N-M 5 4 4 3 3 1 3 
3 JUNIOR N-M 35 28 22 14 16 12 19 
4 SKILEID M 17 35 37 47 40 41 40 
5 SEMI-SKILLED 28 25 26 27 31 33 27 
6 UNSKILLED M 13 9 9 9 11 13 10 
ALL (=100%) 
---- 
(78) 
----- 
(338) 
------ 
(148) (629) 
------------ 
(212) 
------ 
(76) (1481) 
------------ ----------- 
% 20-24 
1 HIGHER PROF 20 8 5 3 2 1 5 
2 INTERNED N-M 23 21 10 9 6 8 12 
3 JUNIOR N-M 24 27 27 14 10 3 17 
4 SKILLED M 21 27 34 52 45 35 42 
5 SEMI-SKILLED 9 12 20 18 30 35 19 
6 UNSKILLED M 3 5 5 4 7 19 5 
ALL (=100%) 
--------- 
(89) 
----- 
(357) 
------ 
(185) 
------ 
(799) 
------ 
(288) 
------ 
(92) 
----- 
(1810) 
------- ------ 
N 25-29 
1 HIGHER PROF 29 17 12 5 4 0 9 
2 INTERMED N-M 33 33 20 15 12 6 19 
3 JUNIOR N-M 17 16 20 8 8 5 11 
4 SKILLED M 11 24 36 52 50 47 43 
5 SEMI-SKILLED 10 9 9 16 23 29 15 
6 UNSKILLED M 0 2 3 4 3 12 4 
ALL (=100%) 
---------- 
(72) 
--- 
(398) 
---- 
(178) (821) 
------------ 
(293) 
--- 
(113) (1875) 
----- 
File: M MOB 
-- -- --- 
Sourc 
------------ 
e: Q1S79&80 
97 
Table 5.2: INTER-GENERATIONAL MOBILITY - MUM 
OCCUPATIONAL CLASS DESTINATIONS BY AGESEXJP 
Standardised residuals fran model of no association 
OCCUPATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL CLASS OF FATHER 
CLASS OF SON 
-- ----- -- 
1 
-- -- 
2 
------ 
3 
---- - 
4 5 6 
--- - - 
AGE 16-19 
- - - ----- ------- ----- 
1 1.9 .9 .9 -. 8 -1.3 -. 8 
2 .9 .3 .5 -. 3 -. 3 -. 9 
3 3.2 3.6 .9 -3.0 -1.2 -1.4 
4 -3.3 -1.6 -. 6 2.6 .0 .1 
5 .2 -1.0 -. 2 -. 1 .9 .9 
6 1.0 -. 5 -. 3 -. 6 .7 1.1 
ALL (=100%) 
------- 
(78) 
------ 
(338) 
----- 
(148) 
------- 
(629) 
----- 
(212) 
------- 
(76) 
----- ------- 
M23 20-24 
1 6.5 3.0 -. 0 -2.4 -1.9 -1.7 
2 3.0 5.2 -. 5 -2.3 -2.7 -1.1 
3 1.4 4.5 3.0 -2.0 -3.1 -3.2 
4 -3.0 -4.2 -1.6 4.4 .8 -1.0 
5 -2.2 -3.2 .1 -. 9 4.2 3.4 
6 -. 8 -. 8 -. 3 -1.6 1.1 5.4 
ALL (=100%) 
------- 
(89) 
------ 
(357) 
------ 
(185) 
------ 
(799) 
------ 
(288) 
--- 
(92) 
------- 
AGE 25-29 
--- ----- 
1 6.0 5.6 1.5 -3.8 -2.4 -3.1 
2 2.8 6.5 .2 -2.7 -2.8 -3.1 
3 1.4 2.7 3.7 -2.3 -1.8 -1.8 
4 -4.1 -5.7 -1.3 4.3 2.0 .7 
5 -1.2 -3.4 -2.1 .3 3.4 3.8 
6 -1.6 -1.8 -. 3 .4 -. 6 4.8 
ALL (=100%) 
-- 
(72) (398) (178) (821) (293) (113) 
------ ------------ 
File: M MJB(7)(16) 
------ ------ ----- 
Sour 
-------- -- 
ce: Q1S79&80 
Chi-Square: 72.7 
Sign: p . 001 
Chi-Square: 298.5 
Sign: p . 001 
Chi-Square: 356.6 
Sign: p . 001 
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manual workers in each age group (in other words the sons of 
skilled manual workers are more likely to be skilled manual workers 
themselves than in-any other occupational class). It is also 
clear, however, that the skilled manual class (Class 4) is the 
largest and most heterogeneous class as well as being the most 
self-recruiting, and significant proportions of sons from all 
backgrounds enter skilled manual work. The apparent inter- 
generational stability among skilled manual workers is therefore 
partly an artifact of the occupational structure. 
Standardised residuals can be canputed by subtracting the expected 
cell frequency (for the model to be tested) from the observed cell 
frequency and dividing by the square root of the expected cell 
frequency. Analysis of the standardised residuals from a model of 
no association between the variables gives a more useful 
presentation of the data, since it controls for marginal 
distributions, and thus class sizes. As a rule of thumb, 
standardised residuals over 2.0 or less than -2.0 are ccnsidered to 
be significant (Gilbert, 1981). 
when the data are presented as stan(kirdised residuals from a model 
of no association (or perfect mobility) a different picture 
emerges. Analysis of the diagonals in Table 5.2 only partially 
confirms the findings of Glass and Hall. The skilled manual class 
is the only class which shows any inter-generational class 
transmission in the youngest age group, with a standardised 
residual of 2.6, but sons of skilled manual workers (Class 4) are 
most likely to be in Class 4 themselves by the age of 20-24, 
possibly as a result of short-term manual careers. In the longer 
term, the most stable classes inter-generationally are the higher 
non-manual classes (1 and 2). The residuals for Class 2, in 
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particular, increase with age and stability does seem to depend on 
long-term career mobility of sons. A high degree of class 
stability occurs at all ages in the unskilled manual class, class 
6, when the size of the class is controlled for (from Table 5.1 it 
might have been thought that this class was the least stable inter- 
generaticnally). 
Glass and Hall's study also showed that the sons of lower grade 
ncn-manual workers are the least likely to follow in their fathers' 
footsteps. Circumstances have changed in the last thirty years, 
which has seen the decline of manual work in manufacturing industry 
and the development of non-manual jobs in the service industries, 
and it might thus be expected that junior nc -marwal work may have 
increased in inter-generational stability. Nevertheless, the GHS 
data presented in Table 5.2 show the junior non-manual and the 
semi-skilled manual classes (3 and 5) to be less stable inter- 
generaticnally. 
The data in Table 5.2 suggest that while some classes increase in 
inter-generational stability with the respondent's age, others do 
not. Thus Classes 1,2 and 3 gain inter-generational stability 
with age, presumably as a result of sons moving into these classes 
after their education or in the cause of long-term work careers. 
This seems to be typical of the middle classes. Most working class 
patterns are somewhat different. Classes 5 and 6 show fluctuation 
with age and there is an indication of movement between manual 
classes. Class 4, while showing the most inter-generational 
stability among younger sons, shows only slightly more stability 
among older sons. In general, work careers in the manual classes 
appear to be shorter-term than those among non-manual classes, and 
100 
perhaps are more likely to be disorderly (Goldthorpe, 1980) 
involving movement both upward and downward. 
Comparison of Chi-Squares for the three parts of Table 5.2 show 
that the model of no association fits progressively less well as 
the age groups get higher. Chi-Square increases from 72.7 for the 
lowest age group to 356.6 for the highest, and the percentage of 
cells in the table which showed significant (more than 2 or less 
than minus 2) standardised residuals increased from 14% to 61%. 
According to these statistics, there is a marked increase in the 
degree of inter-generational stability between the lowest and 
middle age groups, but it would seem that the rate of increase 
slows down as infra-generational mobility among sons decreases, and 
some middle class scns achieve cc unter-mobility back to their class 
of origin, while some working class sons achieve upward mobility 
into skilled manual work like their fathers. 
courrter-Mobility 
Table 5.1 shows clearly that some sons of middle class fathers 
initially move into manual work (it was seen in Table 4.3 that 
these were mainly early school leavers). As the age of leaving 
education is not controlled for in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, then it 
should be remembered that the lower age groups will exclude those 
who are still in education, while the higher age groups will 
include those who stayed langer in education when they Younger; so 
the composition and totals of the three age groups vary. 
Comparison of the two higher age groups, the most comparable, 
shows, though that while many middle class song gradually regain 
their middle class status, there are still many in manual work at 
the age of 25-29 years. 
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Class transmission is complicated. Sons of higher social class 
origin may have a relatively better chance than their working class 
counterparts of gaining higher class jobs, but counter-mobility, as 
Goldthorpe pointed out, can be problematic: 
While in some instances cowiter-mobility may be a more or less 
automatic process (... ) one cannot assume that this will 
generally be the case, and that the downward mobility involved 
is thus more apparent than real. 
(Goldthorpe, 1980: 53) 
Thus, where downward mobility is observed among the sons of non- 
manual workers, it cannot be assumed that counter-mobility will 
follow. The sons of non-manual workers who are in manual work at 
the age of 25-29 may display downward mobility in their non-work 
relationships as well as in their occupational class, showing 
working class rather than middle class patterns of marriage, 
voting, etc. This will be examined in later chapters. 
Goldthorpe found that although 59% of sons of Class 1 and 2 fathers 
(according to his schema, which corresp7! rx3s roughly to the one used 
here) were themselves in the same class in 1972, only half of them 
began work in these classes: 
What is bf major interest here is the suggestion that counter- 
mobility to the higher levels of the class structure is by no 
means always a straightforward matter: rather, it seems, it 
may often come about only through a relatively complex series 
of work-life movements. 
(Goldthorpe, 1980: 125) 
The data presented in Table 5.1 show that 58% of sons of Class 1 
fathers and 69% of sons of Class 2 fathers are in manual work in 
the 16-19 age group, but the px"nporticns decrease with age, to 21% 
and 35% respectively in the 25-29 age group. This is because some 
16-19 year olds sons of Class 1 and 2 fathers are still in 
education, and those who have left education are unlikely to get 
higher non-manual jobs, so sons fron these classes have to exported 
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into another, lower class. Table 5.2 stows nearly perfect mobility 
in the lower age group, rather than any particular association 
between higher social classes and manual work. 
Muck of the mobility of middle class sans occurs not between manual 
and non-manual work, but within non-manual work. Table 5.2 shows 
that sons of fathers in Classes 1 and 2 are relatively likely when 
young to be in Class 3, but the association decreases with age as 
upward mobility within the zu -manual classes occurs. In contrast, 
the sons of fathers in Class 3 appear to show neither evidence of 
career movement up through the classes, nor any relative tendency 
to begin their careers in manual work. Table 5.2 shows no 
association between the class of sons and that of fathers in Class 
3, which appears to contain sons of heterogeneous origins. 
Goldthorpe found that in the middle ranges of the social hierarchy 
there was a lower rate of inter-generational stability, but still 
some shifting between class positions on a smaller scale, and 
counter-mobility from manual back up to intermediate class. He 
concluded that the inter-generational stability within the 
intermediate class was still often the product of work-life 
sequences, but that these sequences were more complicated for the 
intermediate class than for the higher social classes. Men in the 
intermediate class might move in and out of self-employment and 
supervisory work, and the apparent stability within this class 
might be misleading, because of short-term fluctuations 
(Goldthorpe, 1980: 129). Table 5.2 shows that the model of no 
association fits the data for Class 3 better than for any other 
class across all three age groups, suggesting that sons of Class 3 
fathers, though more likely to be found in Class 3 are relatively 
likely to be found in any other class. 
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In contrast to the higher and intermediate class, the working class 
were not found by Goldthorpe to display antra-generational mobility 
as a means of achieving class stability, in other words they tend 
not to move into manual work from non-manual classes. The data 
presented here seem broadly to confirm Goldthorpe's conclusions, 
though the inter-generaticnal stability of the manual classes does 
occasionally occur through a process of intra-generaticnal class 
movement, as this chapter will later show, and Class 4 stability 
appears to be partly the product of short-term working class 
careers: as workers gain in skills and experience they become 
skilled workers in their trade. 
Upward Mobility 
Goldthorpe stresses the importance of early work as an initial 
training ground for later occupations. Fran an early work career 
in manual jobs, upward mobility of the working class might involve 
a complicated pattern of work-life mobility, involving job- 
changin9, 
(... ) often in an apparently disorderly fashion, between 
different grades of manual, lower-technical, manual 
supervisory, and rank-and-file white collar occupations. 
(Goldtixupe, 1980: 137) 
He ccncluded that 
Just as (... ) we would see counter-mobility as being the "hard 
way" for men of high-class origins to succeed their fathers, 
so we would see the indirect routes to high-class positions as 
being the "hard way" for men of lower-class origins to be 
upwardly mobile. 
(Goldthorpe, 1980: 137) 
Upward mobility of working class sons appeared from Table 4.3 to be 
most likely for those with more full-time education. Upward 
mobility purely through working careers, for those with lower 
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educational achievements, looked far less common. Proportions of 
sons of working class fathers who are themselves in manual work 
decreased only from 86% to 82% between the ages of 16 and 29 
(compared with a decrease from 66% to 37% among the more educated 
working class). This suggests that upward mobility of the working 
class is unlikely to be achieved through work-life advancement 
alone (in contrast perhaps to the counter-mobility of the middle 
class), but results more frequently from a combination of 
educational and work-career routes. The GHS data tends to be 
misleading here, because of the lack of any work history data, and 
the extent to which work careers assist the mobility of the working 
class will become clearer when the NCDS data is analysed. The data 
here confirm the earlier finding that education appears to be the 
major raute to upward mobility. 
As Goldthorpe has shown, however, it would be wrong to consider 
many of the occupational class positions of manual worker sans as 
their class destinations, since it is likely that their work 
careers will follow a disorderly pattern, involving movement both 
up and down (Goldtixxrpe, 1980: 137). 
Int; r aticnal Mobility of Women 
Class differences in the inter-generational mobility of women can 
be seen in Table 5.3, which restricts analysis to women without 
children. There is thus a problem of representativeness in each age 
group, since younger women exclude those still in education, as 
with the table for men, but here the higher age group also excludes 
the large number of women who have had children. Interpretations 
are therefore made with caution. 
The table shows the extent to which women enter Class 3, the 
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Table 5.3: INFER-GIIERATIONAL MOBILITY - WOMEN WIT = CHILDI EN 
OCX3JPATIONAL CLASS DESTINATIONS BY AGBGRCXJP 
OCCUPATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL CLASS OF FATHER 
CUSS OF 1 2 3 4 5 6 ALL 
DAUGHTER 
--------------- 
% 
----- 
% 
------ 
% 
------ 
% 
----- 
% 
---- 
% % 
AOE 16-19 
--- ----- ------- 
1+2 HIGHER N-M 4 8 7 9 5 5 7 
3 JUNIOR N-M 64 63 71 54 53 39 57 
4 SKILLED M 0 2 2 5 7 14 5 
5 SEMI-SKILLED 21 26 21 30 32 39 29 
6 UNSKILLED 11 1 0 1 3 3 2 
ALL (=100%) 
--------------- 
(28) 
----- 
(136) 
------ 
(58) 
------ 
(273) 
----- 
(88) 
------- 
(36) 
------ 
(619) 
------ 
ME 20-24 
1 HIGHER PROF 7 4 2 1 1 0 2 
2 INTERNS N-M 31 22 21 14 11 13 17 
3 JUNIOR N-M 43 57 59 58 47 44 55 
4 SKILLED M 1 3 2 5 4 10 4 
5 SEMI-SKILLED 18 13 15 21 32 28 20 
6 UNSKILLED M 0 1 1 1 4 5 1 
ALL (=100$) 
-------- 
(72) 
----- 
(302) 
------ 
(124) 
------ 
(482) 
------ 
(157) 
------ 
(61) 
------ 
(1198) 
------ ------- 
M 25-29 
1 HIGHER PROF 19 6 6 2 1 0 5 
2 IN ERMED N-M 29 42 33 26 20 10 30 
3 JUNIOR N-M 48 39 50 49 57 45 47 
4 SKILLED M 2 3 4 6 6 0 5 
5 SEMI-SKILLED 2 9 5 16 15 30 12 
6 UNSKILLED M 0 1 1 0 1 5 1 
ALL (=100%) 
--------- 
(42) 
----- 
(170) 
------ 
(78) (222) 
------------ 
(86) 
------ 
(20) 
------ 
(618) 
------ ------ 
File: F MOB Source: GHS79&80 
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Table 5.4: INr R-CENERATIONAL MOBILITY - WOMEN WInwr CHILDREN 
OCCUPATIONAL CLASS DESTINATIONS BY Amp 
Standardised Residuals from Model of No Association 
OOQJP CLASS OCCUPATIONAL CLASS OF FATHER 
OF DAUCiTER 
------------- 
1 
------ 
2 
------ 
3 
------ 
4 
-- 
5 6 
AGE 16-19 
---- ------- - -- 
2 -1.0 .0 -. 1 .9 .1 1.0 
3 .5 .9 1.4 -. 7 -. 4 -1.4 
4 -1.2 -1.4 -1.1 .5 .8 2.5 
5 -. 7 -. 5 -1.2 .5 .5 1.1 Chi-Square: 41.7 
6 3.4 -1.0 -1.1 -. 6 1.0 .4 Sign: p . 02 
ALL (=100%) (28) (136) (58) (273) (88) (36) 
------------- 
?L 20-24 
------ ------ ------ ------ ------- ----- 
1 2.7 2.4 .1 -1.8 -1.3 -1.2 
2 2.7 1.8 1.0 -1.6 -1.9 -. 8 
3 -1.4 .5 .6 1.0 -1.3 -1.1 
4 -1.2 -. 9 -1.1 1.0 .0 2.0 
5 -. 3 -2.6 -1.3 .3 3.5 1.4 Chi-Square: 96.8 
6 -1.0 -1.0 -. 5 -1.4 3.4 2.4 Sign: p . 001 
ALL (=100%) 
----- 
(72) 
------- 
(302) 
------ 
(124) 
------ 
(482) 
------ 
(157) 
------ 
(61) 
----- -------- 
N 25-29 
1 4.4 .8 .8 -1.9 -1.5 -1.0 
2 -. 2 2.9 .5 -1.1 -1.8 -1.6 
3 .0 -1.5 .3 .4 1.3 -. 2 
4 -. 7 -1.1 -. 4 1.0 .4 1.0 
5 -1.8 -1.2 -1.8 1.7 .8 2.3 Chi. -Square: 74.0 
6 -. 6 -. 3 .5 -. 6 .4 2.1 Sign: p . 001 
ALL (=100%) 
------ 
(42) 
------ 
(170) 
------ 
(78) 
------ 
(222) 
------ 
(86) 
------ 
(20) 
----- -------- 
File: F ! VOB(6)(16) Source: GLS79&80 
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largest occupational class, especially those whose fathers are 
themselves in Class 3. Comparison of the marginals reflects the 
different composition of the different age groups, though counter- 
mobility of the middle class can perhaps be seen in the decreasing 
numbers of women in Class 5 with age (and in view of the different 
occupational structure for women, in the decreasing numbers in 
Class 3, as many women move up into Class 1 and 2 with age). 
Upward mobility of women of working class origin into the higher 
classes appears to be more possible than it is for men (Table 5.3), 
since so many women go into semi-professional work, particularly 
nursing. Downward mobility of middle class daughters is almost 
exclusively into Class 5 (which includes personal service workers) 
and may reflect a situation whereby the less educationally gifted 
middle class women may take temporary, rather than career, work and 
seek early marriage as a means of maintaining their class 
positions. Chapter 12 will examine this is more detail; it is 
sufficient to suggest here that for some women, early marriage 
rather than working careers may be the route to cc unter-mobility. 
The difficulty of analysing gender differences in patterns of 
inter-generational stability and mobility has already been 
explained. Table 5.4, which shows the standardised residuals from 
a model of perfect mobility, or no association, exemplifies the 
problem. Only 7% of residuals for the 16-19 group, 22% for the 20- 
24 group, and 11% for the 25-29 group are statistically significant 
(above +2 or below -2). Inter-generational class stability 
therefore shows most strongly in the 20-24 age group which includes 
most of those who have stayed longer in education. Even so, the 
analysis shows greater intergenerational mobility for women than 
for men. Chi square for the three Parts of the table are all lower 
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than the equivalent statistics for men in Table 5.2, ranging from 
41.7 to 96.8 for different age 
There are exceptions, however. In particular, the table shows a 
high degree of inter-generational stability in the highest classes, 
as was found to be the case for males, with reproduction of classes 
1 and 2 more common in the higher age groups. There appears to be 
evidence too, among 20-24 year olds, of inter-generational 
stability in Classes 5 and 6. Least stability inter-generationally 
at all ages appears to be in Class 3, as for sons, although most 
women are to be found in this class. Although Table 5.3 suggests 
that many working class daughters are in non-manual work, Table 5.4 
shows that when the relative size of classes is controlled for, 
through the analysis of standardised residuals, working class 
daughters are relatively unlikely to enter non-manual work. The 
earlier findings from Table 5.3 were therefore clearly distorted 
by the class distributions. 
There is some evidence here that women follow similar career 
patterns to those of men, particularly in terms of the movement 
into Classes 1 and 2 with age of daughters of higher class fathers. 
The chances of a middle class daughter doing manual work become, as 
with sons, increasingly unlikely with age and this suggests that 
some counter-mobility has occurred. It is therefore just as 
necessary to understand women's current occupational class in the 
context of their inter-generational mobility as it is in the case 
of men. 
Ir tra-c, eratJorlal rbbility in the NCDS 
So far, only the GHS has been used in this analysis of mobility, 
and examination has been of the increase in inter-generational 
109 
class stability with age, and how this appears to be achieved 
through career mobility. It has been useful to surmise, from age 
comparisons, the extent to which mobility has been achieved by the 
age of 29 years, in relation to the class of origin. The GHS does 
not, however, provide us with any longitudinal data of work 
careers. The NCDS, in contrast, lacks the longer age perspective 
provided by the GAS but does allow some limited analysis of intra- 
generational mobility between the occupational class of the first 
job obtained and the current occupational class, in the light of 
the class of origin and educational level. The NODS data can thus 
be used to examine what one might expect to find at the age of 23 
years, given that the GHS data has suggested that mobility is a 
long-term process in most cases. 
Table 5.5 examines intra-generational mobility by comparing 
occupational class in first job with that in the current job. The 
column headings relate to the four groups initially used to 
differentiate between young people in terms of their class of 
origin and their educational level. Data is presented for all 
males and for all childless females, regardless of length of time 
in the labour market or the number of jobs held. 
The table shows the importance of education in reducing the 
likelihood of downward mobility and, for working class sons, 
increasing the chance of upward mobility. The longer educated are 
the least likely to suffer downwards mobility during their working 
careers: within this group, there are some gender differences 
(women are less likely than men to be downwardly mobile), but no 
variation according to class of origin. This suggests that 
educaticn has a levelling effect, and overcomes the effect of class 
of origin, though not of gender, at least as far as intra- 
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generational mobility patterns are concerned. There is also 
evidence of upward career movement among the more educated. The 
label "stable class" does not preclude the possibility of less 
radical movement within either the manual or the non-manual 
classes. Many of the stable middle class in practice show 
considerable movement within the rc-manual classes, in particular 
moving from Class 3 up into the high non-manual classes with age, 
in the course of typical middle class careers. 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 5.5: INTRA-GE ERATIONAL MOBILITY 
Crosstabulatioaz of current occupational class by occupational 
class of first job, by class of origin, age left education 
and sex, among females without children and all males 
Six categories of occupational class are used 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
FATIER'S OOQJP CLASS: NON-MANUAL MANUAL 
AGE LEFT EDUCATION: <18 18 < 18 >' 18 
DIRECTION OF MOBILITY %%$% 
UPWARD 31 32 26 31 
STABLE 55 61 58 61 
DOWNWARD 13 7 17 8 
---------------------- 
ALL (=100%) 
---------------------- 
LES 
------------- 
(1053) 
------------- 
---------- 
(747) 
----------- 
----------- 
(2931) 
---------- 
------- 
(431) 
------- 
FMA 
UPWARD 24 23 21 25 
STABLE 67 72 69 71 
DOWNWARD 
-------- 
9 
------------- 
5 
-- 
10 4 
--------------- 
ALL (=100%) 
-------------- 
(705) 
------------- 
-------- 
(831) 
---------- 
---------- 
(1638) 
------ 
------- 
(521) 
--------- 
p< . 001 throughout 
---- ------- 
File: CLASSMOB(12) 
Source: I)S 
Arncng those with less full-time education, there are differences 
according to class. Upward mobility is more common and downward 
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mobility less common for children of non-manual fathers, compared 
with those from working class backgrounds. If previous hypotheses 
are correct, the two gawps vary because while many of the middle 
class are counter-mobile, the less educated working class do not 
show upward mobility over time. It should be noted, though, that 
among the less educated sores of non-manual fathers, 13% have been 
downwardly mobile in the course of their work careers. Counter- 
mobility is therefore not straightforward and not without risk: 
downward inter-generational mobility may be followed by further 
downward mobility on an antra-generational level. 
The patterns of work-life mobility may be complicated for those in 
manual work, involving movement both up and down the class 
structure. Table 5.5 shows that among the sons of manual workers 
who left full-time education early, 17% had been downwardly mobile 
and 26% had been upwardly mobile since their first jobs. The 
rather flat patterns observed in relation to the less educated 
working class in Table 5.2 may therefore have resulted from manual 
workers following disorderly careers (Goldthorpe, 1980) or short- 
term working class careers within the manual classes (Ashton and 
Field, 1976). 
Table 5.5 suggests that women show greater intra-generational 
stability than men in their careers to the age of 23, with between 
67% and 72% currently in the same occupational class as the class 
of their first job. As with men, the more educated groups vary 
little according to class of origin. Among the more educated, 
those from middle class backgrounds are marginally more likely to 
show upward mobility (24%) than those from working class 
backgrounds (21%). Some waren might achieve counter-mobility or 
upward mobility before they have children, but the evidence 
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suggests that intra-generational mobility both up and down is less 
common among women than among men. In other words, the class 
destinations of many women may be determined by their educational 
level. 
Paths E Class of Origin 
Another way of examining class careers is to describe the mobility 
routes, from class origins, through education and class of first 
job to the current occupational class at 23 years. Figure 5.6 
shows the routes from class of origin to the current occupational 
class for males in the ICDS. 
The data show that only 38% of those with non-manual fathers, 
compared with 72% of sons of manual fathers, can be described as 
showing completely stable class careers. 
The 19% of middle class sons who have reached non-manual work 
through indirect means represent the counter-mobile. Among these, 
8% reached non-manual work through a combination of educatiaýal and 
work routes, and 11% through work routes alone. Downward mobility 
(in so far as this can be assessed at the age of 23) has occurred 
among 45% of those of middle class origins, of whom 9% had 
education beyond the age of 18 years. The figure shows that there 
is considerable crossing inter-generaticnally of the manual/non- 
manual divide among men of middle class origins compared with those 
from working class backgrounds, and it is likely that as suggested 
by Table 4.3, for many of the middle class downward mobility will 
be temporary. 
Amcrg saris of manual workers, 25% have reached upward mobility by 
the age of 23. They include 7% who went straight into non-manual 
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Figure 5.6: MOBILITY ROUTES FROM CLASS OF ORIGIN - MALES 
FATHERS ACE LEFT CLASS OF Q)RRIINr YOUTH 
CLASS F-T IDUC 1ST JOB OCC CLASS CLASS 
18 N-M N-M 
42 27 261 STABLE M-C 
15 12 (38%) 
Al 
18 (1C 
JNPER-MOBILE 
N-M 
(1800) 
59 
100 100 
314 
43 
100 
M 
2 
3 
º7 
33100 
M 
DOWNWARD M-C 
(45%) 
<18 
18 N-M 
13 8 
x 11 
M 
(3362) 
//\, 
5 
87 76 
100 100 100 
<18 M 
File : Lcx 3n b (9) 
Source: NCDS 
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N-M 
7 
8 
3 
7 
A 1] 
3 
º3 
691 
100 
M 
1 -MOBILE (7%) 
WIRK-iä7ITPE (18%) 
" -MJ3ILE" 
(4) STABLE W-C 
(72%) 
Figure 5.7: MJBILITY IWrES FROM CLASS OF ORIGIN - 
WOMEN WITHOUT G! ILDREN 
See text for explanation of Manual and Non-Manual Classes for women 
FATHERS ACHE LEFT CLASS OF JRREN Y(X7 
CLASS F-T EPIC 1ST JOB 0CIC CLASS (LASS 
18 N-M N-M 
54 41 401 
4 3J 8 1 
N-M 
(1536) 
2 
1 
13 -im 5 
46 42 36 
100 100 100 100 
<18 M M 
18 ' N-M N-M 
24 17 17 
3 2 
4 
7 
M 
(2159) 
1 
7 3 
76 73 66 
100 100 100 100 
X18 M M 
File: C (9) 
Source: ISS 
STABLE M-C (43%) 
COUNTER-MOBILE 
(13%) 
DOWNWARD M-C 
(ce) 
ED -NMILE (17%) 
WORK-ROUTE (13%) 
"C 1TER-MDBILE" 
STABLE W-C 
(69%) 
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work after full-time education, 3% who achieved mobility through a 
combination of education and work routes, and 15% who achieved 
upward mobility tihrough working careers. Upward mobility via the 
work route seems more common than might have been expected from the 
GHS data. A small number (4%) of working class sons can be 
identified as the "counter-mobile working class", returning to 
manual work after initial employment in non-manual work. In 
general, tough, it seems that once the working class have achieved 
upward mobility, they retain their non-manual status. 
Figure 5.7 shows the mobility routes for women without children. 
The class schema has been dichotomised on different lines to take 
account of the different occupational structure for women. Those 
in junior non-manual work (Class 3) have been divided into those 
with longer in education (18 and aver) and those who left full-time 
education before the age of 18; the more educated have been grouped 
with the higher non-manual classes (1,2) and the less educated with 
the manual classes (4,5,6). This allows a dichotomy which is more 
meaningful for women than the usual manual/non-manual divide. It 
means, however, that by definition, women in Class 3 "Manual" (on 
the basis of their lower educatierzal level) cannot become upwardly 
mobile into Class 3 Non-manual, but all class movement which can be 
identified among men (from Class 4 to Class 3, or from Class 3 to 
Class 2, for example) whether through work or education routes, can 
still be identified among women. 
The figure shows that, among women, 43% of the middle class and 69% 
of the working class can be described as stable both intra- 
generationally and inter-generationally. For the first time, 
miter-mobility can be identified among women, with 13% of middle 
class daughters apparently cx*inter-mobile, regaining their class of 
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origin through work after initial downward mobility. Downward 
mobility has occurred for 44% of the daughters of non-manual 
workers, and upward mobility for 30% of daughters of manual 
workers. 
Women who have stayed longer in education are even less likely than 
men to suffer downward mobility, at least before the birth of their 
first child: only 7% of all middle class daughters without children 
are currently in manual (including lower grade non-manual) work 
after full-time education bey nd the age of 18. Similarly, only 3% 
of working class daughters with a longer education are in manual 
work. Education appears to be the chief means by which working 
class women obtain and stay in non-manual work: 17% took the 
education route and 13% the work route to upward mobility 
(including 3% who took a combination of the two). Education seems 
to protect women from downward mobility more than it does men, as 
was observed earlier. 
The data seem to show that among women there is a 'barrier" between 
the higher and lower classes which prevents downward mobility of 
the middle class into manual work. The very large class of junior 
non-manual workers would appear to act as a "one-way screen" 
(following Blau and Duncan, 1967: 59) protecting women from middle 
class families from entering manual work whatever their educational 
level. The concept does not appear to be as valid for young male 
workers, whose work careers often take them across classes. As 
Goldthorpe points out: 
Attempts to comprehend currently observable mobility flows and 
their implications for class formation in any way which can be 
summed up in some simple metaphor are unlikely to be very 
enlightening. 
(Goldthorpe, 1980: 54) 
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TYx)ugh previous analysis of the GHS allowed speculation that middle 
class women might also show patterns of counter-mobility, there has 
been no evidence of this before. Figure 5.7 shows that counter- 
mobility occurred for 13% of middle class daughters, comprising 8% 
who had education beyond the age of 18, and 5% who left education 
early. These figures, in comparison with those for men (17% of the 
sons of middle class fathers were identified as ocunter-mobile), 
suggest that counter-mobility might be more difficult for women who 
have not had additional education. 
The longitudinal data casts doubts on theories that there is 
homogeneity amcz women. Heath, having considered the situation of 
women in the class structure, caicluded that: 
Womanhood is a great leveller. The restrictions on women's 
job prospects means that they are much less divided by their 
social origins than are men. Class discrimination divides 
men, but sexual discrimination brings women together. 
Doubtless, if sexual discrimination and segregation within the 
labour market vanished, class divisions might assert 
themselves more strongly; but at present women's chances of 
occupational mobility are relatively poor and relatively 
(Heath, 1981: 135) 
By restricting the analysis to women without children and by using 
a revised and more appropriate class schema, the segregation of 
women in the labour market has in a sense been controlled for, and 
data have been produced which question the levelling influence of 
womenhood and emphasise class differences between them. Although 
women are less likely to be mobile, than men through intra- 
generational work careers, there is no evidence that yomig waren 
are a homogeneous group. Access to the educational routes to 
mobility is still determined to a large extent by class of origin, 
as the last chapter showed. As Anthony Heath has himself pointed 
out, it is childbearing which hinders We men's life chances. 
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Table 5.8: SUMMARY CAREER MOBILITY TABLE 
Derived from Figures 5.6 and 5.7 
------------------------------------------------------- 
CLASS OF ORIGIN MIDDLE WORKING 
SEX MFMF 
MOBILITY: 96 $$ 96 
STABLE 36 43 72 69 
UPWARD/0 UNTER MOBILE 19 13 25 30 
DOWNWARDLY MOBILE 45 44 4* 1* 
------------------------------------------------------- 
ALL (=100%) 1800 1536 3362 2159 
------------------------------------------------------- 
* "C, ounter-Mobile" Working Class 
Source: NCDS 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Data from the NCDS is summarised in Table 5.8 and confirms the 
hypotheses drawn from the GHS in the previous chapter and this, 
that while class stability is immediately apparent among the 
working class, it is partly through a process of cauiter-mobility 
in working careers that inter-generational stability occurs within 
the middle class. There is a high degree of mobility among both 
middle class and working class, both male and female. Counter- 
mobility occurs among women as well as men, though it is more 
difficult to identify. In general, the working class display far 
greater class stability inter-generationally and intra- 
generationally than the middle class. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Table 5.9: FKXYIIES T? KEN BY UPWARDLY MOBILE GROUPS 
Derived from Figures 5.6 and 5.7 
----------------------------------------------------- 
MOBILITY ROUTE X CATION IDUC/WORK WORK 
MOBILE GFOJP $% 
----------------------------------------------------- 
berMobile M-C 
Males -8 11 
Females -85 
Upwardly While W-C 
Males 73 15 
Females 17 49 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Source: NC, 'DS 
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The upward mobility routes apparent from Figures 5.6 and 5.7 can be 
summarised in Table 5.9. This suggests that while for males, 
upward mobility or counter-mobility is likely to occur as a result 
of work careers, for women the means to upward mobility is more 
likely to be through educational routes. In other words, the 
occupational class destinations of women are more likely to be 
determined prior to their entry into the labour force, while class 
mobility through work is more common for men. This will become 
more apparent in subsequent chapters when work mobility routes are 
examined in more detail. 
A Typology of Youth Class 
The following "Youth Classes" can now be distinguished. These 
represent "ideal types", according to which most, trough not all, 
young people can be identified. 
Stable Middle Class 
comprising those of middle class backgrounds and higher 
educational levels, who appear to move directly into non- 
manual work (reflecting the effect of class origins and 
educaticri); 
2 Fc x! ati on-Mobile WadcLng Class 
those of working class backgrounds who achieve upward mobility 
into non-manual work through full-time educatiow 
3 Munter-Mobile Middle Class 
those of middle class backgrounds who enter manual work or, in 
the case of women, low-grade non-manual work, and later 
retrieve their class positions through work mobility, or a 
combination of work and education routes; 
4 Wmit Pbuts Working Class 
those from working class families who achieve upward mobility, 
through work rather than education routes; 
5n »a iardly-Mobile Middle Class 
middle class early education-leavers who enter manual work, 
some of whom will become canter-mobile in time, while some 
will remain downwardly mobile; 
6 Stable Woddng Class 
those from working class backgrounds who are early school 
leavers, move into manual work and are unlikely to be upwardly 
mobile. 
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We have seen from the data presented bow these groups were formed 
and identified. Table 5.10 shows the distributions of Youth Class 
in the NC DS and the GHS. The table shows that among current non- 
manual workers, there are four identifiable groups which can be 
distinguished both by class of origin and by the mobility routes by 
which they reached non-manual work. Two groups of current manual 
workers have also been identified: the middle class who have been 
downwardly mobile (some of whom may become counter-mobile in time) 
and the stable working class. Within the manual and non-manual 
classes, there is therefore likely to be heterogeneity. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Table 5.10: YWTH CLASS IN THE CAS AND NCUS 
--------- 
Amcrig all men and women, at 23 years in the NODS 
and aged 16 to 29 years in the CRIS 
------------------------------------ -------- --------- 
M 
NODS 
ALE 
QJS 
FEM 
NODS 
ALE 
QIS 
YOUTH CLASS % 
-------------- 
% 
--------- 
$ 
------- 
% 
--------- -------------- 
STABLE M-C 13 10 13 12 
EDUCATION-MOBILE W-C 5 5 7 7 
CSXJNrER-MOBILE M-C 6 8 4 2 
WORK-ROUTE W-C 12 9 7 3 
DOWNWARDLY-MOBILE M-C 15 16 18 19 
STABLE WORKING CLASS 49 
---------------- 
52 
--------- 
51 
-------- 
56 
-------- ------------ 
ALL (=100%) 5265 
------------------- 
4760 
--------- 
5504 
-------- 
4684 
-------- --------- 
File: 21,22 
Source: NCDS, GHS(79&80) 
----------------------------- -------- -------- -------- 
Table 5.11 shows for both sexes and all Youth Classes, the 
occupational class of the first and current (or last) job, in the 
NDS cohort. Occupational class has six categories here, instead 
of just two. The table shows the occupational classes in which 
in -generational mobility occurs. Among the stable middle class 
and the cation-mobile working class, both male and female, there 
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Table 5.11: OCCUPATIOIIºL CLASS IN FIRST JOB AND IN 
CURRENT (OR LAST) 
----------------- 
JOB, 
------ 
BY YOUTH CLASS 
------------- 
AND SEX 
-- 
YOUTH CLASS 
-------- ----- ------- ------ 
FIRST & CURRENT STABLE EDUC COUNTER WIRK DOWNWARD STABLE 
OCCUPATIONAL MIDDLE MMILE MILE ROUTE MIDDLE W )RKIIG ALL 
CLASS 
----------------- 
% 
------ 
$ 
-------- 
$ 
------- 
$ 
-------- 
$ 
---- 
$ $ 
MFN 
- ------- ------- 
1 HIGHER PROF F 22 21 2 4 
C 24 22 9 9 6 
2 INPERMED N-M F 31 37 11 3 2 8 
C 36 39 53 39 14 
3 JUNIOR N-M F 47 43 31 7 3 14 
C 40 39 38 52 15 
4 SKILEID MF 36 25 53 59 42 
C 65 66 42 
5 SEMII-SKILLED F 52 22 28 26 23 
C 29 26 17 
6 UNSKILLED MF 13 9 8 11 8 
C 
------------------ ----- -------- ----- - -- - 
6 9 5 
T(Y AL (=100%) 
------------------ 
1WCrAm 
677 
----- 
238 
-------- 
- 
332 
------- 
-- --- 
611 
-------- 
------ 
812 
------ 
------- 
2595 
------- 
----- 
5265 
----- 
1 HIGHER PROF F 8 4 1 1 
C 9 5 5 2 2 
2 IN EMIM N-M F 46 35 18 3 2 11 
C 50 42 71 84 18 
3 JUNIOR N-M F 46 61 21 26 57 45 46 
C 41 33 24 14 59 45 44 
4 SKILEID MF 3 4 4 5 4 
C 7 9 6 
5 SEMI-SKIT-1 ED F 74 51 35 47 37 
C 33 43 28 
6 UNSKILLED F 1 1 1 1 
C 
--------- ----- -------- ------- -------- 
1 
- 
3 2 
---------- 
TO'rAL (=100%) 
------- 
704 
----- 
387 
-------- 
238 
------- 
368 
----- 
---- 
999 
------- 
2792 
----- 
5488 
------------ 
File: 130,131 
--- ----- ------- ----- 
Source: NCDS 
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appears to be movement from Class 3 into Class 2; but there are 
considerable gender differences in the class distributions, with 
only 9% of women, compared with 24% of men, in the higher 
professional Class 1. The Table shows that patterns for the 
downwardly mobile middle class and the stable working class are 
also very similar. Men in both groups are ocxentrated in Classes 
5 and 6, both in their first and current jobs, while women are 
mainly in Classes 3 and 5. Among women in these groups, the 
downwardly mobile middle class are more likely to be in junior rnn- 
manual work, while the stable working class are in semi-skilled 
manual jobs. 
The Counter-mobile middle class show an interesting pattern, amci- 
both men and women, whereby 52% of men and 74% of women are in 
semi-skilled manual work in their first jobs, while similar 
proportions are in Class 2, intermediate rcn-manual work, in their 
current jobs. This suggests that for both sexes, the mobility 
route for the counter mobile may be from Class 5 to Class 2. 
The work-route working class show a rather different pattern, since 
included in this group are some whose first job was in ncn-manual 
work despite their educational level (they left full-time education 
before the age of 18). Most of those who did enter ncn-manual work 
immediately on leaving full-time education entered junior non- 
manual work in Class 3. Of those entering manual work in their 
first jobs, the majority of women went into semi-skilled manual 
work (51%), while men entered either skilled or semi-skilled work. 
In their current jobs, the work route waren predominantly occupy 
Class 2, which includes the lower professions (the table suggests 
that some work-route women first enter a factory or other semi- 
skilled job on leaving school, before starting nursing or other 
training for the lower p2ofessicns). The work route, in terms of 
class, for men appears to involve movement mainly into junior non- 
manual work (52% are currently in Class 3), though some go into 
intermediate non-manual jobs (39%). when work route and counter- 
mobile men are compared, then, it seems that though the counter- 
mobile were in lower occupational classes in their first jobs, they 
are in somewhat higher occupational classes in their current jobs. 
In other words, the counter-mobile appear to do rather better than 
the work-route, in terms of intra-generational class mobility. 
This does not appear to be the case among women, since the counter- 
mobile appear to be more likely to be currently in junior non- 
manual work than the work-route (24% compared with 14%), while the 
work-route are more heavily concentrated in Class 2 (84%). 
The typology of youth class was developed in order to examine 
stratification in youth, and to understand differences between 
social groups of young people in terms of their class careers. It 
can therefore form a foundation for further analysis of the class 
and gender differences in other aspects of the transition to 
adulthood, in work, family formation and housing careers. 
s ry 
Stratification in youth has several dimensions: there is division 
according to class of origin, access to mobility routes, current 
occupational class and gender. For an understanding of the 
position of young people in the social structure all these factors 
need to be taken into account. Ideally, this requires the use of 
longitudinal data, though it is possible to develop hypotheses 
about mobility and class trajectories from cross-sectional data. 
Analysis has shown that any apparent homogeneity among the young 
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working class or middle class is only superficial, and a wider 
class perspective shows the extent of basic class divisions. These 
divisions are expected to be reflected in many aspects of young 
people's lives. Analysis of the transitions to adulthood in work, 
housing and family formation will therefore be more revealing if a 
multidimensional approach to stratification is applied to the 
analysis. 
125 
6 
Choice ar'xd faint in the Latots Maiket 
Social class of origin and educational level were seen in Chapter 4 
to determine current occupational class to a large degree; in 
Chapter 5 the class careers of young people were examined and it 
was suggested that the social class destinations of many may result 
from careers in the labour market rather than the attributes with 
which young people enter the labour market (in Parsonian terms, 
"achieved" status rather than "ascribed" status). For other young 
people, however, it was observed that class destinations were 
determined at an early stage. The stable middle class and the 
stable working class groups were so-called because they are 
unlikely to change their occupational class radically after their 
entry to the labour market. 
The stratificatory effects of the school system were briefly 
discussed earlier, in terms of its role in class reproducticn and 
the way the system tends to channel young people into different 
occupational strata (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Bourdieu, 1974). Some 
school pupils thus manage to achieve qualifications which will help 
them get better jobs, while others do not. The labour market 
further stratifies. Some jobs offer further career mobility, while 
others do not. Though the institutions forming the labour market 
are more autonomous than those which form the education "market", 
they still form part of a social system which assigns people to 
social classes and provides differential access to power, privilege 
and basic life chances (Kreckel, 1981: 530). The achievement of 
upward mobility and counter-mobility through work careers therefore 
depends in part on the structure of the labour market, and Whether 
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it assists or hinders the process. 
Interest in the school to work transition has not typically centred 
on the evidence it might provide sociological studies of class 
reproduction and mobility. Indeed, the bulk of early work on the 
entry into employment focused on occupational choice. It is only 
in recent years that structural constraints, in terms of the 
variability of occupational opportunities, have entered the debate, 
and this has perhaps been because the increase in youth 
unemployment has forced the issue into the open. More recently 
still, attention has been drawn to the stratificatory function of 
the labour market, again partly because the current recession has 
resulted in the labour market closing its doors to many who seek 
jobs. The different theoretical approaches to the entry into work 
have taken the form of a debate between theories of occupational 
choice and theories stressing the constraints of the occupational 
structure, but the differing views are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Instead, they appear to focus on different dimensions 
of the transition to work, and on different social groups. 
Occupational Choice and the CMartivifty Structure 
The location of the worker in the labour market raises theoretical 
issues. Why do people work in particular jobs? Why do many 
subsequently change jobs? Is the point of entry into the labour 
market the result of individual choice or limited opportunity? 
Among early theories of occupational choice were those ceveloped by 
Ginzberg (1951) and Super (1953), developmental psychologists whose 
theories had a profound effect on practitioners working in the 
field of Career Guidance, and on sociological thinking in the 
fifties and sixties. Ginzberg proposed that occupational Choice 
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was a developmental process of decisions made over the years, 
ranging from an initial choice based cn "maximum satisfaction" to a 
final oamprcmise in the face of social constraints. In the final 
"reality" period: 
... the individual recognises 
that he must work out a 
compromise between what he wants and the opportunities which 
are available to him. 
(Ginzberg, 1951: 186) 
occupational choice was thus seen as part of the process of 
crystallisation during adolescence described by Erikson (1968), and 
represented development towards adult psychological maturity. In 
these terms, then, job stability and job satisfaction represent the 
realisation of ambition or "self-actualisation", while job 
instability and even occupational mobility represent failure in the 
decision-making process. 
This view corresponds closely to the functionalist view of the 
transition from school to work, which holds as a criterion of 
success the degree to which individuals have been socialised into 
their work roles and thus beoocne adjusted to their work situations. 
For Ginzberg (1951), success was the realisation of ambiticn, and 
failure was frequent job-changing, or "floundering" in the 
occupational structure. 
It should be pointed out here that Ginzberg's analysis was 
initially based on the study of boys from upper-inane families in 
the United States, although he later supplemented his findings with 
some further studies of boys from lower-income families and data on 
girls, since he recognised that gender and educational achievement 
might affect the degree of Constraint cn freedom of choice. Later 
criticisms of Linzberg have cited working class youth in Britain, 
and it may be that his analysis has greater relevance to the study 
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of male middle class patterns, where there is greater access to job 
opportunities and other life chances. 
Ginzberg's work sparked off a debate in Britain, in which 
sociologists increasingly commented on the individual's lack of 
freedom to choose in the light of a very limited job opportunity 
structure. Kenneth Roberts, the main contributer to the debate, 
tested some hypotheses derived from analyses by Ginzberg and Super 
and concluded that, far from careers arising out of individual 
ambition, 
... ambitions are in fact products of careers. (Roberts, 1968: 176) 
Maizels, in her study of young workers, found much discrepancy 
between the needs and aspirations of school leavers and the 
opportunities open to them, and concluded that: 
The present requirements of the economic and social structure 
conflict with the needs of young adolescents to develop and 
assert their true individualities. 
(Maizels, 1970: 319) 
Though the questicns of individual need and the needs of the social 
structure are problematic concepts and open to criticism, this 
study does throw light on the extent of constraint on individual 
choice. In practical terms, both Maizels (1970) and Carter (1962) 
found that up to two-thirds of school leavers failed to obtain 
their Chosen jobs. 
occupational choice is hampered by lack of opportunity. Whether a 
school leaver can fulfill his or her ambitions depends on a 
combination of worker characteristics (such as gender, educational 
achievements, race) and labour market characteristics (such as 
whether industries are expanding or contracting, whether local 
labour markets are closing down or prospering, and the level of 
economic growth). The very notion of choice or ambition is 
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structured by the school leaver's frame of reference (Roberts, 
1971). Very often, neither the young nor their parents have much 
knowledge of labour market opportunities other than at a very local 
level. Roberts looked at the role of the home and the school in 
shaping ambitions: 
School leavers (... ) enter the labour market with their 
aspirations narrowly focused upon a limited range of 
occupations. Yet they lack the thorough job knowledge 
required to crystallise their ambitions upon a specific job. 
(Roberts, 1971: 143) 
Roberts has more recently summarised his argument as follows: 
The point being argued is that whilst individuals certainly 
have some scope for choice, the relationship between choice 
and opportunity is not simply arithmetical. The crucial fact 
is that choices, both in education and the labour market, are 
"determined" within parameters that are independently and 
previously cast by structural processes. 
(Roberts, 1981: 290) 
Roberts thus echoes the words of Allen (1968) and others later, in 
stressing the importance of locating the study of the transition in 
terms of the social structure. 
Keil (1984) advocates a model which provides an alternative to the 
linear and fragmentary approach of much recent research on the 
transition to work: 
The reduction in the availability of employment cpportunities, 
the acknowledgement of the sharp differentiation in 
experiences determined by ethnicity and gender make clear the 
need for a model which is sensitive to the complexities of the 
interrelationships between work, home and education and to the 
possibilities (probabilities? ) of discontinuities as well as 
continuities. 
(Keil, 1984: 7) 
The study of the transition from school to work clearly needs to be 
concerned with the location of young school leavers in the social 
structure. Class, gender and ethnicity will all affect the work 
experience and aspirations of the young. 
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Ambition and opportunity, choice and ocnstraint, are elements of 
the concept of "careers". The presence or absence of career 
motivation and opportunity largely structures working lives. It 
will be helpful to examine the sociological literature on careers, 
at this stage, in order to look at the transition from school to 
work in this broader context. 
Qonoept of Career 
The term "career" was originally brought into the sociological 
vocabulary by Weber. Describing a career structure as an essential 
feature of bureaucracies, he defined it as: 
A system of "promotion" according to seniority or to 
achievement, or both. 
(Weber, 1947: 334) 
Essentially, a career has been seen in terms of a job structure 
providing linear and orderly upward progression, as Wilensky points 
out: A career is a succession of related jobs, arranged in a 
hierarchy of prestige, through which persons move in an 
orderly (more-or-less predictable) sequence. 
(Wilensky, 1960: 523) 
Developing it of this notion of career structure, which relates to 
the job, has come a ccncept of career motivation, which applies to 
the worker. The two concepts of career motivation and career 
structure should however be kept distinct, though there is a close 
relaticnship between them. 
The concept of career has typically only been applied to men, 
reflecting perhaps the male orientation of much early sociology. 
Turner, for example, saw the ccix ept of career motivation as male 
gender specific, because (in his view) of the different emphases in 
ambition of men and women. He distinguished between a female 
emphasis an "material aspects of position" and a male emphasis cn a 
"cultural' style of life" which was more associated with career 
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orientation (Turner, 1964: 171). 
Women may accept the inevitability of marriage and motherhood 
disrupting their work, in the same way as some working men accept 
the inevitability of manual labour (Griffin, 1985: 50; Willis, 
1977). Among women, career motivation might therefore be 
diminished by the disccntinuaýs nature of most women's employment 
histories and the knowledge that child-bearing and limited job 
opportunities will affect their ability to achieve upward mobility 
in their work. The previous chapters have shown that even among 
women without children, upward mobility is likely to result from 
educational rather than occupational achievement. The increasing 
attachment to the labour market which has been reported for women 
has been achieved largely through their increasing involvement in 
part-time work, which is unlikely to provide training or allow 
promotion to any great extent (Martin and Roberts, 1984: 119). The 
more continuous work histories which more women are now following 
are still unlikely, in comparison with the situation of men, to 
result in upward career movement. As Crompton and Sanderson (1986) 
suggest, women still tend to be "practitioners" rather than 
"careerists" in their work. 
The concept of career has also been seen as class-related. 
Typically, it is the middle class who have been observed to defer 
gratification for the sake of longer-term gain, and who are 
ambitious in their attitude to work. In contrast, the working 
class have been described as seeking immediate gratificatirn, and 
opting for higher wages now, rather than career advancement later 
(Goldthorpe et al., 1969). So careers are associated with the 
middle class: 
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For the middle classes (... ) age is largely correlated with 
career. That is, the older a person (up to a certain age), 
the more likely he is to have moved up in socioeconomic 
position. 
(Lipsett, 1981: 279) 
In ccntrast, an xg the working class, there is no such expectation 
of advancement with age beyond movement with experience into 
skilled manual work. 
There is, however, unequal access to mobility chances within the 
middle class in "post-capitalist society", since some do not occupy 
positions that are part of a bureaucratic hierarchy (Dahrendorf 
1959: 55). Lower grade white collar workers, for example, may be 
prevented from achieving career movement by "career blocks" (so- 
called balkanisaticn), according to Giddens: 
Historically, one of the characteristics separating the clerk 
from the manual worker has been the fact that the former has 
nominally, and to some degree actually, enjoyed promotion 
possibilities which were not open to the latter. In so far as 
the position of clerical workers is subject to a career 
"block", such that the opportunities of career mobility are 
only open to those with specialised academic qualificaticns, 
there is likely to be a stxnng stimulus to unionisation and to 
collective action. 
(Giddens, 1981: 191) 
It is therefore simplistic to associate careers with the middle 
class, without some qualification. It appears that within the 
middle class there may be small scale, larger scale or even no 
career movement. Giddens' example of clerical workers is 
interesting, since it suggests why many women who are nominally in 
non-manual work, fail to show the career patterns of male non- 
manual workers: their work as clerks and typists is generally low- 
grade and lacks the career structure to which many male higher- 
level inn-manual jobs belong. 
In contrast to the middle class, the working class do not generally 
display work careers. Even the affluent workers in GoldUxxrpe et 
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al. 's (1969) study, though similar in many ways to the middle 
classes, showed marked differences in their attitude to their jobs: 
Qne clear-cut difference between our affluent workers and most 
men in white-collar jobs lies in the fact that among the 
former, serious aspirations for promotion were held by only a 
small minority, with one important reason for this being the 
view that promotion - to supervisory level at least - was 
simply not worth while. 
(Goldthorpe et al., 1969: 75) 
GoldthDrpe and his colleagues noted that many of their respcndents 
... doubted the objective possibilities of a career from the 
shop floor upwards; 
(op. cit: 75) 
and they found, as earlier writers had, that instead of 
... aspiring in white-collar fashion to make a "good career" 
within their firms, these men hoped rather to gain a "good 
living" from their firms - the typical aim was not a 
progressive series of jobs but the wherewithal to sustain a 
progressive advance in the material conditions of their out- 
of-work lives. 
(op. cit: 77) 
Career motivation therefore seems to arise only if there. is a 
possibility of ambitions being realised, and if the benefits are 
likely to be worth the sacrifice involved. There is no object in 
concentrating on work unless the dedication is likely to bear 
fruit. Those in manual work, or lower grade ncn-manual work, which 
offers no career structure, are therefore unlikely to have career 
motivation. Women are additionally affected by the expectation of 
discontinuities in their working lives. Career orientation is both 
shaped by, and a product of, opportunity and is thus largely 
associated with men in higher non-manual jobs. 
Careers and C`areerlessrýess in Youth 
For the concept of careers to be applied to youth, a wider 
definition of "career" is needed than that discussed above. Career 
orientation needs to be extended to mean simply tzying to improve 
one's position. Nevertheless it will still be the case that career 
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orientation will be structured by opportunity. 
A career orientation or lack of it appears to be formed early in 
youth, during the school years. Career orientation is likely to 
occur among those who accept the norms of the school and are 
academically achievement-motivated. Possible reasons for a lack of 
career aspirations are proposed by Willis (1977) arx Ashton (1973) 
who identify a process whereby some working class school pupils 
accept the inevitability of manual work. They suggest that peer 
group identification is one of the main factors in channelling the 
academically ungifted into careerless occupations: 
For the norms and values of their peer group offer them 
support in their counter-rejection of the dominant values 
transmitted within the school. This rejection of education, 
and hence of the possibility of entering those occupations 
that require educational certification, constitutes a process 
that further commits pupils to semi-skilled work. 
(Ashton, 1973: 109). 
Willis has been criticised, by Corrigan (1979) and others for 
suggesting that the motivation for manual work comes from within 
working class culture rather than resulting from structural 
inequality. Corrigan suggests instead that working class attitudes 
to work result from lack of class consciousness, accompanied by a 
preoccupation with local, short-term and instrumental factors: 
The picture is one within the general cultural limitations of 
boys seeing their future work as part of a chance 
configuration of family, careers and traditionally-known job 
opportunities in the area. 
(Corrigan, 1979: 78). 
Corrigan goes on to conclude that far from expectations of job 
satisfaction or career trajectory, 
Instead we see what has been described as the instrumental 
working class attitude to work, or alternatively the 
expectation of alienated labour. 
(Corrigan, 1979: 80) 
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Within the working class, then, it is helpful to define different 
groups according to their attitudes and work behaviour. In 
contrast to the school non-achievers, whom Ashton identified as 
"careerless", there are those identified as following "working 
class careers", typically as a result of apprenticeships, and this 
group had accepted both the norms of the school and their own 
academic limitations: 
Thrtixrghaut their school life they are systematically offered 
and pointed towards the promise of a greater reward in the 
short-terns future. 
(Ashton, 1973: 115) 
Brown (1984) explores the orientations of school leavers, and 
further develops the theme of alienation and instrumentalism as the 
basis for working class attitudes. His typology can be set out as 
follows: 
Sc pool Zee axe ern to Sdtiol 
Reins Getting In Alienated 
Ordinary Kids Getting On Alienated Instrumental 
Swots Getting Out Normative Instrumental 
In Brown's terms, the Rems are concerned with "getting into" the 
working class through unskilled manual jobs; the Ordinary Kids, 
through alienated in their atitudes to school, are caxcezned to "get 
cri" in working class terms, through respectable working class jobs; 
the Swots are concerned with "getting out" of the working class, 
and use the school as the means to do so. 
The most helpful typology of working class youth careers is that 
developed by Ashton and Field (1976), which divides occupational 
careers into three types: 
The Careerless, comprising mainly those of lower working class 
origin, who are in semi-skilled or unskilled work and are 
characterised by concern with immediate gratification, 
frequent job-changing and (occasionally) delinquent 
subcultures; 
Short-term cam, those in lower non-manual or skilled 
manual work and origins, who have a short-term career 
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orientation which takes them through initial training but 
little further, and who are not frequent job-changers, and 
might be regarded as the respectable wozking class; 
Extended Careers, primarily of the upwardly mobile working 
class and the middle class who leave school early and move 
into secure jobs providing long-term careers. 
The typology provides a useful framework for examining work 
careers, and incorporates many of the ideas put forward by Willis, 
Corrigan, Jenkins and Brown. The "Careerless" would appear to 
include both the alienated "Rems" (Brown), the "Lads" (Jenkins) and 
the "Hammertown Boys" (Willis). In terms of the typology of youth 
class developed here, the "Careerless" would be a sub-group of the 
stable working class. Those in short-term working class careers - 
The Ordinary Kids (Brown and Jenkins) - represent the remainder of 
the stable working class. Those in extended careers in Ashton's 
typology, or Swots (Brown) and Citizens (Jenkins), correspond to 
the Upwardly Mobile Working Class. All the typologies discussed 
were developed in order to examine working class orientations and 
behaviour, and therefore exclude the middle class. Typically, the 
middle class are also involved in long-term or extended careers. 
The Extended Careers in the Ashton and Field Typology could thus 
also include other groups from the Youth Class typology: the Stable 
Middle Class, Upwardly Mobile Working Class and Counter-Mobile 
Middle Class. These groups, or their equivalents, appear to have 
received little attention in sociology; the transition to work of 
the middle class has rarely inspired interest (cf. Kelsall, et al., 
1972). 
The presse or absence of a career orientation is likely to affect 
a young person not only in their working lives but also in other 
aspects of their transition to adulthood. The studies by Willis, 
Ashton and Brown with regard to young workers, and by Goldthorpe 
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with regard to adult men, have all shown the importance of a 
longitudinal approach to the study of employment. For the 
"Careerless", "Reins" or "Hammertown Boys", occupational mobility is 
likely to take the form of horizontal movement in the labour 
market, rather than vertical, and the point of entry into the 
labour market is therefore likely to be a useful indicator or 
future employment and life-style. For those entering a career, 
whether short or long term, the first job entered may be less 
significant, and represent merely a stepping stone in a career 
progression. Similarly, as Brown (1984) points out, the 
introduction of the concept of career allows a further evaluation 
of the notion of occupational choice, in that aspirations of school 
leavers may relate to later stages of their careers rather than 
their first jobs. It may be that for the aspiring working class as 
for the middle class, careers are in part a product of ambition and 
modified according to labour market experience (Roberts, 1968). 
These distinctions have not always typically been made in studies 
of young workers, and "Careerlessness" appears to have attracted 
more attention than it deserves. More significantly, perhaps, 
studies of young workers have concentrated on the working class, 
and particularly on males. 
The aim of the following chapters is to re-examine the transition 
from school to work in terms of the class location of young people, 
male and female, working class and middle class. The study will 
use the typology of Youth Class as a basic framework for analysis. 
The differential access of young people to occupational choice is 
examined and, additionally, the linearity of the transition is 
questioned (Chapter 7). Issues relating to entry into the labour 
market and subsequent movement within it will be addressed, in 
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terms of the actions of young people and their families rather than 
the aspirations of either (Chapter 8). Then in Chapter 9 some of 
the work-related routes to upward social mobility will be looked at 
in the context of work careers and differential access to 
oppor'tlu 1ties. 
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fiter 7 
The ßhtiy Int Wcak 
In this chapter, entry into work by school and college leavers will 
be examined in the light of the typology of youth class developed 
earlier. Family affiliation with local labour markets, and the 
recruitment methods of employers will be seen to structure to a 
great extent the entry into work of new recruits to the labour 
force and their initial occupational and class location. The 
character of local labour markets, in terms of recruitment 
practices and job information outlets affects the ability of young 
people to choose their future work. 
E it ry and Location 
About half of all young people leave school at the minimum age with 
either rn qualifications or with qualifications below GCE 0 Level. 
Of those leaving school in 1980 at the age of sixteen, about one 
third had not found employment by the end of the year (Department 
of Employment, 1984: 230). 
Over the last decade the labour market has been subject to trends 
which have greatly altered the job opportunities of young people. 
The shift from primary and manufacturing industries to the service 
industpy has meant that for many male school leavers, the types of 
jobs which were once typically entered, in semi-skilled or 
unskilled work in manufacturing industry, often no longer exist. 
The service industry jobs which have replaced them are less likely 
to offer training and apprenticeships (Department of Employment, 
1984: 232). Ashton's study of youth labour markets concluded that: 
In general terms, the overall shift in emphasis from a 
manufacturing to a service eoaxomy has tended to irx cease the 
number of cpenings in the higher occupational segments while 
decreasing the number In the lower manual segments. The 
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result has been a contraction in the opportunities for 16-year 
old school-leavers entering the local labour-market straight 
from school, and and incase in the proportion of places for 
the older school-leaver or college-leaver. 
(Ashton et al., 1982: 45) 
While industries and the number of jobs have been declining, the 
characteristics of the labour force have changed as well. Payne 
(1984) found that young workers were increasingly likely to have 
qualifications, while the unemployed young were more likely to be 
those without qualifications. It is difficult to determine whether 
more young people may be going on to further education, since the 
numbers are generally underestimated by schools; recent published 
statistics show that the number of minimum age school leavers had 
risen in 1981-2 and 1982-3 even though the number eligible to leave 
had'fallen (Department of Employment 1985: 322-325). It may be the 
case that employers are increasingly taking on the more qualified, 
rather than that more young people are staying in education. Raffe 
(1984: 253) 'suggests that far from educational qualifications being 
devalued during the recent recession (which is likely to occur if 
more people gain qualifications), what has happened is that while 
employment prospects are worse for all school leavers, the relative 
advantage of the qualified has increased. 
A third major effect upon young entrants to the labour force has 
been the succession of government schemes, designed to provide 
training to the less qualified school leavers and to reduce the 
numbers of the unemployed. Neither the GHS nor the NC DS covers 
government schemes in any detail, and it is not proposed to attempt 
any analysis here. It should be noted, however, that some 
respondents to the GHS and NC DS will be out of the labour force 
because of membership of the Youth OpporttmitiP3 plogramme (ypp) 
or earlier Work Experience Programme (WEP) which were in operation 
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at the time. 
Employment while Still at school 
For many young people, there is no clear cut division between being 
a school pupil and being an employee. Education and employment are 
likely to overlap. College students often take on holiday work; 
school children under 16 take on evening, holiday and weekend work; 
full-time workers are often receiving part-time education or in- 
service training. The transition from school to work is more 
complicated therefore than it first appears. 
The question of child employment is an interesting area, morally, 
sociologically and economically. It seems that many children take 
an employment, sometimes illegally, while they are still at school 
(MacLennan et al., 1985). For many, then, the "entry into 
employment" is purely a formal entry, since they may already have 
been in part-time employment, though uninsured and untaxed, for 
many years. The Low Pay Unit research on child workers showed that 
many children work lag ha= and do jobs normally associated with 
adult workers, though for less pay; there is thus a danger that 
they provide a cheap alternative to adult labour and exacerbate 
unemployment among school leavers. 
Since the economic lives of young people living at home remain a 
relatively unresearched area, the importance to the school child or 
the family of an additional income from paid work in term-time, 
remains an area for speculation. It is possible, as the Low Pay 
Unit research has indicated, that this part of the household 
income may be a useful addition in many cases, occasionally by 
providing a contribution to the household budget or more commonly 
through reducing the child's need for pocket money or clothing 
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expenses (MacLennan et al, 1985). 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 7.1: PAID WORK AS SCHOOLCHILDREN AGE) 16 
BY YOUr CLASS AT 23 
Percentages of each type who had jobs curing term-time 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
MALE FEMALE 
YOUTH CLASS Prop. Base prop. Base 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
STABLE MIDDLE CLASS 40 (539) 41 (580) 
EDUCATION-MOBILE W-C 
COUNTER-MOBILE M-C 
WORK-ROUTE W-C 
DOWNWARDLY-MOBILE M-C 
37 (195) 48 (301) 
51 (255) 57 (182) 
58 (474) 56 (301) 
56 (655) 54 (798) 
STABLE WORKING CLASS 53 (1912) 49 (2120) 
-------------------------------------------------- -- 
ALL 52 (4030) 50 (4282) 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
File: UNMP(23) 
Source: NCDS 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
How widespread is child labour, and who does it? The NCDS asked 
respondents at 16 years (in 1974) whether they had a job during 
term time, excluding holiday jobs. When all paid jobs are 
considered, regardless of the working hours involved, it is seen 
(Table 7.1) that around half of all respondents had a job of some 
sort during term. When proportions are examined in the light of 
their youth class a distinction emerges between those who will take 
(after 16) the educational route to upward mobility and those who 
will take the work route, regardless of class of origin. Among 
males of working class origin, 57% of those who became upwardly 
mobile through work had term-time jobs, compared with only 37% of 
those who became upwardly mobile through education. Among the 
middle class, 51% of the counter-mobile had term-time jobs, 
compared with 40% of the stable middle class (who achieved class 
stability through education). The downwardly mobile middle class 
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(many of whom will achieve counter-mobility in time) were also 
likely to have school time jobs. The picture for women is broadly 
similar, with employment during school associated with later 
mobility through work rather than educational routes. 
It appears therefore that work during the school years is 
associated with low educational achievement (and may affect it), 
but is not necessarily associated with low subsequent achievement 
at work (cf. Roberts, 1984: 8). It seems that there is a link 
between paid work when at school and employment in adult life: 
young people may be set along a particular class trajectory, or 
mobility route, far earlier than one might expect, and pre-adult 
work may be an important feature of early work experience. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 7.2: UNII4PLOYMENI' BY EXPERIENCE OF PAID WORK DURING 
----- 
SCTiOOL AT 16 BY YOUTH CLASS AT 23 
Percentages of each class with total of six mcntths or more 
unemployment since leaving school 
Raw percentages 
------------------- ------- -------- ----- ------- ----------- --- - 
YC7UIH CLASS JOB NO JOB ALL 
-- 
SIGN. 
-------------------- 
% 
------- 
Base 
-------- 
% 
----- 
Base 
------- 
(=100%) 
----------- 
p= 
----- 
Males 
STABLE MIDDLE 10 (218) 9 (321) (539) NS 
EDUC-MOBILE 10 (73) 20 (122) (195) p . 05 
BUNTER-MOBILE 13 (126) 20 (129) (255) NS 
WORK-ROUTE 13 (273) 13 (201) (474) NS 
DOWNWARD MIDDLE 16 (364) 27 (291) (655) p . 001 STABLE WORKIlVG 
----------------- 
24 
------- 
(1012) 
-------- 
35 
----- 
(899) 
-------- 
(1911) 
----------- 
p . 001 
--- --- 
Females 
STABLE MIDDLE 7 (240) 10 (340) (580) NS 
EDUC-MOBILE 3 (145) 19 (156) (301) p . 001 
(XUNIER-MOBILE 11 (104) 15 (78) (182) NS 
WORK-ROUTE 12 (168) 18 (133) (301) NS 
DOWNWARD MIDDLE 14 (431) 19 (366) (797) NS 
STABLE WORKING 
---------------- 
20 
-------- 
(1037) 
------- 
27 
----- 
(1082) 
-------- 
(2119) 
---------- 
p . 001 
---- 
File: UNEMP(23) 
-------------------- -------- ------- ----- -------- 
----- 
Source: NcDS 
--------------- 
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The data in Table 7.2 shows an association between taking on a job 
when still at school and lower incidence of unemployment later. 
The table shows that among the stable working class men and women, 
and downwardly mobile middle class men, those who had been child 
workers of both sexes were less likely to suffer long-term 
unemployment in adult life. Perhaps early work experience is an 
advantage in the labour market for those who otherwise are likely 
to risk unemployment, providing young applicants for jobs with 
evidence of their commitment and reliability. Local labour markets 
vary, however, and in areas of high unemployment the kinds of jobs 
taken by school children may be less available. 
Unemployment 
Paid work may start before a young person has left school, but it 
is not certain that employment will commence on leaving education. 
Trends in the economy, industry and employment all affect youth 
employment, which is one of the major social issues of our time. 
in 1979 and 1980 unemployment was beginning to increase, 
particularly among young people, but overall current unemployment 
among the GHS sample aged 16 to 29 was relatively low at 6%, and 
only 10% of the NCDS sample was unemployed at 23 years in 1981. 
Current unemployment is considerably higher, unemployed jobseekers 
comprising 19% of 16-19 year olds and 16% of 20-24 year olds in 
1985 (Department of Employment, 1986) - and even Use figures are 
an underestimate of the total percentages unemployed, since they 
exclude all those on the Youth Training Scheme, and those who are 
not locking for work. 
In the labour market, young people are often in competition with 
adults for jobs, and during the current recession the ccmpetitiaz 
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has become even more acute. Though young workers may be attractive 
as cheap labour, their lack of experience and need for training, 
together with the employer's greater sense of responsibility 
towards employees of longer standing, all tend to militate against 
the young in their search for work. It is easier for an employer 
to restrict recruitment than to make redundancies. 
Casson (1979) suggests that high unemployment among yauV people is 
partially due to competition from female workers, particularly 
married women. The occupational structure of married women is 
usually gender-specific, part-time and often limited to semi- 
skilled factory work in particular industries, or to junior 
clerical work. There are some areas, though, notably in the 
distributive trades and cleaning work, where married women and 
young people are in competition for jobs. 
The recession has resulted in higher levels of unemployment at all 
ages, but particularly among the young . Raffe stresses 
the need to 
differentiate between structural causes of youth unemployment 
(manifested in the changing industrial structure) and recent, 
rather than underlying, trends resulting from the recession. His 
study of school leavers in Scotland suggests that most youth 
unemployment results from the recession and not from structural 
change (Raffe, 1984: 260). 
Raffe's study rejected earlier claims by Rees and Atkinson (1982) 
that youth unemployment was caused by youth-specific structural 
factors, and posited instead that youth and adult unemployment were 
in close relationship and recession-induced (following Makeham, 
1980). Youth unemployment rises faster than adult unemployment 
during a recession, but also drops at a faster rate during a 
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recovery, in a pendulum effect. The main explanation for this 
effect is that there is a greater likelihood that young people will 
be seeking work, and in consequence they will be first hit by any 
change in employer's recruitment practices. 
--------------------- 
Table 7.3: 
----------------- 
BY YOUTH CLASS 
----------- ----- -- 
Total months unemployed since leaving full-time education, 
by youth class and s ex. 
Row percentages 
--------------------- --------- -------- ----------- ------- 
TOTAL MONTHS U NEMPLOYED 
YOUTH CLASS 
--------------------- 
Nahe 
--------- 
1-5 
-------- 
6 or More 
----------- 
N(=100%) 
-------- 
M LES 
STABLE MIDDLE 67 24 9 (677) 
EDUCATION-MOBILE 59 25 16 (238) 
COUNTER-MOBILE 61 23 16 (332) 
WORK-1 ITE 62 24 14 (611) 
DOWNWARD MOBILE 56 22 22 (811) 
STABLE WORKING 47 24 30 
- 
(2593) 
- --------------------- 
ALL 
--------------------- 
--------- 
54 
--------- 
-------- 
24 
-------- 
-------- -- 
22 
----------- 
---- -- 
(5262) 
------- 
FFIAIES 
STABLE MIDDLE 65 26 10 (704) 
F ºTION-MOBILE 64 24 12 (387) 
COUNTER-MOBILE 59 27 14 (238) 
WORK FXYM 59 24 17 (369) 
DOWNWARD MOBILE 63 21 17 (1005) 
STABLE WORKING 
----------------- 
54 
--------- 
22 
-------- 
24 
------- 
(2798) 
---- 
ALL (=100%) 58 23 
---- 
19 
------- 
(5501) 
File: UNII P(23) 
Souurce: NCDS 
-------------- 
The low unemployment figures in the (ß-1S and NODS data taxier study 
d4 not permit close study. The relevant issue here is, what is the 
experience of unemployment of the different youth classes, and 
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should the unemployed form a separate category which should be 
added to the typology for some analyses? 
Table 7.3 shows unemployment, defined as total period of 
unemployment since leaving full-time education, in terms of the 
typology of youth class for the NCDS cohort. Nearly a quarter of 
all young people have experienced short periods of unemployment 
totalling under six months. However, when we examine longer 
unemployment periods, totalling over six months, there is a clear 
association between unemployment and youth class. 309 of the 
stable working class have had a total of more than six months 
unemployment in their work lives, compared with only 9% of the 
stable middle class. Unemployment among the mobile groups ranged 
between 14 and 16%, except for the downwardly mobile middle class, 
22% of whom had been unemployed for a total of more than six months 
since leaving full-time education. Again, the picture for women is 
broadly similar to that for men, trough 3% fewer had suffered long 
unemployment. 
In the next chapter, the high incidence of unemployment among the 
downwardly-mobile middle class will be examined in terms of 
the strategies of mobility, and in particular the risks involved in 
class mobility through job-changing. 
The NCDS data shows the advantages of longitudinal data over 
cross-sectional data when studying unemployment, since the total 
number of months of unemployment is a better indicator than current 
unemployment for looking at the characteristics of the unemployed. 
The findings presented here show the extent of the experience of 
unemployment among the NODS cohort, of wurm 46$ of men and 42% of 
women had experienced some unemployment. 
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The ease with which people get jobs varies according to their 
(supply side) characteristics (Jenkins, 1984), the characteristics 
of the local labour and the extent of their dependence upon it. 
The GHS does not allow a detailed examination of local labour 
markets, since geographical regions are too large and 
heterogeneous. The broad regional and industrial distribution of 
-the sample can be seen from Table 7.4, which gives a regional 
breakdown of the industries in which 16-29 year olds are employed. 
There are striking gender differences: while males are fairly 
evenly distributed between industries, 64% of women are in just two 
industries, the distributive trades and professional and financial 
services. Roberts et al. (1985) have commented on the role of 
employers in perpetuating gender segregation in industry, despite 
nominal equal cr-portunities for women. 
Data for males in the GHS shows that while some industries 
(construction, utilities, distributive trades and public 
administration and defence) show little regicnal variation, there 
are other industries which tend to be specific to some areas 
(notably, consumer goods - food and clothing - industry in East 
Anglia, raw materials in the north of England, East Midlands and 
Wales, professional and financial services in the Icndcn area, and 
capital goods in the West Midlands). (Appendix 3 gives full 
details of industrial classifications). It is clear then that 
expansion in the service industries and the decline of 
manufacturirxj and primary industry will affect some areas more than 
others. It is also likely to affect men more than women, if men 
have been traditionally employed in the now declining and more 
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localised industries. 
------------------------------ 
Table 7.4: INDUSTRY BY REGION 
------ ------ ------ -------- ---- -------- 
Industry of current (or last) job amang GiS respond nts, 
aged 16-29 
Row percentages 
-------------------- ---- ------ ------ ------ ------ -------- ---- -------- 
IND USTRIA L GROU P ALL 
REGION 
------------ 
1 
-------- 
2 
---- 
3 
------ 
4 
------ 
5 
- 
6 7 8 (=100%) 
MFN 
----- ------ -------- ---- -------- 
NORTH 9 16 19 18 8 19 4 7 318 
YORKS, HUMBER 12 17 15 11 9 22 10 4 473 
NORTH WEST 11 13 19 13 9 23 8 5 656 
E MIDLANDS 14 20 19 13 7 18 5 4 392 
W MIDLANDS 8 13 26 11 6 21 10 5 538 
E ANGLIA 19 7 19 17 7 18 11 3 176 
LCNDON 7 4 13 13 13 26 20 5 715 
HOME GTIES 9 5 20 11 10 26 15 4 597 
CUTER SE 13 8 17 14 9 25 10 4 382 
SOLMI WEST 14 5 18 12 10 27 11 5 333 
WALES 12 17 9 17 9 25 7 4 242 
SCOTLAND 10 10 14 14 10 24 12 7 580 
ALL RDGIC* 
------------ 
WCHEN 
11 
-------- 
11 
---- 
17 
------ 
13 
------ 
9 
------ 
23 
------ 
11 
-------- 
5 
---- 
5402 
------ 
NORTH 16 4 7 2 2 45 20 6 332 
YORKS HUMBER 13 7 5 2 3 42 23 4 500 
NORTH WEST 12 8 6 1 4 43 22 4 641 
E MIDLANDS 19 10 7 1 4 35 20 5 395 
W MIDLANDS 10 4 17 1 2 37 22 6 489 
E ANGLIA 20 2 11 2 4 38 19 4 205 
LCNDON - 10 2 5 1 7 37 35 4 766 
HOME CTIES 9 4 6 2 5 36 34 5 523 
OUTER SE 9 3 9 1 5 38 30 7 391 
SOUTH WEST 12 2 9 1 5 43 25 5 370 
WALES 14 5 5 3 3 45 19 7 238 
SCOTLAND 15 5 6 2 4 38 24 6 570 
ALL REGIONS 13 5 7 1 4 39 25 5 5420 
File: ENrRY 
GHS: 79&80 
-------------------------------------------------- 
NOM: See Appendix 3 for Industrial Classification 
-------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 7.5 shows regional differences in experience of unemployment 
amcrxg the NODS sample. This "league table" of unemployment shows 
that total periods of unemployment were similar for men and women 
in each region, though, apart from in the North Midlands, women 
were less likely than men to have experienced more than six months 
employment. Most lcu -term unemployment occurred in the areas which 
are dominated by declining industries, notably in the North of 
England, Wales and Scotland. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 7.5: U NE PLOYM 7Nr BY REGION AND SEX 
Table stows percentages who have had a total of six months 
or more of unemployment since leaving full-time education, 
by region at 16 years and sex 
------------------------------------------- 
MALE FEMALE 
REGION %$ 
------------------------------------------- 
NORTH 30 28 
NORTH WEST 30 23 
WALES 28 25 
S=AND 26 24 
E&W RIDINGS 21 20 
MIDLANDS 21 20 
SOUTH WEST 21 14 
EAST 18 11 
LCD &SE 15 11 
NORTH MIDLANDS 14 17 
SOUTH 13 12 
-------------------- 
TOTAL % 
------------- 
21% 
---------- 
18% 
BASE (=100$) 
-- - 
4680 4646 
-- --- ------------ 
Sign. p'(. 001 
------------- ---------- 
File: DOLE(17) 
Source: ICDS 
-------------------- ------------- ---------- 
Some industries can be more closely associated with unemployment 
than others. The declining industries are likely to lay off their 
workforce rather than recruit new workers. Other industries, such 
as construction work, may be seasonal. Some service industry work 
lacks job security or long-term prospects. Table 7.6 shows the 
industry with which those with the most unemployment have been 
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associated at two points in their working lives (their current job 
and their first job). The table thus gives an indication of those 
industries which are most associated with unemployment - i. e. which 
are the least secure, or the most likely to "lay off" their 
workers. Construction, manufacturing, distributive trades and 
mining are the four industrial sectors which seem to provide the 
least security for their workers. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 7.6: UNEMPLOYM BY INDUSTRY 
Total period of unemployment since entry into labors market, 
by industry, averaged between industry of first job and 
industry of current (or last) job. 
Percentage of those in industry with 6 months or more unemployed, 
all males and females. 
INDUSTRY 6 OR MORE NKR UNEMPLOYED 
a STRUCrICN 29 
MANUFACTURING 27 
DISTRIBUTIVE 24 
MINING 21 
METAL G00®S 19 
AGRICULTURE, FOREST, FISH 19 
TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATION 17 
ENERMI & WATER SUPPLY 12 
BANKEI & FINANCE 9 
------------------------------------------------- 
Bases: 10114 (1st job) and 10027 (Current Job) 
File: IND (27) Source: ISS 
------------------------------------------------- 
occupational choice is restricted for those who live in areas of 
high unemployment and who are unable or unwilling to move to 
another area, thus depending on local labour market opportunities. 
Young people and their parents may have limited knowledge of career 
possibilities other than those which are available locally, and so 
occupational choice will be affected by the breadth of the frame of 
reference of school leavers and their parents. Carter (1962) 
examined the influence of the home and the school on eventual 
occupational choice and observed that parents seldom advised their 
children on jobs, because of their ignorance of the general labour 
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market. The extent of knowledge of labour market opportunity is 
likely to be class related. 
Where knowledge is restricted to local labour markets, children are 
more likely to enter in the same industries as their parents. 
According to the GHS, sons are more likely to be in the same 
industry as their fathers than in any other industry. Table 7.7 
shows the extent of the association between the industrial location 
of young people living in the parental home, and the industry of 
their parent of the same sex. Overall, 24% of sans living at home 
have fathers in the same industry as themselves. Highest incidence 
of sons and fathers in the same industry occurs in the raw 
materials, consumer goods, construction and capital goods 
industries. The standardised residuals from a model of no 
association show that when the size of. each industry is controlled 
for, the closest association is in raw materials, which includes 
coal mining and the steel industry, both of which tend to dominate 
local labour markets. Thus in thriving mining areas, there may be 
few opportunities for sons other than to join their fathers, while 
in areas where mines are closing, there may be no job opportunities 
at all. 
The least associaticri between sons' and fathers' industries seems 
to occur in the public sector service industries, utilities and 
public administration and defence, and it will be seen that 
recruitment patterns in these industries make it more difficult for 
scns to follow in their father's footsteps. 
Among women, 35% of daughters living at home have mothers in the 
same industry as themselves. The areas in which daughters are most 
likely to follow their mothers' footsteps are in distributive 
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trades (42%), professional and financial services (39%), capital 
goods (29%) and consumer goods (26%). These are the industries in 
which most waren are located. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 7.7: FAMILY ATTACHMENT TO INDUSTRY 
Industry of respcu ents showing the gm portion in each 
industry with a same-sex parent in the same industry 
and standardised residuals from a model of no association 
between respondent's industry and parent's industry. 
Among respondents living in the parental home. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
SAME-SEX PARENT REST DENIS 
IIWSTRY IN SAME INWSTRY IN INDUSTRY 
Row $ STD RESID N(=100$) Gal $ 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
MALES 
RAW MATERIALS 28 11.0 (271) 10 
CONSUMER (ADS 28 8.7 (324) 12 
CONSTRUCTION 31 8.3 (360) 13 
CAPITAL GOODS 29 6.8 (472) 17 
PROF & FINANCE 19 5.9 (266) 10 
DISTRIBUTIVE 38 4.3 (771) 28 
UTILITIES 15 4.2 (222) 8 
ADMIN & DE ENGE 8 2.9 (102) 4 
ALL INDUSTRIES 
------------------- 
' 
24 
--------- ----------- 
(2788) 
------------ 
100 
----- 
FII ID S 
RAW MATERIALS 20 6.6 (72) 4 
CONSUMER GOODS 24 5.5 (179) 11 
CAPITAL GOODS 21 7.4 (96) 6 
PROF & FINANCE 31 3.6 (382) 23 
UTILITIES 16 4.1 (76) 5 
DISTRIBUTIVE 52 2.3 (748) 45 
ARMIN & DEFENCE 21 6.2 (80) 5 
ALL INDUSTRIES 35 (1653) 100* 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
* Includes 1% of women in ocnstruction industry 
File: N R, FEMHEAR(18) 
Source: Q1579&80 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
High proportions of daughters in each industry who are living at 
home have mothers in the distributive trades. Retail work is camncn 
both among waren with families, whose employment careers have been 
interrupted by child care often necessitating periods of part-time 
work, and among school leavers (as I shall show). Much of the 
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association between daughters' and mothers' industry is therefore 
due to the limited opportunities available to women. There is 
little theoretical basis in other respects for comparison between a 
daughter whose work career has been continuous, and that of her 
mother whose career has been interrupted by childbirth'and who has 
probably been downwardly mobile (Martin and Roberts, 1984; Dex, 
1984; and Chapter 4 of this thesis). The association between 
daughters' and mothers' industry is likely to decrease with the age 
of the daughter because of her own career movement, and then 
increase again as she too marries and has children with consequent 
disruptions to her own career. 
Daughters are more likely than sons to follow the Occupational and 
industrial footsteps of their parents, because of the segregation 
of women's employment into fewer occupations and industries. When 
this is controlled for (through analysis of standardised residuals 
from a no association model) Table 7.7 shows that the industries 
which are relatively most likely to contain both daughters and 
mothers are capital goods, raw materials, and consumer goods, 
corresponding to the industries in which an association was 
observed among seas and fathers. 
The highest levels of generational attachment were in industries 
which were identified above as more localised rather than 
nationally spread: raw materials, consumer goods, and capital 
goods. The excepticn, among men, is the construction industry. 
Sources of Job Infoýcýmatim 
The findings and discussion so far have focused on where young 
people are located in the occupational structure in relation to 
their family's social class and employment, and the extent to which 
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you xf people appear to reproduce the occupational characteristics 
of their parents. It has been suggested that local labour markets 
del young people towards particular jobs, and it has been shown 
that children are more likely to go into the same industry as their 
parent than into any other industry. As a result, families often 
have links with the local labour market from one generation to 
another, ensuring continuity of the work force and stability of the 
social structure as long as the labour opportunities in an area 
remain fairly constant. One of the mechanisms that ensure this 
continuity may be the information system through which companies 
recruit and applicants hear about jobs. 
Respondents to the GHS who had been in their present job for less 
than a year (30% of all employees), were asked how they first heard 
about their job. Though the sample is inevitably biased towards 
job-changers, the answers throw some light on the recruitment 
practices of employers as well as the job information networks of 
applicants. 
Broadly, there are two main means of hearing about jobs, through 
formal networks, such as employment agencies, advertisements and 
Job Centres, and through informal networks, such as hearing about 
jobs through relatives or friends, or through direct contact 
between employer and prospective employee. GHS data in Table 7.8 
shows that higher occupational classes tend to hear about jobs 
through formal channels, while manual workers hear about their jobs 
through informal channels, particularly through family and friends. 
The table shows clear stratification by occupational class of 
recruitment methods. Overall, young people atze more likely to have 
heard about their jobs through a fries or relative than any other 
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ý;. 
16 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 7.8: SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT 0013 
BY OCCUPATIONAL CLASS AND SEX 
Among those who have been in their current employment for 
less than twelve months, 1980 GiS only. 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
QJRRIINT OCCUPATIONAL CLASS 
SOURCE OF JOB 123456 ALL 
INFORMATION %%%%%%% 
NAT 
RELATIVE/FRIEND 20 29 30 40 51 61 41 
JOB CENTRE 0 3 20 20 21 16 18 
ASKED EMPLOYER 8 12 12 18 13 20 15 
ADVERTISEMENT 48 36 22 14 11 4 17 
PRIVATE AGENCY 12 7 10 2 2 0 4 
OTHER 12 12 7 6 1 0 5 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
ALL (=100%) 25 58 113 234 142 56 628 
p< . 001 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
WOMEN (Classes 1 and 2 combined) 
RELATIVE/FRIEND 25 32 44 45 61 36 
JOB CENTRE 9 19 28 12 7 16 
ASKED EMPLOYER 27 16 11 21 3 18 
ADVERTISEMENT 23 23 17 19 19 22 
PRIVATE AGENCY 6 9 0 1 0 6 
OTHER 
------------------ 
9 
---- 
2 0 2 10 3 
ALL 
---- 
64 
-------- 
325 
------ 
18 
------ 
150 
------ 
31 
------- 
588 
p <. 001 
------------------ --- 
File: JOBHEAR(13) 
----- -------- ------ ------ ------ ------- 
Soxure: C if(80) 
------------------ -------- -------- ------ ------ ------ ------- 
means, but within this group there is a strong class gradient, 
ranging among men from 20% in the highest non-manual class who 
heard about their jobs in this way, to 61% in Class 6. Cbnversely, 
48% of males in Class 1 heard of their jobs through advertisements, 
while only 4% of male unskilled workers heard of their jobs in this 
way, with other classes ranging in between. Job centres and direct 
applications to employers were more associated with junior non- 
manual, and skilled and semi-skilled manual grade occupations, 
while private agencies tend to cater for the top end of the market. 
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Among women the picture is very similar, except that advertisements 
are more widely used by all classes, and waren are more likely to 
make direct approach to employers. Again, the lower the 
occupational class, the more likely job information is to have been 
gained informally. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 7.9: SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT GURREN 0O B 
BY YOUTH CLASS AND SEX 
Among those who have been in their current employment for less 
than twelve months (1980 G-! S) 
STABLE FIXE C i 1TER WORK DOWNWD STABLE 
SOURCE OF JOB MIDDLE MOBILE MOBILE ROUE MIDDLE WORKIN3 ALL 
INFORMATION 
------------- 
$ 
------ 
$ 
------- 
$ 
------ 
$ 
------ 
$ 
--------- 
$ 
--------- 
$ 
----- --- 
MIN 
RELATIVE/FRIEND 17 21 37 29 38 47 38 
J00 CENTRE 5 13 19 22 23 20 19 
ASKED EMPLOYER 8 13 5 10 20 15 14 
ADVERTISEi r 42 38 30 17 13 13 18 
PRIVATE AGENCY 15 4 9 10 3 2 5 
OTHER 13 13 
----- 
0 
------ 
12 
-- 
4 4 6 
---------------- 
ALL (=100%) 
------ 
60 
-- 
24 43 
---- 
41 
--------- 
119 
--------- 
273 
------ 
560 
P<. 001 
---------------- 
OMEN 
------ ------- ------ ------ --------- --------- ------ 
W 
RELATIVE/FRIIIND 32 23 - - 35 37 34 
JOB CENTRE 9 13 - - 14 21 17 
ASKED EMPLOYER 16 23 - - 19 16 17 
ADVERTISEMENT 27 26 - - 25 20 23 
PRIVATE AGENCY 10 9 - - 8 4 6 
OTHER 7 6 - - 0 3 3 
---------------- 
ALL (=100%) 
------ 
70 
------- 
53 
------ 
- 
------ 
- 
--------- 
101 
-------- 
254 
-------- 
478 
p<. 06 
---------------- ------ ------- ------ ------ --------- -------- -------- 
File: JOBFIAR(13 ) 
Source: Q S(80) 
---------------- ------ ------- ------ ------ --------- -------- -------- 
Table 7.9 shows how GHS respondents heard of their present job by 
youth class, thus bringing additional elements into the analysis. 
Variation can now be seen within current occupational classes. 
Among males who are currently in non-manual work, 37% of the 
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counter-mobile heard of their jobs through family or friends, 
compared with 17% of the stable middle class. The upwardly mobile 
working class were less likely than the counter-mobile to hear of 
jobs informally through family or friends (21% of the education- 
route and 29% of the work-route). Among women, too, the upwardly 
mobile working class were less likely to hear of jobs informally 
than were other groups. The data thus suggests that while for the 
counter-mobile family connections may be a help in getting work, 
for the upwardly mobile working class they are less useful. The 
informal recruitment system appears here to favour class 
reproduction rather than mobility. Instead of gaining "inside 
information" about jobs, those of working class origin who seek 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 7.10: SOURCE OF JOB INFORMATION BY INDUSTRY 
Among respondents who changed their jobs in the last twelve 
months, bow they heard about their present jobs, by industrial 
group 
Row Percentages 
-------------------- ------ ------------ --------- ---------- - 
IN FORMAL FORMAL 
- 
INDUSTRY Q NELS C ANMS 
--------- 
OTHER 
---- 
BASE(=100%) 
-------------------- 
a ESTRUCTIa 
------ 
67 
--- 
32 
----- 
1 
----------- 
(92) 
CONSUMER GOODS 64 34 2 (134) 
DISTRIBUTIVE TRADES 62 37 1 (434) 
RAW MATERIALS 58 40 3 (80) 
CAPITAL GOODS 54 40 6 (97) 
UTILITIES 53 46 1 (91) 
PROF AND FINANCIAL 46 50 4 (227) 
ADMIN AND DEFENCE 34 60 3 (50) 
ALL 57 41 3 (1205) 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Source of job information has been recoded into formal 
and informal methods as follows: 
FORMAL CHANNELS: Job Centre, Private Agency, Advertisement 
INFORMAL CHANNELS: Thraxgh Relative/Friend or Direct Contact 
with Employer 
File: HEAR. INEXJST(28) 
Source: Q1S80 
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mobility through work depend largely on Job Centres and other 
information systems instead. 
Table 7.10 shows source of job information by industry, and reveals 
that the industries which seem to use informal networks most are 
the construction, consumer goods, distributive trades and raw 
materials industries. Consumer goods and raw materials were seen 
above to be the two local industries where children were most 
likely to follow their parents. The recruitment method of these 
industries seems to encourage generational attachment to them. The 
construction industry and distributive trades, on the other hand, 
are both wide-spread industries which attract large numbers of 
young school leavers, but are not particularly associated with work 
careers and therefore show fewer signs of generational attachment. 
In contrast to the GHS, the NCDS asks the cohort the source of 
information of their first jobs. Table 7.11 shows that among males 
at 23 years, those who were currently in manual work were more 
likely to have heard about their first jobs through a friend or 
relative, while those who were currently in non-manual work were 
more likely to have heard about their jobs in other ways, though 
informal information was still important to many. The most likely 
to have heard about their first jobs informally were the counter- 
mobile middle class, who later regained their class positions 
through work (39%), while the least likely were those of working 
class origin who became upwardly mobile through education (16%). 
As among the GHS sample, the work-route mobile working class were 
less likely to gain job information informally than were the 
counter-mobile. 
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Table 7.11: SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT FIRST JOB 
BY YOUTH CLASS 
Among NCDS cohort 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Yom C1. ASS 
STABLE EDUC COUNTER WORK DOWNARD STABLE 
SOURCE OF FIRST MIDDLE ROM MOBILE ROUTE MIDDLE WORKING ALL 
JOB INFORMATION %%%$%%$ 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
MEN 
RE[ATIVE/FftID 19 16 39 28 35 37 32 
JOB CENTRE 15 13 15 26 19 24 21 
ASKED EMPLOYER 18 22 15 17 17 20 19 
ADVERTISEMENT 21 23 18 18 12 9 13 
PRIVATE AGENCY 3 2 1 1 1 0 1 
COLLEGE CAREERS 12 14 1 2 3 2 4 
OTHER 13 10 13 8 13 8 10 
----------------- 
ALL (=100%) 
------ 
656 
------- 
233 
------- 
324 
------- 
601 
------- 
786 
------- 
2559 
------ 
5159 
Sign. p . 001 
----------------- 
WCMEN 
------ ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------ 
REIATIVE/FRIIIND 17 15 35 28 28 31 27 
0CB CENTRE 13 20 11 19 18 22 19 
ASIA EMPLOYER 18 13 19 16 16 16 16 
1DVERTISE4E2IT 25 26 22 22 23 19 21 
PRIVATE AGENCY 6 5 3 2 4 3 4 
COLLEGE CAREERS 8 8 3 2 2 2 3 
OTHER 
---------- 
13 
------ 
13 
------- 
9 
------- 
12 
------- 
9 
- 
9 10 
------- 
ALL (=100%) 681 385 235 366 
------ 
990 
------- 
2786 
------ 
5443 
Sign. p<. 001 
-------------- 
File: UNEmP(23 ) 
Sairce: NCDS 
-------------- 
Among women, the picture is the same, with manual workers hearing 
of their first jobs through family or friends, and non-manual 
workers hearing of work through advertisements. Again, the 
counter-mobile were more likely to gain informal job information 
than were the mobile working class. The stable middle class and 
the upwardly mobile (through education) working class were the 
least likely (17% and 14% respectively) to hear of jobs through 
family and friends, presumably because their jobs were associated 
with the national, rather than local, labour market. 
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It is interesting that in the case of first jobs, the counter- 
mobile should make most use of family and friends, while with 
regard to current jobs (GHS data) it was the downwardly-mobile 
middle class and the stable working class who did so. It appears 
that with time in the labour market, the family becomes more useful 
in providing job information for those in manual work. --,. 
It is wrong to read too much into these findings, but it is 
possible that counter-mobility may depend on the help of family and 
friends in getting work which will allow future mobility, or jobs 
"with prospects" for those who have not achieved academic success. 
Parental help in getting a job may thus provide a means of 
achieving inter-generational class stability for the educationally 
unsuccessful middle class. The "work-route" mobile of working 
class origin are perhaps less able to obtain appropriate jobs 
through their families once they have achieved mobility, but 
nevertheless seem to rely on family information for their first 
manual jobs. It may be that while the co unter-mobile are assisted 
in their occupational class mobility by their families, the work- 
route upwardly mobile of working class origin are not. The latter 
are thus disadvantaged in comparison with the middle class counter- 
mobile. Indeed family help in finding employment may impede rather 
than help the upwardly mobile working class. 
It is suggested that recruitment methods help to determine 
occupational class, in so far as informal methods lead to a 
worker's greater dependence on local labour markets, while formal 
methods allow wider dissemination of informatics; the former are 
associated with lower class manual jobs, while the latter are 
associated with non-manual work. The less educationally advantaged 
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are dependent on their families and local labour markets for access 
to information about jobs. 
Research on Recnuitmeit Practices 
In a study of recruitment patterns in the Midlands, Jenkins et al. 
(1983) found an association between informal recruitment and higher 
manual work, rather than unskilled manual work as seen above. 
Jenkins developed the notions of "suitability' and "acceptability" 
in order to look at employers' attitudes to prospective employees: 
suitability for a job, in terms of qualifications and experience, 
were not sufficient criteria for acceptability, which was according 
to subjective assessment on the part of interviewers. 
Acceptability was often ensured through "word of mouth" recruitment 
practices, which meant that the companies could recruit stable, 
reliable workers through the existing work force. Thais informal 
recruitment can be seen as a means of control. 
From his previous work on young people in Northern Ireland (1983) 
Jenkins had developed a typology of "citizens", "ordinary kids" and 
"lads", roughly a gradation of the working class on twin dimensions 
of respectability and occupational class, and perhaps not a satis- 
factory measure when taken out of its original context. 
Application of this typology to the study of job information 
networks in the Midlands, showed the "citizens" to be the most 
likely to hear of jobs through word of mouth, and the "lads" least 
likely (Jenkins, 1984: 22). Jenkins concluded that word of mouth 
recruitment was used to ensure compliance and confidence in the 
work force, since the "citizens" were to be seen as respectable and 
dependable, qualities which the "lads" apparently lacked. Table 7.8 
does not appear to confirm Jenkins' theory, since informal job 
information was found to be most used by the lowest occupational 
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classes. 
Ashton and his colleagues (1982) also examined recruitment 
practices, and observed that in the three areas under study, 
Over 50 per cent of employers mentioned the use of word-of- 
mouth recommendation from friends or relatives as a method of 
recruitment, often commenting on the family networks within 
the establishment. 
(Ashton et al., 1982: 26) 
Ashton makes no mention of the use of informal recruitment as a 
means of control, but agrees that word-of-mouth recruitment 
"usually with little attention paid to references" is related to 
the lower segments of the occupational hierarchy. 
Jenkins and colleagues (1983) suggest that in times of recession, 
not only does recruitment decrease, but information about the 
labour market is gained in different ways. They found that fewer 
manual jobs were advertised during the recession and more were 
filled through word-of-mouth recruitment than before. As a result 
of these changes, 
Employment vacancies seem to be becoming less visible and 
public, and, at the organisational level, the labour market 
may be viewed as a set of segments, each more or less opaque 
when viewed from the perspective of the outsider. 
(Jenkins et al., 1983: 266) 
They suggest that word-of-mouth recruitment can best be seen as an 
extension of the use of the Internal Labour market into the wider 
market, where it operates as a closure mechanism. The jobs that are 
advertised, through the Employment Service, tend to be lower level 
jobs. 
The GHS and ISS data only partly agree with Jenkins' assessment: 
lower level jobs are recruited via informal networks, intermediate 
jobs often through Job Centres, and higher level jobs via 
advertisements and private agencies. The different findings may be 
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the result of using national, rather than local area data; 
furthermore, Jenkins et al. were looking at the effects of the 
recession, while the QIS and NC)S data would not have been affected 
by the recession to the same extent. Circumstances may have 
changed since the survey data was collected. 
Families as a Source of Job Information 
It is suggested here that family links with the labour market 
provide an-important source of job information, and that 
generational attachment to local industry is thus encouraged and 
perpetuated, for manual workers at least. 
For the less educated, and those in manual jobs, there is a 
dependence on inside information about the workings of the local 
labour market, which is likely to restrict young people to their 
immediate locality and increase their dependence upon their 
families. The stable working class in particular are likely to 
reproduce from one generation to another the occupational class and 
industry of the previous generation. For the counter-mobile middle 
class, family links with the labour market are needed in order to 
find jobs, and it is suggested here that this may be one way in 
which the middle class have an advantage in securing the best jobs, 
those with career potential, for their offspring. The upwardly 
mobile working class are less likely to be able to obtain the jobs 
they want through their kin. The stable middle class and the 
upwardly mobile working class, both with educational advantages, if 
not class privileges, do not use family contact with the labour 
market to the same extent because they do not have to. Their 
qualifications and the probability that they have already at least 
partially left their parental hones to go to college (see Chapter 
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Thirteen), mean that they are more geographically mobile, and thus 
have more scope for finding the better jobs. 
------------------------------------------------- 
Table 7.12: FAMILY UNEMPLOYMENT 
---------- 
Fmrxxnic activity of respcndents living as children in the 
parental home, and not in full-time education, ac cording 
to the ecxi is activity of Head of Household and Spasse 
of Head of Household 
------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
SONS EMEDYKENT FATlEMS EMPIDYMENr STATüS 
STATUS EMPLOYED NOT EMPLOYED 
AND XZ %% 
------------------------------------------------- 
16-19 
---------- 
EMPLOYED 92 79 
UNEMPLOYED 8 21 
ALL (=100%) (1137) (179) 
20-24 
EMPLOYED 95 85 
UNEMPLOYED 5 15 
ALL (=100%) (856) (184) 
----------------------------- - - ------------ ------ 
DAUOffERS FATHERS EMPLOYMENT MOTS EMPL 
---------- 
OYMENT 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS STATUS 
STATUS EMPLOYED NOT EMPLOYED EMKDYED NOT EMPLOYED 
AND ACS %%% 
--------------------------------------- - 
$ 
--- -- ---- 
16-19 
---------- 
EMPLOYED 92 82 93 86 
UNEMPLOYED 8 18 7 14 
ALL (=100%) (1023) (153) (712) (307) 
20-24 
EMPLOYED 96 88 95 96 
UNEMPLOYED 4 12 5 4 
ALL (=100%) (483) (113) (306) 
--------------------------------------- 
(165) 
--- ------- 
Note: 
---------- 
UNIImpLOYED = has no paid work but is available for work 
NOT EMPLOYED = has no paid work (housewives, ill, retired, 
or unemployed) 
File: NEWWORK1(50) 
Source: C-IS(79&80 ) 
------------------------------------------------- -------- 
As information about lower level jobs becomes less open during the 
recession, family roles will change, as school leavers become 
increasingly dependent upon their kin. Allatt and Yeandle (1984) 
suggest that: 
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Change in the labour market enhances the familial power of 
some parents fortunate enough to have access to the job market 
(Allatt and Yeandle, 1984: 21) 
and, furthermore, that there may be a rekindling of previously 
dormant kinship links as distant relatives are increasingly asked 
for help. 
Location within the family of origin may be advantageous to the 
young person seeking a job, if members of the family are in 
employment and may have access to labour market information. What 
if they are unemployed? 
Table 7.12 shows the economic status of young men according to the 
economic status of the head of household (assumed to be the father 
figure) and for young women according to both the head of household 
and the spouse of the head (assumed to be the mother figure), for 
people living as children in the parental hone. At all ages and for 
both sexes young people are two to three times more likely to be 
unemployed if their father is not working. In addition, there 
appears to be an association between the mother's attachment to the 
labour market and that of younger daughters. The table suggests 
that over and above structural factors affecting unemployment, 
factors at the level of the family are likely to be associated with 
unemployment too. 
A recent study of the effects of the recession on employment in 
Hartlepool (Morris, 1986), suggests that whereas prior to the 
recession, fathers could transmit their own positicn of privileged 
access to work down to their sons, this is no longer the case. 
When fathers are of an age at which they increasingly risk 
unemployment, and sons are increasingly unable to enter trade 
apprenticeships, then the means by which generational transmission 
of work identity was achieved, has broken down. The patterns 
167 
described in this chapter would appear to have been modified in the 
last few years. 
It would seem, nevertheless, that yang people have differential 
access both to jobs and to information about them. Less educated 
workers seeking lower grade jobs are often dependent on informal 
channels of information about vacancies. Where there is a job 
shortage, as in the present recession, there is no need for lower 
grade jobs to be advertised, since cheaper recruitment can be 
achieved through the existing work force. Those in lower grade 
occupations thus become increasingly dependent on family links with 
the local labour market, and their chances of having a job may 
depend upon their relatives having access to job information. 
Where the family has no links with the labour market, the chances 
of getting a job become much reduced. 
As Pahl (1984) has suggested in a different context, a rift is 
likely to develop between those families which have work and those 
which do not, leading to a polarisation. The disadvantaged are 
likely to suffer a "spiral of disengagement" from the work process, 
if it is the case that the unemployment of each family member 
increases the chances of unemployment in the next. Allatt and 
yeandle have commented on the increasing nepotism in families, who 
will tend to "look after their own" rather than help the school 
leaver next door (Allatt and Yeandle, 1984). 
SIMUIary 
Entry into work, the first stage of the school to work transition, 
is a complicated process which is structured by the constraints of 
the labour market. Young people vary in the extent to which they 
are dependent upon local labour markets and informal networks for 
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hearing about jobs. The role of families in helping the 
transition, including ensuring class stability, varies with the 
recruitment practices of different industries and the extent to 
which they form local labour markets. 
Young people with educational qualifications have access to open 
information about jobs cri a national level, and are less dependent 
upon local industry and their family contacts. Their class 
stability or upward mobility has been largely achieved through 
education and they do not need to "work their way up from the shop 
floor". Those in manual work are likely to be heavily dependent on 
local recruitment through word-of-mouth and may depend on family 
contact with local industry. The upwardly mobile through work 
rather than educational routes, appear to get family help in 
obtaining their first jobs, but as their work careers progress, 
those from working class homes are increasingly unlikely to get 
work through their families, while the oaaiter-mobile middle class 
continue to do so. Working class families cannot actively help 
their children become upwardly mobile, but the middle class seem 
able to assist their children regain their class of origin. 
It seems that subsequent careers and occupational mobility are to a 
large extent structured at the outset by the way in which young 
people enter the world of work. 
169 
thapber 8 
Movement in the r atioLrr Market 
The previous chapter identified some of the factors affecting the 
entry into the labour market. In this chapter and the next I shall 
be looking at subsequent movement within the labour market and 
examining the means by which intra-generational mobility is 
achieved. As with the entry into work, subsequent work histories 
result from a combination of choice and constraint. Choice is 
primarily reflected in attitudes towards work careers; different 
social groups have different motivations and priorities with regard 
to work, and these structure their employment aspirations. On the 
other hand, the labour market has a structure which stratifies the 
labour force, providing differential access to the opportunities 
towards which individuals may be motivated. A career motivation, 
even if equally shared in the population, will not therefore lead 
to equal success. 
"Unstable Workers" 
Movement between jobs in the labour market has been perceived as a 
consequence of the characteristics either of the worker or of the 
labour market, or both. The tendency has been for emphasis to be 
placed increasingly on the role of the labour market in determining 
worker behaviour, but it has not always been so. 
A major strand in the literature on youth employment is the 
description of young workers as unstable, frequently changing jobs 
and lacking a sense of career direction. Those who did not settle 
immediately into stable employment were described by Ginzberg 
(1951) as "floundering" in the labour market. This "floundering" 
was seen as negative, unproductive behaviour, resulting from a 
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failure to adjust to the work role. Such theories focus on the 
individual characteristics of the worker, attributing job-changing 
to personality deficiencies, such as immaturity. 
Later studies of job-changing, still mainly undertaken during a 
period of low unemployment, continued to emphasise personal 
characteristics. Baxter (1975) defined chronic job-changers as 
those who change their jobs on average more than once every six 
months, and observed of this group: 
Certain characteristics of chronic job-chargers, such as their 
low levels of education and skill - characteristics stcungly 
associated with the unemployed, - especially the long-term 
unemployed, also tend to suggest that they might well 
contribute to unemployment in other aspects. 
(Baxter, 1975: 204) 
Baxter clearly saw job-changing as a problem related to personal 
characteristics. He estimated that only ar urxi 3g of all fifteen 
to seventeen year olds could be defined as chronic job-changers, 
and suggested that those who were job-changers in their youth 
repeated this behaviour in adulthood. He did not distinguish, as 
others later did between those who sought to move up the 
occupational ladder and those who just wanted a change of job. 
Alternative theories of job-changing locate its cause in the 
occupational structure, attributing apparent job instability to the 
characteristics of the youth labour market, in other words, to the 
job rather than the worker. Ashton and Field's typology of the 
youth occupational structure identified frequent job changers as 
occupying "careerless" occupations (Ashton and Field, 1973: 109). 
Though the typology was later applied to job-holders, it was 
originally constructed on the basis of the jobs held. Thus 
careerless occupaticns were generally among unskilled jobs, holding 
no prospects for promotion, insecure and often seasonal. Job- 
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changing among this group might therefore be seen in part as the 
result of structural constraints, seasonal characteristics of 
particular industries (such as tourism and construction) or 
redundancy in declining industries, all of which might force a 
worker to change his or her employment. The typology also considers 
the possibility of other ncn-structural reasons for changing jobs: 
long-term (chiefly middle class) careers and short-term (mainly 
working class) careers both involve job movement which is 
voluntaristic rather than forced. 
Carter studied job and occupational changes during the first five 
years in the labour market, and concluded that such changes were 
not simply the response to labour market requirements. Young job- 
changers were not just reacting to the constraints of local 
opportunities. Nor were they displaying immaturity in their 
actions. Carter argued against the "flounder-ling" theory of Ginzberg 
and the "trial" theory of Miller and Form (1951), pointing cut that 
job-changing was not just a teenage phenomenon. Instead, he 
proposed that it was important to distinguish between workers who 
aspired to better jobs and those for whom one job was much like 
another (Carter, 1975: 101). 
Cherry's (1976) study of job instability among the young 
distinguished between purposeful job-changing and "aimless 
drifting". Testing Super's (1953) theories of "floundering", 
characterised by horizontal moves, and "trial", characterised by 
vertical moves, Cherry rejected them on the grounds that they 
ignored the intention of the move and only looked at the outcome. 
She found some association. between job-changing and personal 
problems, but concluded that frequent early job-changing was not 
necessarily harmful, appearing to lead to "no appreciable 
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occupational or eot mit disadvantage" by the age of 26 years. She 
concluded that: 
Contrary, perhaps, to the expectations of many of those in 
occupations with a recognised career structure, a frequent 
charge of employer appears to be a satisfactory and effective 
strategy for a young worker entering the labour market with 
the minimum of qualifications. 
(Cherry, 1976: 200) 
For some young workers, then, job-changing might have a positive 
Betion, associated with career moves. 
There is, perhaps, a complicated interplay between worker and job 
characteristics. Raffe's recent assessment of the relative 
significance of job and worker characteristics as explanations of 
instability among young workers found, like Ashton, that 
occupational instability was mainly the product of unstable jobs 
rather than of unstable workers. However, he concluded that some 
young people might respond to the instability of their employment 
by becoming unstable themselves, and that when it came to getting a 
new job, such personal characteristics would then affect the 
chances of re-employment. Thus although job characteristics were 
predominant, there was evidence of some interaction of job and 
worker characteristics affecting the outcome (Raffe, 1983). 
it is perhaps significant that Raffe's study was undertaken during 
a period of high unemployment, when labour market factors had 
become more clearly visible. The earlier studies which emphasised 
worker characteristics were all undertaken when there was a labour 
six)rtage. 
A recent study by Ashton and Maguire (1986) suggests that the youth 
labors market is segmented and that the different segments lead to 
different outoanes in terms of job movement, so that: 
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What was previously seen to be random movement or drifting in 
semi-skilled and unskilled work, can now be comprehended as 
being a result of the pressures of market segmentation. 
(Ashton arm] Maguire, 1986: 21). 
Higher segments (Professional, Managerial, Administration and 
Technicians) provide more stable jobs, but deny access to school 
leavers; the middle levels (Skilled Manual and Clerical Segments) 
recruit young people and train them; the lower segments contain 
many jobs which are denied to the young (shift work, jobs which 
involve operating dangerous machinery) and also jobs for which the 
young are in competition with married women (shop work, for 
example). Some job changing is inevitable therefore, and the 
result of the operation of a youth labour market. As young workers 
become older and experienced, they move into the adult labour 
market. 
Explanations of job-changing which identify occupational change 
among the less educated and the working class as "instability" and 
occupational change among the more educated and middle class as 
career moves seem to be class prejudiced. Fu thermore, they do not 
allow the possibility of upward mobility through work routes of 
those who start their careers in manual work. An understanding of 
the labour market allows a clearer comparison of the job histories 
of early school leavers and the more educated within the same 
ax ceptual framework. 
Job-Changing 
Job-changing may represent different phenomenon for different 
groups. While for some, job-changing may be a planned move in an 
"orderly career" leading to upward mobility, for others, it may be 
be one of many "disorderly" moves in a working life which reflects 
structural constraint more than personal choice. In the case of 
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some in manual work, job-changing is more likely to be associated 
with lateral movement between occupations, reflecting 
disatisfacticn of the worker and insecure work rather than positive 
movement. The distinction is not clear cut, however, as the 
following analysis will show. Among young workers there may be 
both lateral and vertical movement between occupations, reflecting 
a combination of career aspirations, with changing needs and 
developing labour market opportunities. 
The first question, then, is who are the frequent job-changers? 
Table 8.1 looks at the average time spent in jobs (age since 
leavirxg full-time education, divided by number of jobs) amaxg the 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 8.1:: AVERAGE TIME IN JOB BY YOUM CLASS 
Years since leaving full-time education, divided by number of jobs. 
A job is defined as one month or more with the same employer, 
and excludes vacation jobs. Row percentages 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
AVERAGE TIME IN JOB 
YC IUI'H CLASS UNDER 1 YR 1-2 YRS OVER 2 YRS ALL(=100$) 
Men 
STABLE MIDDLE 
IDUC-MOBILE W-C 
COUNTER-MOBILE M-C 
WORK-I c TrE W-C 
DOWNWARD MIDDLE 
STABLE WORKIIG 
Women wiest Children 
STABLE MIDDLE 
EU -MOBILE W-C 
COUNTER-MOBILE M-C 
WORK-ROUTE W-C 
4 29 67 (637) 
6 33 61 (228) 
13 39 48 (327) 
5 27 68 (608) 
9 31 61 (804) 
5 32 63 (2593) 
13 43 44 (607) 
10 34 56 (345) 
19 41 40 (206) 
6 41 53 (280) 
DOWNWARD MIDDLE 9 31 60 (678) 
STABLE WORKING 4 26 70 (1527) 
---------- ---------------------------------------- 
Significanoe p<. 001 
File: Iii ES(26) 
Sauce: NrnS 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
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NCDS cohort. The groups which show the shortest average time in 
jobs are not the stable working class, as might have been expected, 
but the counter-mobile middle class, among whom 13% of men and 19% 
of women have held jobs cri average for under a year since entering 
the labour market. Should we therefore re-assess the notion of 
job-changing as negative and immature behaviour? The counter-mobile 
middle class have changed jobs more frequently than other groups, 
but they nevertheless have achieved mobility through their work 
careers into non-manual work. Job-changing may therefore represent 
for this group a means of co unter-mobility. 
It is interesting that in contrast to the counter-mobile, the work- 
mobile of working class origin are among the least frequent job- 
changers: only 5% of males and 9% of childless females were in jobs 
for less than a year on average. The reason for the difference may 
lie in the definitions of "job" here: a job is defined as a period 
of time with the same employer. Number of jobs held therefore 
refers to movement between employers. If the work-route wcrkirx3 
class achieve mobility through promotion from the shop floor, i. e. 
vertical movement, this would not be seen in the table. Job- 
changing among the counter-mobility, which does show up in this 
table, indicates movement between employers. A major difference is 
thus suggested between upward mobility routes of the counter-mobile 
middle class and those of the work-mobile working class: the former 
make lateral moves in the labour market, while the work-route may 
be more likely to achieve upward mobility through promotion and 
vertical movement within an internal labour market. 
The data presented in Table 8.1 have the advantage of being 
icngitudinal, describing job-changes over a period of time. Such 
data are not available in the GHS, though some information about 
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job-changing can be gleaned. Table 8.2, from GHS data, shows 
percentages in each youth class who have changed their jobs twice 
or more in the last twelve months. Since the question was asked of 
those who had been in their jobs less than twelve mcnths, there is 
some bias. The table shows that amcrxj men, job-changing appears to 
be closely related to class, with the stable working class 
apparently the most frequent job-changers. Amcx women, there seem 
to be no clear patterns. As far as men are concerned, the table 
shows why job-changing is generally and probably erroneously 
associated with lower occupational classes. It would appear from 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 8.2: JOB-CHANGING BY YOLMI CLASS 
Percentage who have changed employment twice or more in the last 
twelve months, among those who have been in their present job 
for less than twelve months (C-1S). Row percentages. 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
MORE THAN 2 JCSS ALL (=100%) 
YCXJ CLASS $ Cbl% Base 
Males 
STABLE MIDDLE 9 10 (121) 
EX ATION-RCXJPE W-C 17 4 (47) 
COUNTER-MOBILE M-C 16 8 (92) 
WORK-ROUTE W-C 17 7 (84) 
DOWNWARD M-C 23 19 (232) 
STABLE WORKING 
------------------------- 
24 
---------- 
52 
------------ 
(622) 
---- 
TOTAL % 
------------------- 
21 
- 
100 
--------- 
(1198) 
------ 
Womesi wiest Children 
- -------- ------------ ------------- 
STABLE MIDDLE 23 15 (120) 
CATION-RWI'E W-C 16 8 (63) 
COUNTER-MOBILE M-C (4) 2 (13) 
WORK-ROUE W-C 18 3 (22) 
DOWNWARD M-C 24 24 (185) 
STABLE WORKING 
------------------------- 
16 
---------- 
48 
------- 
(374) 
TOTAL % 
------------------------- 
19 ' 
---------- 
----- 
100 
------- 
------------- 
(777) 
Source: C 1S79&80 
------------------------- ---------- 
------------------ 
File: JD iAN(59 ) 
------------------------- 
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a comparison of Tables 8.1 and 8.2 that cross-sectional data on 
job--changing can misinform, are that lorxgituainal job history data 
can stow a clearer and more accurate picture. 
From these data, we must conclude that job-changing should be seen 
in a more positive light: among the young, it is particularly 
associated with an upwardly mobile group, rather than the 
careerless, and seems to represent career movement rather than 
"driftin4°. There are, however, dangers to be associated with any 
change of job when the job market is restricted. 
Movement betwea Jobs 
For early school leavers, the "ideal" job may not be available, due 
to a shortage of jobs, or a lack of suitable qualifications on the 
part of the applicant, or in many cases, because the applicant is 
too young for a particular job. Some jobs may therefore be 
regarded as stepping stones, providing temporary work until the 
sought after apprenticeship or other work can be entered. Ashton 
and Maguire's concept of a segmented "youth labour market", often 
recruiting school leavers and preceding entry into the adult labour 
market, is helpful here (Ashton and Maguire, 1986), but may be 
somewhat simplistic and unduly rigid. Raffe (1983: 32) argues that 
the labour market is only segmented "in a very weak sense of the 
word", as there is movement between sectors. 
Carter (1975) examined the early work careers of school leavers in 
Sheffield in a longitudinal study. He found that job aspirations 
changed in the course of individual work careers, in accordance 
with the local opportunity structure. Most boys entered the local 
steel industry on leaving school, despite in many cases having 
expressed a desire not to do so. Within a year, many had reacted 
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against the noise and dirt of the job, and left. By five years, 
though, the attraction of higher wages, combined with the 
development of adult family responsibilities, had caused several. to 
drift back to the steel industry again. 
Similar findings were reported by Dennis et al. (1956) in their 
classic study of a coal mining community: 
When boys leave school at fifteen they do not always enter 
mining. For a few years they will try all manner of other 
jobs - shop-assistants, errand-boys, drivers-mates, building 
labourers, etc., etc., but before they reach maturity they 
answer the call of the mine, apart, that is, from the limited 
number that can be absorbed by other skilled and semi-skilled 
trades in the locality, and the small number who leave Ashton. 
(Dennis, Henriques and Slaughter, 1956: 177) 
The phenomenon is not restricted to boys. Carter found that for 
girls as well there was evidence of a gravitation towards local 
labour market needs in shops, factories and offices. He oarcludes: 
The occupational structure shapes the pattern of work 
experienced by young workers; the profiles at the different 
stages in employment indicate the logic of the local 
employment scene. Individual aspirations correspond, albeit 
in less than perfect fashion, with the available 
oppportu pities; and those youths and girls whose aspirations 
are not matched by opportunities, or the ability to take 
advantage of them, come to terms with the situation during the 
course of their first of their first five years of work. 
(Carter, 1975: 98) 
The ISS data allow the examination of movement between occupations 
from first job to current job. Stepping stone jobs and "adult" 
jobs can therefore be identified. 
Table 8.3 compares the stability of different occupaticns, and is 
based on the standardised residuals from a model of no association 
between occupation in first and current jobs. Those with only cne 
job (in the same job currently and on entry into the labour market) 
are included in the analysis. The greatest stability is, 
unsurprisingly, mainly in professional and administrative 
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--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 8.3: OCCUPATIONAL GROUP IN FIRST JOB AND CURRENT JCB 
Percentage in the same occupational group in current job 
as in first job, with standardised residuals from a model 
of no associaticx 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
CURRaVT OR LAST SANE AS FIRST JOB CURRENT JOB FIRST JOB 
OCCUPATION Row % Std Residual (=100%) %$ 
II 
TRANSPORT 32 15.0 543 9 6 
SELLING 23 16.5 267 4 6 
MISCELL NEXXJS 21 20.6 129 2 4 
MANAGERIAL 48 21.8 383 6 3 
PERSONAL SERVICE 32 23.8 226 4 4 
PAIN'I'G-ASSEMBLY 39 27.1 250 4 4 
CONSTRUCTION 48 27.4 418 7 5 
FA1MINC7-FISHG 38 31.9 189 3 4 
SECURITY 54 32.9 263 4 3 
MATERIALS PROC 46 33.1 523 9 11 
ARTS & SPORT 51 33.3 96 2 1 
METAL/ELECT PROD 62 34.9 1252 21 25 
CLERICAL 58 39.5 611 10 12 
SCIENCE PROF 69 45.4 398 7 6 
PROF/SUPPORT MGT 83 48.5 296 5 3 
IHELPII' PROF 84 53.4 189 3 2 
Sign: p . 001 Base = 6033 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
woR wiUzt thildr 
SELLING 22 14.4 243 6 12 
MANAGERIAL 51 17.2 158 4 1 
CLERICAL 77 20.5 1890 46 49 
PERSOýºL SERVICE 39 21.9 367 9 12 
PAINIG/ASSEIMBLY 42 24.0 150 4 3 
ARTS & SPORT 48 28.8 62 2 1 
MATERIAL PROC 55 32.5 181 4 4 
HELPING PROF 86 36.4 707 17 12 
PROF/SUPPORT Wr 86 37.1 160 4 2 
SCIENCE PROF 68 41.1 71 2 2 
OTHER (Base 50) 3 3 
Sign. p<. 001 Base = 4120 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
File: OCXIJP(24) Source: NCDS 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
occupations which are likely to be entered at a higher age. In 
these cases, the table reflects both the stability of the jobs (as 
suggested earlier by the data in Table 7.6) and the fact that the 
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sample will have been in the jobs for a shorter period of time, and 
thus had less chance to change jobs. The least stability, for both 
males and females, is in selling, personal service and 
miscellaneous trades. The table shows movement into management 
with age and, among men, into transport, presumably as men become 
old enough for HGV licences at 21 years. Clerical work, as 
previously suggested, shows different patterns among men and among 
women: among men, clerical work is grouped with higher-level 
stable jobs, while among women, it is grouped with lower-level 
unstable work. Although 77% of women in clerical jobs appear to 
have stayed in clerical work, this percentage is affected by the 
size of the group, and when occupational distributions are 
controlled for through the use of standardised residuals, clerical 
work is seen to be relatively unstable for women, reflecting 
perhaps the relative lack of career potential for women in clerical 
jobs. 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Table 8.4: STEPPD' ST CM JAS 
Movement between occupations (where first and current 
occupations are not the same), standa rdised. residuals fron 
Model of No Association 
Based cn same data as Table 8.3 
------------------------- ------- ---------- ----------- 
FIRST J08 
----------------- 
CURRENT JOB 
------------------ 
----- 
ST. RES. BASE 
---------------------- - 
Men 
Clerical Prof/Support Mgt 2.5 (49) 
Managerial Selling 2.0 (13) 
Selling Managerial 4.3 (42) 
Farming/Fishing Managerial 4.2 (34) 
Miscellaneous Transport 3.1 (34) 
Women 
Personal Service Managerial 7.7 (51) 
Selling Personal Service 2.0 (57) 
painting/Assembly 
------------- 
Materials Process 
------------------- 
2.4 
------ 
(12) 
------- ----- 
File: OOCUP(24) 
----- -- 
Source: NC'DS 
------------------ ------------------- ------ -------------- 
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Table 8.4 shows movement between occupations, again based on 
standardised residuals from a model of no associaticn. Amccng men, 
there is movement from clerical work, selling and farming/fishing 
into management, suggesting career advancement in these 
occupations. There is also movement between management and selling 
in both directions, which suggests that career moves may be 
complicated: in some cases management in a very all company may 
be succeeded by a lower grade selling job in a larger company 
which provides better long-term prospects and training. The data 
show that those in miscellaneous occupations are the most likely to 
go into transport work later. Among women, there is movement from 
selling into personal service and from personal service into 
management, suggesting similar, though less direct, career movement 
to that of men. 
It seems from these data that early work careers might be 
characterised by lateral movement between employers as well as 
vertical movement within a firm. The lateral movement might precede 
later upward career movement: personal service work, selling, 
clerical work and low grade farm work might all be described as 
constituting a youth labour market in jobs, providing initial entry 
to a pre-adult labour market in some cases. Shop work (selling) in 
particular seems to fulfill a stop-gap function for the young 
worker, who may move into a more stable occupation in time. 
Ashton and Maguire (1986) suggest that the demand side 
characteristics of the youth labour market structure the 
occupational mobility of young workers, but the reasons for this 
early period of work in the distributive trades, personal service 
or other low grade and low paid "dead end" jobs are probably 
numerous. It could be, as Dennis et al. (1956) and Carter (1975) 
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suggested, the result of early reaction against the demands of 
local industry. It seems strange, however, that the behaviour has 
persisted when local industry demands have changed so radically in 
the last few decades. Few opportunities still exist for the young 
in local industry, and one might expect school leavers to take the 
available jobs rather than react against them. Perhaps the answer 
lies elsewhere. 
Supply Side Factors affecting Job Mobility 
It may be that the particular circumstances on the supply side of 
the youth labour market lead to the high proportions of young 
people who take "pre-adult" work. Carter suggested that the 
assumption of adult respcnsibilities may lead young workers to take 
on more stable occupations as they get older. Many school leavers 
live in the parental home until they marry (see Chapter 13). Where 
work amities exist, it might be expected that the young will 
move into better paid and more secure jobs as they begin to move 
from association with their same-sex peers, to forming stable 
relationships with the opposite sex. Courtship and impending 
marriage or cohabitation may provide a rationale for moving from a 
job which provides little more than pocket money, to a job which is 
more likely to allow the establishment of an independent home. 
Housing, family formation and work careers are thus linked in the 
transition to adulthood. 
In a consideration of the relationship between family 
responsibility and the structure of employment, Siltanen (1984) 
makes a useful distinction between "full-wage" jobs and "aanpo nt 
wage" canes: 
A full-wage job is one which enables its incumbents to take 
sole respcnsibility for maintaining an indepeyck3nt XXLsehoid, 
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a responsibility which can include financial maintenance of 
other household members not in waged work. A job which 
provides a component-wage is one which does not enable 
incumbents to be wholly responsible for the financial 
maintenance of a household. 
(Siltanen, 1984: 21) 
Siltanen found that recruitment to component-wage jobs was 
predominantly among younger workers living with their families of 
origin. As domestic responsibilities increased, so did recruitment 
to full-wage jobs. 
Movement from shop work to "adult work" might therefore usefully be 
seen in these terms. While family responsibilities are light, the 
young may take on low paid work; as they take on adult 
responsibilities they need full-wage work. The acceptability of 
component-wage work may depend on other factors, though. If other 
members of the household are in employment, then a component wage 
from the son or daughter may simply provide pocket money and a 
small contribution to household expenses; if members of the 
household are unemployed, then a low wage may not be adequate. 
Recent goverrunent policy has aimed at reducing youth rates of pay, 
on the assumption that this will reduce youth unemployment. As 
Roberts et al (1986) point out: 
The wider debate on youth pay has tended to ignore the views 
of young people themselves, together with the effects of pay 
on their labour market behaviour and lifestyles. It seems to 
have been tacitly assumed that 16-18 year olds who live with 
their parents have minimal income needs and domestic 
responsibilities, and therefore will suffer no harm if their 
wages are forced down. 
(Roberts, Dench and Richardson, 1986: 29) 
Very little research has been done on the contributions young 
people make to the family budget, though it has been estimated that 
young people in work ocntribute nearly a quarter of net household 
income (DHSS, 1984). Many young people, particularly those of 
working class families, pay a substantial proportion of their 
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earnings into the family budget to cover the cost of their keep. 
Some used to hand over their entire wage packets to their parents 
and receive a small amount of pocket money in return (Carter, 
1962: 290; Millward, 1968), but it is likely that this practice has 
decreased. 
Millward (1968) examined the way in which family status structured 
behaviour at work among working class girls living in the parental 
home. He found that the extent to which the girls contributed 
their wages to the family income was an important factor explaining 
their behaviour at work, and that 
(... ) the occasion on which a girl changes from one behaviour 
to another is a significant event in the development of the 
family and the girl's search for independence. 
(Millward, 1968: 150) 
He found that initially girls would hand over their wage packet to 
their parents, "giving in" being the expression used, but there was 
a progression to "going on board" when girls would hand over a part 
of the wage and spend or save the rest themselves. "Going on 
board" was often associated with a life event such as engagement or 
a birthday (often the eighteenth). This behaviour at home had 
consequences for behaviour at work. As long as a girl was "giving 
in" her wages to her parents, there was little incentive to earn 
more; consequently, the girls who were "on board" had a higher 
level of performance at work than those who were not. 
These findings lead us to question Ashton's typology of youth 
careers. It is clearly difficult to distinguish a group of young 
workers who can be regarded as "Careerless" when much lateral job 
movement is often apparently so closely associated with changing 
job opportunities, needs and responsibilities and with later career 
movement. The stable working class, among whan one would expect to 
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find the careerless, show low rates of job-changing in this age 
group. If there is a "hard core" of unskilled and unstable workers 
they are a very small group and more likely to be identifiable when 
they are older. Movement between jobs of younger workers seems to 
be more closely associated with the worker's desire to improve 
position in the labour market, within a domestic context of 
increased responsibility, and within a labour market context of a 
wider variety of jobs tempered with regional variation in 
opportunity. 
Roberts et al. (1986) suggest that the recession has made the 
transition from youth to adult work more difficult: 
The low paid youth jobs that some obtained were turning into 
blind-alleys rather than stepping-stones. 
(Roberts, Dench and Richardson, 1986: 37) 
Job-changing appears to have decreased during the recent recession. 
Evidence from the Scottish School Leaver Surveys shows that 
successful job-changing (those who had left one job and found 
another by the time of the survey) had decreased from 17% of the 
1977 sample to 5% of the 1983 sample, according to Raffe (1984), 
who also points out that: 
... contrary to early experience, 
the successful job-changers 
tended to be relative advantaged young people, those with 
qualifications and living in areas of relatively high 
employment. 
(Raffe, 1984: 257) 
It would seem therefore that career movement which depends on a 
fairly open labour market is becoming increasingly difficult. 
Those who might in easier times be able to change their jobs in 
order to improve their situations may be more reluctant to do so 
when length of service with a company can mean the difference 
between employment and redundancy. Many may therefore be inclined 
to stay put, even if this means keeping a lower status "dead end" 
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job, if job security becomes more important that upward mobility. 
Thus upward mobility of the counter-mobile middle class or the 
work-route working class, is likely to become more difficult, and 
even movement into the adult labour market is restricted. 
Summary 
Career aspirations and opportunities are class related. It seems 
that there is a relationship between aspiration and constraint in 
which each is modified according to the strength of the other. 
Accordingly, the higher the social class, the greater the 
opportunity for choice; the lower the social class, the more choice 
is modified by constraint. However much young wcrkers may want to 
"get on" in life, many realistically will know that they are 
limited both by their personal characteristics and by the 
limitations of the labour market. Initial aspirations may be 
modified by experience. 
There is, however, a third major influence on labour market 
behaviour, in the degree of domestic responsibility of the young 
worker. This factor affects the importance of stability in and 
income from work. 
occupational mobility amcng young workers is affected by all three 
factors: ambition for upward mobility may involve changirXI jobs; 
job-changing may be caused by labour market factors such as 
seasonal work, job insecurity, or the exclusion of young workers 
from adult jobs; or job-changing may result from an increase in 
domestic responsibility and the need for greater job security. 
Analysis of the NODS found that far from being associated chiefly 
with the lower occupational classes, job-changing was mainly 
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associated with the counter-mobile middle class, suggesting that it 
might be for some a means of improving their position in the labour 
market. It was suggested that freedom of movement in the labour 
market has been restricted in the current recession and published 
statistics show that job-changing has decreased in recent years. 
In these circumstances, other strategies for upward mobility may 
take on increasing importance. The transition into stable adult 
employment might best be achieved through the provision of training 
at work, or further education (OECD, 1983: 54). This will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9 
B fies to Upward Nbbbility 
In this chapter, some of the work-related routes to upward mobility 
will be considered. Two youth class groups have been defined in 
terms of the way in which they appear to have gained ground, or 
made up lost ground, in the class structure through routes which 
are not related to full-time education. These are the counter- 
mobile middle class and the work route working class, many of whom 
started their working lives in manual work and moved into non- 
manual work. For the counter-mobile, this represented a return to 
their class of origin. For the work-route, it represents upward 
mobility in the class structure. If this upward movement was not 
achieved through full-time education, then what other means exist 
of achieving upward mobility? 
Four possible work routes to upward mobility are briefly considered 
here: trade apprenticeship, work training, part-time further 
education and self-employment. Each will be examined briefly, and 
some conclusions drawn about access to each and their 
effectiveness. 
Apprenticeship 
Apprenticeship is generally taken to denote a system whereby young 
workers are taught skills through practical training at work and 
theoretical training at college at least one day per week, 
generally over a fixed period of years, during which they receive a 
lower rate of pay than adult workers (Venables, 1974). With the 
decline in industry and the development of new technologies, the 
organisation of skilled manual work has been transformed in recent 
years, and the concept of apprenticeship has been undermined 
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(Ashton and Maguire, 1986: 8). The number of places on 
apprenticeship schemes has been reduced. Job training too has been 
reduced where there is a surfeit of experienced workers seeking 
jobs. Young people who do manage to gain work may still suffer by 
missing out on job training schemes which used to exist for new 
work recruits. 
Apprenticeships have traditionally provided the main means by which 
male manual workers acquire the skills of their trade, and 
therefore represent one of the major means of short-term career 
mobility of the working class from unskilled or semi-skilled work 
into skilled work, and thence perhaps into a longer term trajectory 
leading to self-employment or management in a few cases. Access to 
apprenticeships allows the possibility of future upward mobility, 
therefore. 
Some apprentices aspire to higher than skilled manual work, and see 
their apprenticeship as a means of achieving this. Ryrie and Weir 
found that: 
... there were some who saw their apprenticeship not cnly as a 
method of achieving trade-security and of acquiring practical 
and satisfying skills, but also as a means to future career 
development. 
(Ryrie and Weir, 1978: 68). 
Their study found, though, that aspiring apreritices did not expect 
to achieve higher status through apprenticeship alone: 
... the high aspiring apprentices saw college work as a means 
of achieving the kind of success they wanted in the future. 
(Ryrie and Weir, 1978: 69). 
Such findings are confirmed in Venables follow-up study of 
apprentices. Despite their own achievements, her its felt 
that the route to upward mobility through apprenticeship and 
further education was a hard way: 
... a large number were disillusioned with the route they had 
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travelled and wanted an easier and surer route to middle class 
status for their own children. 
(Venables, 1974: 126) 
The educational component of apprenticeship has changed over the 
years, and is now more likely to provide vocational rather than 
general educaticn. The introduction of the Youth Training Scheme 
(YTS) has affected the training of apprentices, and in some cases 
has partly replaced apprenticeship - in the ccnstzuction industry, 
for example (Ashton and Maguire, 1986). The NC DS cohort, were of 
an age to start apprenticeships in the mid-1970s when manufacturing 
industry was only beginning its decline and YTS had not been 
started. Many of the men, but few of the women, in the cohort had 
been apprentices at some stage in their work lives, though not all 
had completed the apprenticeship. 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9.1 APPRENTICESHIP BY YO J CLASS 
Started and completed apprenticeships by Youth Class 
percentage of each Youth Class 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
M LE FEMALE 
STARTED COMPLETED STARTED COMPLETED 
YOUTH CLASS 96 96 $ P6 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
STABLE MIDDLE CLASS 8743 
EXrATICN-MOBILE W-C 6532 
COUNTER-MOBILE 27 20 54 
WORK-FDITPE W-C 30 20 64 
DOWNWARD M-C 49 38 53 
STABLE WORKING CLASS 52 38 64 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
ALL % 40 29 53 
gase (5260) (5260) (3704) (3704) 
File: APPRENr(31) Source: 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9.1 shows the rates of started and completed apprenticeships 
by Youth Class. As expected, apprenticeship is mainly associated 
with males. There is little variation between youth classes in 
proportions of women in apprenticeships, and apprenticeship does 
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not therefore appear to provide a mobility route for women. Among 
men, apprenticeships are chiefly associated with those who are 
currently in manual work, whether stable working class, or 
downwardly mobile middle class. Similar proportions of the 
counter-mobile middle class and the work-route working class had 
experience of apprenticeship (20% of both groups completed their 
apprenticeship). Those who entered non-manual work immediately 
after full-time education were unlikely to have been trade 
apprentices by definition. 
Table 9.2 confirms that apprenticeship is chiefly to be seen as a 
means of upward mobility within the manual classes, rather than a 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9.2: APPRFNrICESHIP BY CURRENT OCCUPATICNAL CLASS 
Percentage of Males with Apprenticeship 
AFPRPNr AYPEL94 P APPRENr TOTAL 
OCCLJPATIpNAL Ct LY + TRAINIW, + EDUCN AprRFNr BASE 
CLASS 
---- 
% 
-------- ---------- 
% (-100%) 
------------ 
1 HIGHER PROF 5 
- 
5 
----------- 
16 
-------- 
26 
------- 
(290) 
2 INrERMED N-M 11 3 6 20 (810) 
3 JUNIOR N-M 7 4 5 16 (883) 
4 SKILLED M 44 10 7 61 (2400) 
5 SEMI-SKILLED 24 5 3 32 (993) 
6 UNSKILLED M 21 
-- 
2 4 27 (308) 
---------------- 
ALL 
------- 
-- ---- 
27 
-------- 
----------- 
7 
------- 
----------- 
6 
-------- 
39 
- 
------- 
(5684) 
------- --------- 
Sign. p . 0001 
---- ----------- ------- 
File: Rcxites(26) 
Saune: NCAS 
---------------- -------- ----------- ----------- -------- ------- 
means of movement into non-manual work. Apprenticeship is clearly 
associated with those who were still in manual work in 1981, with 
the highest proportions (61%) in the skilled manual class. Few of 
those currently in run-manual work had been apprentices. A typical 
short-term working class "career" can be achieved through 
ac renticeship, but not mobility up into non-manual classes. The 
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table does suggest, however, that some men who had received both 
apprenticeship and further educaticn had been upwardly mobile into 
occupational class 1; out of the 26% of those in class 1 who had 
entered apprenticeship, 16% had also received further education. 
In contrast, most apprentices who were in manual work at 23 years, 
or who were in occupational class 2, which includes own account 
workers, had not received further education. 
It would appear that apprenticeship is not a route to mobility out 
of manual work, though it may provide a mobility route in 
conjunction with further education. Apprenticeship alone is 
typically associated with male skilled manual workers. Women 
rarely enter apprenticeship and rarely enter skilled manual work. 
The lack of apprenticeships among women is therefore likely to 
prevent them making a successful progression within manual work, 
rather than prevent them achieving upward mobility into non-manual 
work. 
Job Training 
Job training is defined in the Z' S as training involving at least 
14 days or 100 hours attendance at a college, training centre or 
skill centre during any job held. Job training schemes may vary 
considerably in their length, range and scope, in whether they are 
crucial to promotion or not. Without the possibility of 
considering the relative importance of training schemes only a 
cursory examination of their relationship with upward mobility is 
possible. 
Table 9.3, again using NC'US data, snows acz oss-tabulation of job- 
training by youth class and gender. Unlike apprenticeships, job 
training appears to be equally comaan amrng men and waren, with 31% 
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of both sexes having received training as defined. Training was 
mainly received by those currently in non-manual work. It is 
significant that only 38% of the counter-mobile, compared with 47% 
of the work-mobile working class, had received job-training. This 
suggests that the mobility routes of these two groups are not 
identical, as Golda pe (1980) has pointed out. Though both are 
equally likely to have entered apprenticeships, the work-mobile are 
more likely to have received block or day release from work to 
attend a training scheme. If upward mobility is achieved through 
job training, many of the counter-mobile must therefore use some 
other means of retrieving their class positions. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9.3: JCE TRAINIM BY YC IUM CLASS 
Percentage who have received training involving at least 
14 days or 100 hours attendance at a college, training centre 
or skill centre during any job held 
----------------------------------------------------- 
MALFS FEMALES 
Ya7n-I CLASS -% % 
------------------------- ------------------- 
STABLE MIDDLE CLASS 47 32 
ELL ATIcX -MOBILE W-C 41 28 
OIJNTER-MOBILE M-C 38 47 
WORK-IWI'E W-C 47 54 
DOWNWARD M-C 27 29 
STABLE WORKING CZ, ASS 24 25 
----------------------------------------------------- 
ALL 31 31 
Base (5191) (3643) 
----------------------------------------------------- 
File: Routes(26) 
Source: NC)S 
----------------------------------------------------- 
The downwardly mobile middle class seem rarely to have received job 
training or apprenticeship, and this may be a contributory factor 
to their continued loss of status: those who have received training 
or entered an apprenticeship may be more likely to bee me counter- 
mobile. 
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------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9.4: JOB TRAINIM BY OOCUPATiCNAL CLASS 
Percentage who have received job training (defined 
above) by current occupational class and sex 
MALES FEMALES 
OCCUPATIONAL CLASS $ Base $ Base 
------------------------------------------------- 
1 HICHER N-M 46 (290) 31 (87) 
2 INTERMEDIATE N-M 40 (810) 45 (910) 
3 JUNIOR N-M 49 (883) 31 (1980) 
4 SKILLED MAL 25 (2400) 16 (201) 
5 SEMI-SKILLED MANUAL 23 (993) 18 (760) 
6 EILEID MANUAL 19 (308) 13 (30) 
ALL 31 (5684) 31 (3968) 
-------------------- ---------- 
File: Rautes(26) 
Saurce: Nl"DS 
--------------- ---------------------------- ------ 
Table 9.4 shows receipt of job training by current occupational 
class, and shows that job training is associated with particular 
non-manual classes; mainly junior non-manual work in the case of 
men, and intermediate non-manual work in the case of women. The 
table also shows that male clerical workers are more likely to 
receive training than female ones (49% of class 3 men received 
training, compared with 31% of class 3 women), confirmirxj gender 
divisions in clerical work described in earlier chapters. Among 
waren, highest proportion of ex-trainees are in occupational class 
2, which includes lower professionals. Women appear relatively 
more likely to receive training in the lower professional class 
than in any other class, and it is mainly in this class that 
,, career women" are located. 
Findings from the NCDS seem to show that apprenticeship and job- 
training cater for different groups: while apprenticeship is mainly 
associated with male manual workers, training is mainly associated 
with non-manual workers of both sexes. Female manual workers 
appear to receive neither. 
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wer Education 
The idea of part-time further education as an "Alternative Route" 
to educational qualifications and upward mobility was generated by 
the Crowther Report (1959). Raffe has examined some of its 
Concepts and assumptions using data from the Oxford Mobility Study. 
He comments: 
In short, while the system of further education was evolving 
it was generally believed that help for the educationally 
underprivileged was ipso facto help for the socially 
underprivileged. This theme has persisted and attached itself 
to the concept of the "alternative route" - namely, that if 
further education provides a special route for those with less 
academic attainment, it is thereby providing a special route 
for those from less favourable home backgrounds. 
(Raffe, 1979: 52-3) 
Raffe looked at the relative chances of entering part-time 
education of those from different educational and social 
backgr rinds, and found that part-time education seemed more of an 
alternative route in educational terms for the middle class than 
for the working class, in social terms, however, when class 
destinations were examined, there was a positive association 
between part-time education and upward inter-generaticnal mobility 
which was strongest among those from working class backgrounds 
(Raffe, 1979: 47). 
Raffe's conclusions are taken up by Halsey et al. (1980) who 
commented that in general, 
(... ) class chances of access to further education were 
notably equal and educational opportunity would have been a 
lot more unequal if it did not exist. 
(Halsey, Heath and Ridge, 1980: 193) 
Further education is likely to play as important a part as job 
training in improving the mobility chances of the young. Many of 
tlxtse who left full-time education early may undertake some form of 
part-time further education, while in employment Some may return 
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-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9.5: TYPE OF POST-SCHOOL EDUCATIONAL «XJRSE ATTENDED 
BY YOUTH CLASS 
(leading to highest qualification, or current course) 
Percentages in each Youth Class. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
TYPE OF COURSE: FULL-TIME PART-TIME NONE TOTAL 
YOM CLASS %%% (=100%) 
Males 
STABLE M-C 41 25 34 (677) 
IDUC-ROUTE W-C 50 21 29 (238) 
COUNTER-MOBILE M-C 32 15 53 (332) 
WORK-RO(irE W-C 13 19 68 (611) 
DOWNWARD M-C 15 8 77 (812) 
STABLE W-C 
---------------------- 
4 
-------- 
5 
------------ 
91 
--------- 
(2395) 
-------- - 
TOTAL % 
------------- 
15 
---- 
11 74 (5265) 
---------- 
Women wiest Children 
---- ------------ --------- -------- 
STABLE M-C 67 11 22 (650) 
IDUC-ROUTE W-C 59 13 28 (357) 
COUNTER-MOBILE M-C 47 13 40 (208) 
WORK-ROUTE W-C 31 13 56 (280) 
DOWNWARD M-C 26 15 59 (682) 
STABLE W-C 
----------------- 
10 
-------- 
10 
---------- 
80 (1527) 
------ 
TOTAL % 
------------- - 
31 
--- 
-- 
12 
--------- 
57 
--- -- 
(3704) 
- -------- 
File: EIDUP(32) 
----- ------------ --------- -------- 
Source: NODS 
----------------------- -------- ------------ --------- -------- 
to full-time education after a period in the labour force. Table 
9.5 shows the type of post-school course leading to the highest 
educational qualifications of the NCDS cohort, by youth class. The 
table shows further divergence between the counter-mobile middle 
class and the work-mobile working class: among men, the counter- 
mobile predominantly take full-time courses, while the work-mobile 
take part-time education courses. This observed difference is 
however partly due to the formation of the youth class typology, 
which includes among the comter-mobile and the work-mobile those 
who took a combination of education and work routes to upward 
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mobility: 42% of the counter-mobile and 17% of the work-mobile had 
received continuous full-time education (school or post-school) 
beyond the age of 18 years. 
The relevant point, perhaps, is that among all those who take the 
work route to upward mobility, those of middle class origin, the 
counter-mobile, are the most assisted by full-time education. 32% 
of the counter-mobile, compared with only 13% of the work-mobile 
working class received full-time post-school education. Marginally 
more of the work-route mobile than counter-mobile (19% compared 
with 15%) received part-time education. 
Amorxj women, there is a clear gradient from stable middle class to 
stable working class in the percentages who received full-time post 
school education, but no clear differences in part-time education. 
Overall, women without children seem twice as likely to have 
received full-time education as men, 31% compared with 15%. As 
with men, the table shows that canter-mobile women are more likely 
to have received full-time post-school education than work-route 
mobile of working class origin (47% compared with 31%). Part-time 
education is relatively evenly spread among all youth classes in 
the case of women, though the four mobile groups are marginally 
more likely to have been involved in part-time education than the 
two stable groups. 
part-time post-school education canmt from this table be seen as a 
major upward mobility route: it is mainly associated among men with 
the stable middle class and the education-mobile working class 
whose observable working careers have been entirely in nc -manual 
work. In other words it does not seem to provide a true 
alternative to full-time education for early school leavers from 
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the workirxj class. 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9.6: MEANS OF FINA IAL SUPPORT DURING COURSE 
Sources of financial support for attenders of full-time or 
sandwich course (current or highest qualification) 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
SOURCE OF FIINANICIAL S PKRT 
GRANT GRAM' + PARENTS WORK* 
YOUTH CUSS $ %- -% Base 
Males 
STABLE M-C 87 56 11 (315) 
IDUC-ROUTE W-C 82 39 22 (130) 
COUNTER-MOBILE M-C 79 48 22 (117) 
WORK-ROUTE W-C 64 19 16 (90) 
DOWNWARD M-C 72 33 19 (135) 
STABLE W-C 
--------- 
61 
--------- 
23 
------------- 
24 (116) 
----------- 
TOTAL 
---------- 
77 
--------- 
40 
------ ---- 
---------- 
16 
--- -- 
(903) 
---------- 
Wamen without Children 
- -- ---------- ------- 
STABLE M-C 79 53 15 (454) 
IDUC-ROUTE W-C 73 35 23 (220) 
COUNTER-MOBILE M-C 69 39 25 (100) 
WORK-ROUTE W-C 51 25 36 (87) 
DOWNWARD M-C 44 20 34 (186) 
STABLE W-C 
--------------- 
42 
--------- 
17 
------------- 
33 
------ 
(161) 
----- 
TOTAL 
---------- 
65 
--------- 
37 
-- 
---- 
23 
--- -- 
(1208) 
---------- 
File: FDUP(36) 
Source: NC, US 
-------------------- --------- 
----------- 
------------- 
---------- 
---------- 
------- 
------- 
Access to full-time post-school education depends on financial 
help, generally in the form of an educational grant. To what 
extent did the mobile groups, get help to continue their full-time 
education? 1CDS respc 5ents who undertook a full-time post-school 
cause or a sandwich course were asked the source of their funding. 
Table 9.6 shows the results. sources of financial help are divided 
into three groups: educational grant (any source), help from 
parents in addition to a grant, and income from paid work whether 
or not a grant was received. 
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The table shows that among attenders of full-time courses, grant 
provision varies according to Youth Class. Among both men and 
women, the stable middle class were most often in receipt of a 
grant (87% of men and 79% of women) and the stable working class 
least (61% or men and 42% of women). The only exception to a 
general Youth Class gradient between these two extremes are the 
work-route men, of whom only 64% received a grant, compared with 
79% of the counter-mobile men and 72% of the downwardly mobile men. 
In addition to a grant, some of the cohort received financial help 
from their parents. The table shows that those of middle class 
families were considerably more likely to have received financial 
help from their parents than those from working class backgrc nds. 
in particular, counter-mobile men were more than twice as likely as 
work-route men to have had parental help (48% compared with 19%). 
A similar picture occurs for women, except that only 20% of the 
downwardly mobile middle class women had parental help, compared 
with 33% of equivalent men. In general, women were marginally less 
likely than men to get help from their parents, except in the case 
of work-mobile women, 25% of whom were helped, compared with 19% of 
work-mobile men. 
Whether or not respondents received a grant, they were asked 
whether they received regular income from working during term-time 
while doing the course (the question excludes vacation jobs). 
Women were more likely to have worked than men: 23% of women 
compared with 16% of men, overall. Among both men and women, the 
stable middle class were the least likely to have had a term-time 
job (11% of men and 15% of women), but there is little variation 
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between the other groups. 
Table 9.6 shows that some groups are helped more than others to 
attend full-time or sandwich courses. Among men, those from middle 
class families are more likely to get a grant and help from their 
parents. Those from working class families are less likely to get 
help of this kind. When the counter-mobile and the work-route 
working class are compared, the counter-mobile are more likely to 
have an income from each source (grant, parents and work) than the 
work-route group. Few work-route working class appear to achieve 
upward mobility through post-school education, and those who do get 
little financial encouragement. 
There are clear gender differences in the funding of educational 
courses, according to this table: women are less likely than men to 
get grants or help from their parents, and more likely to earn 
money through employment during their Course. Ashton and Maguire 
(1980) have found that while young male workers are often offered 
day release courses or job training as part of their employment, 
young women often have to gain skills and qualifications through 
evening courses for which they have to pay. 
Self-Qnployment 
A change in employment status from employee to self-employed or own 
account worker can be seen as another example of upward mobility. 
It is, however, one that is seldom achieved by the young. Analysis 
of the self-employed in the NCDS cohort (Payne, 1984) has already 
shown that nearly half of the men who were self-employed with 
employees at 23 were in the family business rather than one they 
had set up on their own, and were more likely than employees to 
have received an inheritance of over 500 pounds. This finding 
201 
suggests that self-employment may depend on family assistance. 
Overall the self-employed were likely to have left full-time 
education earlier than employees, and were more likely to have had 
several jobs, (Payne, 1984: 501). It seems, then, that self- 
employment is a more likely outcome for those of middle class 
families and lower educational levels (perhaps those who have been 
classified as counter-mobile here). 
Payne's research showed that self-employment had a different nature 
for women than for men, apart from being less common, it was more 
often appreciated because the working haus were convenient - much 
of the work was part-time - rather than for the pay and 
independence (Payne, 1984: 500-2). 
The self-employed were clustered into specific industries: of those 
men without employees, 37% were in the construction industry; of 
those with employees, 40% were in distributive trades, hotels and 
catering or repairs, especially garages. Among all self-employed 
women (with or without employees) 76% were in service industries, 
often hairdressers or shopkeepers (Payne, 1984: 499). 
it may be then that some apprenticeships lead to self-employment or 
own account work, particularly for motor mechanics and those in the 
building trades. For the most part, though, self-employment 
appears to be the result of family contacts and established family 
businesses, rather than apprenticeship training and the acquisition 
of skills. 
Runmary 
Strategies considered were apprenticeship, training, further 
educaticn and self-employment. Analysis showed that apprenticeship 
was associated with working class men, and led mainly to skilled 
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manual work rather than upward mobility out'of the manual classes. 
Women rarely enter apprenticeships, and this is one reason why they 
so rarely obtain skilled manual work. Training and education were 
mainly associated with the middle class. A major factor affecting 
all of these mobility routes is the extent to which the family of 
origin help. 
It was seen that those of middle class origin received more 
financial help from their parents when on full-time courses, and 
among the self-employed were more likely to have received an 
inheritance and more likely to be working in a family business. 
For the educationally unsuccessful middle class, it seems that 
there is often family help towards upward mobility (in Chapter 7 it 
was seen that this group was the most likely to have heard about 
their first jobs through family or friends, as well). 
In contrast, educationally unsuccessful working class men appear to 
get very little family help in achieving upward mobility: they are 
less likely to hear about their jobs informally, they are less 
likely to profit from a family business, and they receive less 
financial help to further their education. Those that "make it" 
appear to do so through job training, which may enable them to move 
into management. 
Though women were found to be more likely to enter full-time 
education after school than men, and are as likely to enter part- 
time further education, it is clear that they receive somewhat less 
financial help, from grants or parents, and more often have to pay 
their own way through courses. This confirms the findings of 
Ashton and Maguire (1980). It would seem, then, that routes to 
upward mobility through work are less accessible for women, and 
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this may be a reason why women are less likely than men to be 
upwardly mobile through work routes (Chapter 5). 
When job-changing carries a risk of unemployment, and training and 
apprenticeship are both reduced because of the surfeit of 
experienced workers, and recruitment of the young and inexperienced 
is limited to low paid and often dead end jobs, it is hard to see 
how mobility chances for any group can remain unaffected by the 
present industrial decline. Both the counter-mobile and the work- 
mobile, who rely on upward mobility through work routes must risk a 
greater prospect of remaining in manual work in the future. 
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Chapter 10 
Work and Sa[oe 
In our society, the family is the primary social guxap. It is the 
environment in which children are raised and from which they move 
out into the world of work. As they grow older, they will 
generally leave their families of origin and create households of 
their own, forming new families and raising children. Relatively 
few people do not eonfonn to this basic pattern. 
In the following chapters, some aspects of this process of family 
and household formation will be examined. It will be seen that 
patterns of marriage, childbearing and housing careers vary 
considerably according to class and gender. It is the purpose of 
this chapter to consider the nature of, and reasons for, the 
interaction between occupational class careers and transitions 
which take place at home. 
The functional i st view of the family 
Studies of the family in society tend to refer to the "pre- 
industrial family" and the "contemporary family" in ways which 
suggest that the family has changed in character and roles as a 
result of the industrial revolution. Stereotypes have developed of 
the pre-industrial peasant family as a large I- seftld, comprising 
extended family and engaged in collective production, in comparison 
with the smaller contemporary family (the "nuclear family') which 
is involved chiefly with socialisation and consumption. 
Both Marx and Weber saw pre-industrial Britain organised along the 
lines of collective peasantry, with the family as the basic unit of 
both production and cxx sumptian, and thus an integral part of the 
socio-eccryomic system. The industrial revolution caused a major 
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change: 
The household has (... ) undergone an extensive internal 
transformation (... ); its function has been restricted to the 
field of consumption, and its management placed on an 
accounting basis. 
(Weber, 1961: 94) 
The industrial revolution thus severed the direct link between the 
family and production, creating two separate worlds - the private 
world of the home and the public world of work. 
The functionalist view, developed by Talcott Parsons, saw the 
roles of the family becoming more focused and generally 
diminishing, as a result of this perceived separation of home and 
work. Parsons considered the role of the family to be chiefly that 
of socialisation, preparing the young for their future roles in 
society. When this role too was believed to be threatened, as the 
welfare state and the education system appeared to be taking over 
the socialisation role of the family, then the institution of the 
family itself was seen to be at risk. Alternatives to the family, 
such as the kibbutz system in Israel, were examined as possible 
primary social groups of the future (Parsons, 1956). 
Other threats to the stability of the family were seen to lie in 
the increasing participation of women in the labour force. Goode 
suggested that there was conflict between the demands of the 
occupational structure and those of the family, since the market 
economy and occupational structure took no account of the worker's 
role in the family (Goode, 1982: 179-180). He considered that such 
factors weakened the family control system, and thus constituted a 
further threat. 
The image of the family in industrial society, developed since 
Marx by functionalist sociologists such as Parsons and Goode, is of 
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a nuclear family, comprising parents and children, linked to the 
socio-ecc mit system via the chief (male) breadwinner. It is seen 
as an important unit of consumption, but not as a unit of 
production. Its primary function is the reproduction of labour 
power (to Marxists) or socialisation of the next generation to 
their work roles (to functionalists). Gender roles thus become 
quite distinct, with the husband as the chief earner and ambassador 
to the outside world, and the wife as home-maker and child-bearer, 
family-centred rather than work-oriented. It is easy to see why 
this view has been challenged as more women work, and as large 
social institutions take over many of the functions perceived to 
belong to the family. The response was to suggest that the family 
was under threat; an alternative response might be to reconsider 
the position of the family in society. 
A Historical Re-evaluation 
Recent research is beginning to show that the industrial revolution 
had a less drastic effect on the family than previously thought. 
Demographic and historical research has questioned the assumption 
that the nuclear family was a product of the industrial age. The 
view held for many years was that because of the increase in 
geographic mobility and the formalisation of paid labour, the 
extended family of earlier times contracted until it consisted of 
just two generations, parents and children. Historical research 
has now shown that this was an exaggeration. Families in, 
pro-industrial times were no larger than now; confusion has arisen 
because the words "family" and "household" were used 
interchangeably. Many pre-dial hmLseholds contained servants 
who lived in as part of the household but were not necessarily kin. 
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Flandrin (1979) has shown that the large households of the past 
were usually those of the rich, and included servants, or those of 
sharecroppers who needed a large family workforce. Most households 
prior to the industrial revolution averaged five persons and 
consisted of parents and children. The present day nuclear family 
is not, according to Laslett (1972: 130-1), a result of 
industrialisation. 
Nor can it be said that the extended family of the present day is 
becoming less significant, either for the working class or the 
middle class. Bell (1968) has shown the importance of the extended 
middle class family in providing material support, and rejects the 
view that industrialism and the extended family cannot co--exist. 
Harris (1983) follows Laslett in rejecting the myths of the large 
extended families of the past and the isolated nuclear families in 
the present. It would seem that as long as the extended family has 
a function in providing material or financial assistance, then 
kinship networks will be maintained. Anderson (1971) sees the 
relationship between the family and the economic system as a factor 
affecting the size and cohesion of urban families in nineteenth 
century Lancashire. It was often the case then as now (see Chapter 
7) that workers obtained employment through their kin, even though 
formal work had shifted from the home to the factory. Advantages 
were therefore to be gained from maintaining family relationships, 
even for those in urban areas. 
Although they were largely free from the economic and 
normative constraints which, in the rural areas, made 
terminating relationships with family and kin such a 
precarious and consequently rare business, yet, because they 
faced other problems of social welfare and, for migrants, of 
accommodation and information, they could not exist for long 
at an optimum level of satisfactions without some form of 
assistance from others. Kin were the major form of 
assistance. 
(Anderson, 1971: 160-1) 
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Anderson is making some interesting points: firstly, he suggests 
that links with the extended family are maintained for 
instrumental, often economic reasons; secondly, he suggests that 
there was no clear-cut division between home and work in the 
nineteenth century; thirdly, he distinguishes between 
industrialisation and urbanisation, seeing the latter, rather than 
the former, as having the major effect on family life. 
MacFarlane (1978) has challenged more of our assumptions about pre- 
industrial England, by suggesting that it was not a typical peasant 
community at all, and cannot be compared with otter pre-industrial 
European societies. This constitutes a major challenge to the 
theoretical basis for earlier descriptions of the "pre-industrial 
family". MacFarlane argues that geographic mobility and wage labour 
were both common in sixteenth and seventeenth century England. 
Individual, rather than collective family, ownership was common 
from the mid-fourteenth century until the eighteenth century, as 
records of land transactions show. Notions of collective 
peasantry, derived from evidence in other countries, cannot 
therefore be applied to pre-industrial Britain. MacFarlane points 
out: 
Within the recorded period covered by our documents, it is not 
possible to find a time when an Englishman did not stand 
alone. Symbolised and shaped by his ego-centred kinship 
system, he stood in the centre of his world. This means that 
it no longer possible to "explain" the origins of English 
individualism in terms of either Protestantism, population 
change, the development of a market economy at the end of the 
middle ages, or the other factors suggested by the writers 
cited. Individualism, however defined, predates sixteenth 
century changes and can be said to shape them all. 
(MacFarlane, 1978: 196). 
Among the writers cited by MacFarlane was Weber, who had argued 
that the separation of the social from the economic, of 
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landownership from the household, was central to the development of 
a rational capitalist system, and that modern life was dominated by 
the separation of the business from the household (Weber, 1930: 21- 
2). MacFarlane has thus challenged the whole argument that the 
family has become separated from the economic system. 
Feminist critiques 
Perhaps the major strand of criticism of the "traditional" view of 
the family, its position in society, and the division of labour 
within it, has come from feminist sociologists over the last decade 
or so. Functionalist views appear to relegate women to the role of 
housewives, denying the importance socially and economically of 
women's increasing roles as wage-earners. The importance given to 
men's employment outside the home, vis-a-vis women's unpaid work 
within the home, seems to be based on the assumption that work and 
home are separate, representing the public and private spheres. 
Ann Oakley partially addressed the issue when examining the 
importance of housework: 
The relevant questions sociologists fail to ask include: to 
what extent do housewives influence family status-rankings 
through their ocnsumpticn or general housekeeping behaviour? 
Does a married woman's adherence to stereotyped ideals of 
"feminine" behaviour in dress, appearance and so forth, have 
any influence on social perceptions of her family's status? 
How far do women determine the occupational positions and 
behaviour of their husbands? How is a family's social ranking 
affected by both husband and wife in a paid job or career? 
(Oakley, 1974: 13) 
These questions are still, for the most part, based on the notion 
of the family as a unit of consumption, and the female adult as the 
maintainer and producer of wage labour. It is only in the last 
question that Oakley considers the role of women in production as 
well as ccnsl mpticn. Nevertheless, once the assumptions about the 
role of one family member are questioned, further questions are 
raised about the role of the whole family in society. 
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If the family is viewed as a collective eccnomic unit, the roles of 
all its members in production can be taken into acc=t; it is when 
work and home are separated ocnceptually that the productive role 
of women in the labour market (and other workers in the family, 
such as children) tends to be overlooked. Put more simply, it 
appears that while men attract sociological interest primarily 
because of their roles in production, women tend to be ocnsidered 
mainly in relation to their roles in the home. If work and home 
were not coroeptually separated, the roles of both men and women, 
in both work and home, could be examined. For this to happen, it 
is necessary to consider the role of the home in production. 
MacFarlane's (1978) argument was against the notion of peasant 
collectives, not against that of the family as a collective 
productive unit. 
Recent research by Pahl (1984) has revealed the extent to which the 
family acts as a co-operative within the informal labour market, in 
a manner which reflects many of our previous images of the pre- 
industrial peasant family. Indeed, it would seem from Pahl's 
account of household work strategies an the Isle of Sheppey, that 
many of the conclusions drawn about the separation of work and home 
relate only to formal work situations. Cnce work within the home 
is considered, then it begins to seem that the role of the family 
in production has varied less than previously imagined. 
According to Pahl, there has been a growth in self-provisioning by 
families, including a growth in the provision by households of 
services which were once formally provided (i. e. in the formal 
market place). This he refers to as the "self-service economy", 
the result of a trend of privatisation in self-provisioning. While 
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such strategies have been seen by some to be the coping respcnses 
of the poor (see Mingione, 1983, for example), Pahl found, in 
contrast, that households needed the inane from formal employment 
in order to provision themselves. There was thus, he suggested, a 
degree of polarisation between those families who are busily 
involved in all forms of work at one pole and households unable to 
do a wide range of work at the other (p. 313). This polarisation: 
... involves a process of positive and negative feedback; households with members in employment are most likely to 
engage in all other forms of work, and the reverse is the case 
where no one is in employment. There is a kind of ratchet 
effect, so that once households get into a benign spiral 
upwards their collective efforts keep them there. 
(Pahl, 1984: 334) 
The emphasis is on the collective efforts of family members, both 
in the formal economy and in the household economy. The theory 
thus allows us to see the family as linked through all its members 
with the wider social Institutions, rather than via the male bread- 
winner alone. Pahl goes so far as to suggest that the polarisation 
he describes is more significant than the manual/non-manual divide 
in determing life chances, though he provides little evidence to 
support this. 
It seems then that the family may have either returned to many of 
its peasant forms, or, in the light of MacFarlane's work, have 
retained much of its productive function insofar as the informal 
economy is concerned. Indeed, if separation has occured, it is not 
so much between the home and work, as between formal and informal 
work. The division between the formal and informal sectors of the 
economy has become greater as the family has become more private, 
but the productive function of the family unit has been maintained. 
It has, however, become less visible. 
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The privatisation of the family 
Housing policies and designs have affected family patterns and 
increased the privacy of family life. While accommodation has 
become more spacious since the urban over-crowding of the 
nineteenth century, it has also become more enclosed. There has 
been a tendency for the family to close its doors. As Paul Cohen 
has pointed out: 
The first effect of the high-density, high-rise schemes was to 
destroy the function of the street, the local pub, the corner 
strip, as articulations of communal space. Instead there was 
only the privatised space of the family unit, stacked one on 
top of each other, in total isolation, juxtaposed with the 
totally public space which surrounded it, and which lacked any 
of the informal social controls generated by the 
neighbourhood. 
(Cohen, 1972: 16). 
The privatisation noted by Pahl with regard to self-provisioning, 
was earlier reported by Goldthorpe et al. in their study of 
affluent workers. They found that affluent workers were "home- 
centred" rather than career-oriented, but emphasised that 
privatisation was a working class solution which should not be 
confused with embourgeoisement: 
A privatised style of life can best be understood not as a 
sign of incipient "middle-classness", in the way it often 
seems to be interpreted, but rather as reflecting the 
adaptation of long-standing working class norms of sociability 
to new economic and social conditions. 
(Goldthorpe et al., 1969: 103). 
Hours of work and distance from kin are both cited as factors 
affecting such adaptations. 
Privatisation may be imposed on many working class families by the 
urban housing design of the 1960s; homecentredness may be a 
response to lack of career opportunity; in addition, the advent of 
television has made leisure more home-based. One consequence of 
such privatisation may be imreased strain on family relationships 
((Rahen, 1972: 17; Komaravsky, 1967: 340) and this may be contributing 
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to the apparent increase in marital breakdown. 
The increased privatisation of the working class may have re- 
inforced the functionalist view of the world divided into public 
and private spheres, the former dominated by the male worker, and 
the latter by the female home-maker. The division can once again 
be seen as false if working class privatisation is seen as a form 
of adaptation to the constraints of housing design, rather than as 
a form of athourgeoisement. 
An alternative view 
The traditional views of the family as a unit of consumption and 
reproducer of wage labour, or as an agent of socialisation and 
social control, are views which see the role of the family as 
limited through the effects of industrialisation. The family is 
seen as isolated from the mainstream of the social and economic 
system, linked only through the male breadwinner. These views deny 
the importance of women in society and the role of the family in 
production, a role which it is suggested has probably continued un- 
noticed since before industrial times. It would seem that the 
privatisation of the family which has occurred with urbanisation, 
has led some sociologists to conclude that there has been a 
division of work and home. The emphasis on the study of formal 
work situations has re-inforced this view. When informal work 
situations and the domestic economy are examined, than the role of 
the family in production can be seen. It is suggested, then that 
it is not work and home which have been separated, but formal and 
informal work. 
This view invests the family with far greater importance in the 
social stnlcture. The family is thus seen as a productive economic 
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unit, and individual members gain in importance. The marriage, on 
which the family is based, can be seen as an economic partnership 
in terms both of the work the two partners perform at home, and the 
formal work situations in which they are involved outside the 
family. 
Such views have been expressed before. Leonard (1980) in her study 
of courtship and weddings, calls for a rejection of the 
functionalist approach, which sees the family as a unit 
characterised by consensus, and urges: 
... a move away from seeing the 
family as a "unit of 
ccrLsumpticd" and psychic support, with relationships between 
"individuals", to a stress on production and reproduction 
within the family and the wider society... 
(Leonard, 1980: 4) 
Implications of the revised model 
It is now possible to look at variation in patterns of marriage and 
housing, and to understand how and why they occur. Once work and 
hone are seen as integrated rather than separated, and equally part 
of the socio-economic system, then it becomes easier to understand 
why women as well as men act 'in particular ways which relate to 
their own social or occupational class and why the woman's own 
occupational class affects marriage patterns. The model of the 
family as a productive economic unit allows us to make sense of 
both class and gender differences in patterns of leaving home, age 
at marriage and first birth and choice of spouse. For both men and 
women, and for both the working class and the middle class, 
occupational careers affect family formation and housing careers, 
and vice versa. 
If home and work are considered to be integrated, rather than 
separate, then it makes sense to look at transitions in home and 
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work as inter-related. This study, having examined work 
transitions in the context of social mobility, will now look at 
family formation and housing in the same context. Goldthorpe and 
his colleagues have shown that attitudes to work structured 
attitudes to home for his affluent workers (quoted above). In 
previous chapters reference has been made to ways in which domestic 
roles, relationships and responsibilities can be observed to 
affect patterns of work. Ways in which social mobility and 
occupational careers affect home circumstances will now be examined. 
The wider'cznsequences of careers have been examined by Mannheim, 
who suggested that a career orientation is reflected not only in 
attitudes to work, but also in an individual's wider belief system 
in areas of irn-work life. He concluded that: 
... individuals who take part not only have their specific 
actions prescribed (... ) but in addition have their life-plan 
to a large extent imposed in the form of a "career", in which 
the individual stages are specified in advance. Concern with 
a career requires a maximum of self-mastery since it involves 
not only the actual processes of work but also the 
prescriptive regulation both of the ideas and feelings that 
one is permitted to have and of cage's leisure time. 
(Mannheim, 1940: 56) 
The presence or absence of social mobility might therefore be 
expected to affect family formation and housing as much as it has 
been seen to affect work. 
216 
fiter 11 
Wo Marries W=? 
In the previous chapter, it was suggested that the separation of 
work and home is largely an artifact of previous theoretical 
perspectives, and that what has happened instead is a separation of 
the public and the private. The role of women in the workplace and 
the role of men in the home have only been examined in recent 
years. The extent to which the partners in marriage might be 
regarded as a joint productive unit, rather than segregated into 
work and domestic roles is becoming increasingly apparent. 
Research on the nature of marriage has led to an awareness of the 
effect of class on differences in the marital relationship, and has 
shown that much of the variation can be attributed to the social 
class of the wife, as well as that of the husband. The literature 
will be discussed below. The class characteristics of marriage 
partners will be examined, in the light of findings from previous 
research about the effects of social mobility on marriage and the 
choice of spouse. The notion of marital mobility, that is social 
mobility through marriage, will be considered for both men and 
women. 
Relationships within marriage 
In the previous chapter it was suggested that the marital couple is 
engaged in a joint economic enterprise. This is not to suggest 
that there is equality in the marital relationship. Indeed, the 
relations within families reflect the inequalities within the wider 
society. It is a functionalist error to see the family as a 
consensual unit, with its members socialised into and accepting 
their allotted roles, though families may present a united front to 
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the outside world. Simone de Beauvoir pointed out that: 
Many young households give the impression of being on a basis 
of perfect equality. But as long as the man retains economic 
responsibility for the couple, this is only an illusion. It 
is he who decides where they will live, according to the 
demands of his work; she follows him from city to country or 
vice versa, to distant possessions, to foreign countries; 
their standard of living is set according to his income; the 
daily, weekly, annual rhythms are set by his occupation; 
associations and friendships most often depend on his 
profession. 
(de Beauvoir, 1972: 498 - original emphasis) 
Many studies of relations within marriage emphasise the varying 
nature of marital relationships and of the degree of inequality 
between husband and wife. Early research distinguished between 
"segregated" relationships, where 
... husband and wife have a clear differentiation of tasks and 
a considerable number of separate interests and activities; 
and "joint" relationships, where 
husband and wife carry out many activities together with a 
minimum of task differentiation and separation of interests. 
(Bott, 1971: 53-4) 
In her classic study of the family, first published in 1957, 
Elizabeth Bott explained that she was describing not the degree of 
equality within the marriage, but variations within 
... a basic division of labour, by which the husband was 
primarily responsible for supporting the family financially 
and the wife was primarily responsible for housework and child 
care. 
(Bott, 1971: 54) 
Her attempts to explain variation in this basic pattern in terms of 
the occupational class of the husband were not very successful: 
although most segregated role relationships were associated with 
husbands in manual work, and most joint role relationships were 
associated with professional and semi-professional male partners, 
there were many exceptions. It will be seen that the variation may 
show the importance of including the wife's education and 
occupation in the analysis. 
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Although Bott did not attribute relationship types to social 
classes, a stereotype has grown of the working class marital 
relationship as segregated, and the middle class relationship as 
sharing. This is despite evidence to the contrary. 
Young and Willmott concluded from their study of working class 
families in Bethnal Green: 
... we cannot reconcile our other 
impressions with the 
stereotype of the working class husband. The man's earnings 
may still be his affair, but when it comes to the spending 
power of the money, his part of the wages as well as hers, 
husband and wife share the responsibility 
(Young and Willmott, 1957: 27). 
What they were suggesting was that within the basic division of 
domestic labour, within the "normative" roles of husband as 
breadwinner and wife as home-maker, they found some evidence of 
joint ccnjugal roles in working class families. 
Nor does the stereotype necessarily hold for the middle class. 
Pahl and Pahl's study of managers and their wives looked at marital 
relationships in a sector of the middle class where husbands were 
committed to a work career, and examined the extent to which wives 
were passive participants. Although the wives were often the 
"planners and thinkers" when husbands were too heavily work- 
oriented, there was little evidence of sharing in any practical 
sense within the marriages (Pahl and Pahl, 1971: 264-5). 
Edgell's study of middle class couples warns against confusing the 
two concepts, sharing of roles and equality in marriage; the first 
does not necessarily involve the other. Edgell found considerable 
segregation of roles among middle class couples who might have been 
expected to display fairly equal: joint conjugal relationships. He 
suggests that conjugal role behaviour varies in response to the 
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spouses' changing relationship to the economic division of labour 
outside the home, and to constraints emanating from changes in the 
family situation itself. He concludes that the sexual division of 
labour in society and in the family are two sides of the same coin, 
with the division of labour predicated upon the twin primary social 
activities of economic production and the reproduction of labour 
power (Edgell, 1980: 104-6). 
Research is beginning to stow how the characteristics of the wife 
affect the patterns of marriage. Komarovsky found that amang blue 
collar workers in the US, it was the wife's educational level that 
most affected her involvement in community affairs: 
The less-educated couples conform more closely than the high 
school graduates to the specialisation of the roles posited by 
Talcott Parsons. Among the former the husband is not merely 
the provider but the "secretary of state" concerned with the 
family's relations with the external world. But the high 
school wives tend to be more involved in community affairs 
than their husbands. 
(Koinarovsky, 1967: 333; the reference is to Parsons and Bales, 
1955: 47). 
Thus, the level of education of the wife is likely to affect the 
relationship. More-educated couples are less likely to ccnform to 
gender role stereotypes of the wife as home-maker and the husband 
as the link with the outside world. 
Edgell (1980) found that the extent to which both partners were 
involved in the labour market affected the marital relationship. 
Diana Gittins, in a recent study of decreasing family size in the 
working class between 1900 and 1939, concluded that this sbauld be 
seen as a result of the changing relations of working class men, 
women and children to the socio-economic, political and cultural 
systems. In particular, she found that the location and nature of 
women's werk affected family size, and concluded that: 
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All these factors affect marital role-relationships and power 
relationships, the extent of knowledge of reproduction and 
birth control, and the degree of communication between 
marriage partners. These in turn determine both the desire 
and the ability to limit family size effectively. 
(Gittins, 1982: 187) 
It would seem then that the changing nature of women's 
participation in the labour market will have an effect on the 
marital relationship and family size. Indeed, many aspects of the 
marriage are likely to be determined by the relationships of the 
partners with the labour market. If a woman's education and her 
position in the labour market affect the marital relationship, then 
it will not be surprising to learn that the occupational class and 
social mobility patterns of both partners affect the choice of 
spouse. 
Choice of Spouse - 
It has frequently been observed that there is considerable endogamy 
in marriage; that is, partners come from similar, and therefore 
socially acceptable, kinship groups. As Komarovsky points out, 
from research in the United States, both partners bring their 
cultural expectations of marital roles into the marriage. It is 
therefore an advantage for couples to come from similar backgrounds 
and share similar expectations: 
Ambiguous definitions of conjugal roles or conflicts over 
different perceptions of marriage cause few marital 
difficulties because spouses have similar cultural 
backgrounds. The exceptions to this consist of a few cases of 
religious and class intermarriages. 
(I warovrsky, 1967: 333) 
Differences in the class of origin of marriage partners sometimes 
caused strain ai the marriage: 
The intermarriage which creates the more serious strain is one 
in which the wife (and not the husband) has the superior class 
bac]ogroq n cL The marriage norms of the high blue-collar worker 
are more egalitarian than in the lower strata and the wife who 
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marries "up" has no difficulty in accepting this improvement 
in her position. 
(Kcmazrnrnsky, 1967: 338) 
In contrast, wives of higher social status (in terms of class of 
origin) expect more equality in marriage and are likely to be 
dissatisfied with segregated c njugal roles. This dissatisfaction 
can lead to a breakdown of marriage. There are good reascx s, then, 
why partners might marry into families which are of the same social 
class as their own. 
It is interesting that "marrying up" is easier for the wife than 
for the husband. This may indicate that while social mobility 
through work routes is difficult for women, as earlier chapters 
have found, social mobility through marriage may provide an 
easier alternative. However, findings which are based on the class 
of origin of both partners neglect the possibility that either or 
both may have been intra-generationally mobile, with the result 
that their current "achieved" class position is different from 
their "ascribed" class, which was based on class of origin. It is 
therefore important to consider the social class of the marriage 
partners themselves, both of whom are likely to be in employment 
until they have children. 
Goode (1982) has suggested that the increasing number of working 
wives is putting strain on the modern family. Harris (1983) also 
suggests that dual wage earning could put a strain on the family, 
but he stresses that this would occur only where marital partners 
do not share equal opportunities for social mobility. In theory, 
where one partner is socially mobile after marriage, the other 
might be subjected to a "role strain" between the social class in 
marriage-and that of his or her family of origin. It may-not be 
possible to sustain both sets of relationships, with the result 
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either that the marriage may end or that contact with the family of 
origin diminish. Young adulthood, as has been seen in earlier 
chapters, is characterised for many by considerable movement in the 
occupational class structure, with opportunities for upward 
mobility largely determined by class of origin, education, and 
gender . Marriage partners are therefore likely to have unequal 
prospects for upward mobility. 
Harris suggests that the sexual division of labour in society in 
practice minimises the risk of differential mobility between 
spouses and thus indirectly contributes to the stability of the 
marriage (Harris, 1983: 75). Of the two working partners, it is the 
husband who is most likely to seek and obtain advancement in his 
work, as has been shown. Women are likely to be held back by 
domestic responsibilities and the structure of the occupational 
system. Married women tend towards downward mobility as a result 
of their interrupted working careers (Chapter 5), the main 
exception being teachers and other semi-professionals, who seem 
able to resume their careers and regain their class positions after 
disruptions for child-bearing or geographic moves (Dex, 1984; 
Martin and Roberts, 1984). 
Komarovsky's findings related to class of origin; Harris's 
observations relate to differential intra-generational mobility 
between the two partners; other findings relate to the wife's own 
occupational class. Thornes and Collard examined the 
characteristics of divorced couples in Britain and concluded that: 
Social mobility did not emerge in this study as a correlate of 
divorce. Nor, unlike American findings, was there any 
evidence to link dissimilarity of social class background with 
divorce. However, marriages in which the wives were of a 
higher grade occupation (at marriage) than their husbands, 
appeared to be more prone to divorce. 
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(Thames and Collard, 1979: 58) 
Since upward intra-generational mobility is most likely to be 
associated with the husband, then it is not surprising that 
mobility appears not to be associated with divorce. Few men are 
able to marry women who are upwardly mobile through work, since 
they are a rare pher nerxxL 
These findings suggest that there are advantages in like marrying 
like, whether endogamy is measured in terms of class of origin, - or 
current occupational class, or intra-generational mobility 
patterns. The exception seems to be where a women marries "up" 
either in terms of her class of origin or her own class trajectory. 
It will therefore be interesting to consider marital mobility 
patterns for both marriage partners, in terms of their Youth Class. 
Marital Mobility 
The expression "marital mobility" originally meant marriage between 
perms of different social standing. The notion of marriage as a 
means of social mobility was introduced by Baskin: 
Such a marriage usually leads one of the parties either to 
social promotion or degradation. In this way, some people 
have made their careers; some others have ruined them. 
(Satin, 1927: 179) 
More recently, however, the term "marital mobility" has come to be 
applied mainly to women, and as Heath has pointed out, become based 
upon fundamentally sexist assumptions. In particular, it: 
... assumes 
that a woman's status or class position is 
determined by her husband's occupation, and it implies that 
the woman's own achievements have little to do with her 
husband's fate. 
(Heath, 1981: 111) 
Marital mobility in its original. sense and applied to both men and 
women is worthy of study. Endogamy suggests that the stable middle 
class and the stable working class will both marry within their 
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class. Mobile groups may present interesting variations. For 
example, men and women who have been defined as the downwardly 
mobile middle class may retrieve their class positions through 
marriage, as measured by their wife's or husband's occupational 
class. The upwardly mobile may crystallise their new higher class 
position through marriage with someone of the same higher class. 
The study will address these questions. 
The following analysis is based on the General Household Survey. 
Included as marriage partners are all those who describe themselves 
as "living as man and wife", whether or not they are legally 
married. The meanings of cohabitation and marriage are discussed 
in the next chapter. Because the GHS is based on a sample of 
households, rather than individuals, the married men and married 
women in the sample will often belong to the same household; 
therefore analysis of couples based on wives will show the same 
data as an analysis of couples based on husbands, but presented 
from a different viewpoint. In order to analyse marital mobility 
based on the spouses' own characteristics, including occupational 
class, only couples without children have been included in the 
analyses described in this chapter. This is to avoid including 
women who have been downwardly mobile after having children; the 
aim is to compare the class of husband and wife early in marriage, 
before subsequent intra-generational mobility. 
Do people marry others of the same occupational class as 
themselves? This is not an easy question to answer. Chapters 4 
and 5 have shown the extent of intra-generational mobility in 
youth. Marriage partners are likely still to be on class 
trajectories at marriage, rather than have reached their class 
"destinations". The occupational classes which are measured in an 
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analysis of marital mobility are therefore likely to be occupied by 
both the respondent and the spouse on a temporary basis. 
Nevertheless, they represent the occupational class at or near the 
time of marriage. 
Table 11.1 is a crosstabulation of spouse's class by the 
respondent's own occupational class, first for husbands and then 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 11.1: E'IDOGAMY IN MARRIAGE 
Spouse's current or last occupaticnal class by own current or 
last occupational class, using the 3-class schema 
(see Appendix 1), among married respondents without children 
in the family. 
Coltm % and standardised residuals 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
000UPATIONAL CLASS OF RFSPC1NDE r 
OCCUPATIONAL CLASS 1+2 3+4 5+6 ALL 
OF SPOUSE $ 96 %- 
CLASS OF WIFE 
1+2 47 16 12 24 
6.9 -3.5 -2.7 
3+4 42 63 54 56 
-2.6 1.9 -. 2 
5+6 11 22 34 21 
------------------ 
-3.3 
-------- 
.6 3.2 
ALL (=100%) 
----- 
(210) 
-------- 
(419) 
-------- 
(120) 
--------- 
(749) 
Row $ 28 56 16 
Sign: p( . 001 
CLASS OF HUSBAND 
1+2 58 25 13 31 
7.2 -2.4 -4.2 
3+4 35 60 60 54 
-3.8 2.0 1.0 
5+6 7 15 27 51 
-3.1 
---- 
-. 4 
------ 
4.1 
------------------- 
ALL (=100%) 
-------- 
(225) 
-- 
(512) 
-------- 
(173) 
--------- 
(910) 
now % 25 56 19 100 
Sign: p e, . 001 
File: 68 Source: G1379&80 
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for wives, using the three-class schema described in Appendix 1. 
The total number of husbands is lower than the total number of 
wives in the Q3S, mainly because many wives are married to husbands 
who are over 29 years of age and therefore not included in the 
study. 
The table shows the degree of marital endogamy, measured according 
to the occupational class of both spouses. The analysis calculates 
standardised residuals from a model of no association (which 
hypothesises no association between the spouses' occupational 
classes). Use of standardised residuals ccntrols for differences 
in the gender composition of different classes in assessing 
endogamy. The table shows that the model of no association does 
not fit the data: there is a high degree of marital endogamy. This 
is especially the case among those in the higher occupational 
classes (1 and 2) who show a strong tendency to marry each other 
rather than outside their own occupational class (the standardised 
residuals are 6.9 for men and 7.2 for women). Also showing a 
strong tendency (though not as str ng as among the Classes 1 and 2) 
to marry each other are those in the lower manual classes 
(standardised residuals of 3.2 for men and 4.1 for women). Those 
in the intermediate classes (3 and 4) show less endogamy, when the 
size of these occupational classes is controlled for. The data 
therefore show that while endogamy in marriage exists, its degree 
varies between classes. It seems that, as in the earlier analysis 
of inter-generational mobility, class cczgruence in marriage occurs 
mainly among those in the two extremes of the class sture, the 
higher non-manual and the lower manual classes. 
Most studies of marital mobility have used the class of origin as a 
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measure, rather than current occupational class, particularly in 
the case of the wife. It may be that young people marry others of 
the same class of origin, particularly when they themselves are 
mobile both inter-generaticnally and antra-generaticnally. Marital 
endogamy may therefore relate to their class of origin rather than 
their current occupational class. 
Tables 11.2 and 11.3 test this hypothesis. They extend Table 11.1 
by controlling for the father's occupational class, first for 
husbands and then for wives. Standardised residuals from a model 
of no association are again given, as well as column percentages. 
Table 11.2 shows the data for men. Analysis of the standardised 
residuals shows that when father's occupational class is controlled 
for, the model of no association fits the data better among the 
lower manual and intermediate classes. In other words, among 
people whose fathers are in semi- or unskilled manual work, 
endogamy can be explained by class of origin. The main exception 
is among those who have been upwardly mobile inter-generaticnally. 
Those who have been upwardly mobile into Classes 1 and 2, and whose 
fathers are in lower occupational classes, tend to marry wives who 
are in Classes 1 and 2. In the case of these upwardly mobile, the 
class of origin has not therefore affected the choice of wife. The 
table shows that a high degree of marital endogamy occurs in 
Classes 1 and 2 even when class of origin is controlled for: men 
in Classes 1 and 2, and whose fathers are in the same class, are 
still relatively more likely to marry wives in Classes 1 and 2. 
Marriage among those who are in the higher non-manual classes 
Cannot therefore be explained by their class of origin. 
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------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 11.2: EIS D0GANY IN MARRIAGE - MEN 16-29 YEARS 
------- 
Wife's current or last occupational class by own current or 
last occupational class, controlling for father's occupational 
class, using the 3-class schema (see Appendix 1), aftXX- Q men 
with no child under 16 in the family. 
Column % and standardised residuals 
------------------ -------- -------- ------------------- 
FATHER'S CLASS AND OOQJPATIOI'ºL CLASS OF RESPC NDENT 
OCCUPATIONAL CLASS 1+2 3+4 5+6 ALL 
OF WIFE 
----- 
% 
--------- 
% 
-------- 
% 
-------- 
% 
-------- --------------- 
Father in class 1+2 
1+2 50 24 26 37 
2.0 -1.8 -0.8 
3+4 44 70 37 54 
-1.3 1.9 -1.0 
5+6 7 5 37 9 
-2.2 0.9 2.7 
- -------------------- 
ALL (=100%) 
--------- 
(93) 
-------- 
(74) 
------- 
(19) 
-------- 
(186) Sign: p< . 001 
ROW % 50 
- 
40 
------- 
10 
-------- 
100 
--------- 
Chi-Sq = 31.9 
-------------------- 
Father in class 3+4 
-------- 
1+2 45 12 9 19 
5.5 -2.4 -1.7 
3+4 43 63 60 58 
-1.8 1.0 0.2 
5+6 12 25 31 23 
-2.0 0.6 1.2 
-------------------- 
ALL (=100%-) 
--------- 
(82), 
------- 
(251) 
-------- 
(55) 
--------- 
(388) Sign: p <. 001 
Row % 21 65 14 100 Chi-Sq = 48.9 
-------------------- 
Father in class 5+6 
--------- ------- -------- --------- 
1+2 50 19 10 22 
2.9 -0.5 -1.6 
3+4 42 54 54 52 
-0.7 0.3 0.2 
5+6 8 27 36 26 
-1.7 0.1 1.2 
-------------------- 
ALL (=100%) 
--------- 
(24) 
------- 
(74) 
-------- 
(39) 
-------- 
(137) Sign: p e. 005 
ROW % 18 
--- 
54 
------- 
29 
-------- 
100 
-------- 
Chi-Sq = 16.3 
-------------------- 
Soume: GES79&80 
-------------------- 
------ 
--------- ------- -------- 
File: 68 
-------- 
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The table shows that people who have been mobile inter- 
generationally, marry according to their own occupational class 
rather than their class of origin. This is not surprising where 
the upwardly mobile are concerned, since marriage to a wife who is 
in the same occupational class as themselves, but a higher class 
than their fathers, would appear to be a means of confirming their 
achieved class position. Thus the upwardly mobile of working class 
origin, might confirm their new middle class position through 
marriage to a middle class wife. Results are more surprising in 
the case of the downwardly mobile middle class. Table 11.2 shows 
that men in this group whose fathers are in Classes 1 and 2 and who 
are themselves in Classes 5 and 6, show a relatively strong 
tendency to marry wives who are also in Classes 5 and 6. Just as 
the upwardly mobile appear to confirm their "achieved" class 
positions through marriage, so do the downwardly mobile, yet the 
latter might have been expected to marry into a higher occupational 
class than themselves, particularly if they are likely to be 
counter-mobile in the future. 
The data for women are shown in Table 11.3. The basic pattern 
appears to be similar to that for men. Percentage comparisons 
suggest that a woman's class of origin is an important factor in 
her choice of spouse. However, comparison of the Chi-squares on 
Table 11.2 and 11.3 shows that the occupational class of the father 
has little more effect on a woman's choice of marriage partner than 
it does in the case of men. A woman's class of origin is therefore 
no better a predictor of her husband's occupational class than a 
man's class of origin of his wife's occupational class. 
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Table 11.3: ENDOGAMY IN MARRIAGE - WOMEN 16-29 YEARS 
Husband's occupational class by own occupational class, 
controlling for father's occupational class, using the 3-class 
schema (see Appendix 1), an waren with rx: ) child tinder 
16 years in the family. 
Coles % and standardised residuals 
------------------------------------------------------ -- 
OCCUPATIONAL CLASS OF RESPONDENT 
OCCUPATIONAL CLASS 1+2 3+4 5+6 ALL 
OF HUSBAND $%$$ 
Father in Class 1+2 
1+2 68 32 22 44 
3.4 -2.1 -1.7 
3+4 25 59 63 47 
-3.0 2.0 1.2 
5+6 7 10 15 9 
-0.8 0.2 1.0 
----- ---------------------- 
ALL (=100%) 
------- 
(91) 
-------- 
(124) 
-------- 
(27) 
- 
(242) 
Raw $ 38 51 11 
---- 
100 
------ ---------------------- 
Father in Class 3+4 
------- -------- ---- 
1+2 54 24 15 29 
4.6 -1.5 -2.3 
3+4 39 59 55 54 
-2.0 1.1 0.2 
5+5 7 17 29 18 
-2.4 0.0 2.6 
- ---------------------- 
ALL (=100%) 
------- 
(97) 
-------- 
(271) 
-------- 
(85) 
----- 
(453) 
Raw -% 
-------- 
21 60 19 100 
- ------------- 
Father in Class 5+6 
------- -------- -------- ----- 
1+2 33 20 8 18 
1.8 0.4 -1.8 
3+4 59 66 64 64 
-0.3 0.2 -0.1 
5+6 7 14 29 18 
-1.3 -0.8 1.9 
---------------------- 
ALL (=100%) 
------- 
(27) 
-------- 
(85) 
-------- 
(52) 
------ 
(164) 
ROW -% 17 
---- 
52 
-------- 
32 
-------- 
100 
------ ---------------------- 
Source: GHS 
---------------------- 
--- 
------- -------- 
Files: 68 
-------------- 
Sign: p<. 001 
Chi-Sq = 35.3 
Sign: p<. 001 
Chi-Sq = 46.7 
Sign: p< . 05 
Chi-Sq = 12.7 
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Table 11.3 shows that amcxg women, as among men, that where fathers 
are in the lower manual classes, there is less association between 
the occupational classes of the marriage partners. For this group, 
class of origin of the wife (rather than her own occupational 
class) appears to have a stronger effect on the choice of husband 
(measured by his occupational class). In contrast, women who have 
been upwardly mobile inter-generationally show the same pattern as 
equivalent men, in marrying a husband in the same occupational 
class as themselves. There is also, as with men, a relative 
tendency for those in Classes 1 and 2 to marry each other, 
regardless of the occupational class of their fathers. 
When mobility of women in the labour market is restricted, and 
upward mobility is so often determined by educational level rather 
than attainments at work, then those women who lack educational 
qualifications may seek upward mobility or counter-mobility through 
marriage rather than in the workplace. The downwardly mobile 
middle class group will be seen in Chapter 12 to marry earlier than 
others of middle class origin. Do they marry back up into their 
class of origin? 
Downwardly mobile women show (Table 11.3) a pattern quite different 
from downwardly mobile men. Men in this group were seen to marry 
women of the same occupational class as themselves, thus confirming 
their downward mobility through marriage. Amcrxg women there is no 
such tendency. Women who have been downwardly mobile inter- 
tend, in contrast, not to marry men of the same generationally 
class as themselves, but to marry men who are in higher 
occupational classes. There is therefore some indication here that 
some women achieve counter-mobility through marriage, regaining 
their class of origin through marriage rather than through work. 
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Are women upwardly mobile through marriage more often than men? If 
so, this would indicate that marriage is indeed a means of upward 
mobility used by women, while men make use of the greater 
possibilities of upward intra-generational mobility through work 
routes. Table 11.4 summarises Table 11.1 and shows the overall 
direction of "marital mobility", allowing gender comparisons. 
The table was derived in a similar way to Tables 4.5 and 5.5, but 
with mobility defined as marriage with a spouse who is in a higher 
or lower occupational class group than the respondent, and 
stability occurring where both spouses are in the same occupational 
class group. The table shows that "marrying up" is generally more 
common for women than for men: overall, 28% of, women married 
spouses of a higher occupational class, compared with 19% of men. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Table 11.4: MARITAL MOBILITY SU . ARY TABLE 
Ccnparison of class of spasse with own class, by sex 
Among %cmen without children and all men 
----------------------------------------- 
SEX 
DIRECTION OF MALE FEMALE 
MARITAL MOBILITY $% 
----------------------------------------- 
UPWARD 19 28 
STABLE 54 53 
DOWNWARD 27 19 
----------------------------------------- 
ALL (=100%) (749) (910) 
----------------------------------------- 
Sign: p<. 001 throughout 
Derived from Table 11.1. Mobility is defined as movement upward or 
downward by one class, between own class and that of spouse, using 
the three-class schema. 
See Table 4.1 for occupational class distribution by gender. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
According to Heath, where marital mobility of women is measured in 
tables of husband's class by father's class, marrying up is 
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generally balanced by marrying dawn. However, he rates that: 
There is both more downward and more upward mobility through 
marriage for women than there is through the labour market for 
men. In this sense a woman's "class fate" is more loosely 
linked to her social origins than is a man's. 
(Heath, 1981: 114) 
The data suggest that where marital mobility is measured according 
to the marriage partners' own occupational class, "marrying up" by 
women is not balanced by "marrying down". Many women marry 
husbands in a higher occupational class than themselves. Heath's 
suggestion that there is more mobility through marriage for women 
than there is through work for men is similarly not borne out when 
Tables 5.5 and 11.4 are compared. Upward mobility through marriage 
appears to occur on the same scale for women as upward mobility 
through work occurs for men: Table 11.4 shows that 28% of women 
married husbands in a higher occupational class, while Table 5.5 
shows that upward intra-generational mobility of men by the age of 
23 years varies between 26% and 31% for different social groups. 
When marital mobility is measured by the woman's own occupational 
class rather than that of her father, the marriage route to class 
mobility appears to be as available to women, as the work route is 
-to men. Comparisons of this kind are, however, extremely 
problematic. 
Table 11.5 is a crosstabulation of spouse's occupational class by 
the respondents own Youth Class in the QIS. The table shows column 
percentages and standardised residuals from a model of no 
association (i. e. which assumes no association betwee n the 
Youth Class of the respondent and the occupational class of the 
husband or wife). Among men, 57% of the stable middle class are 
married to women in occupational Classes 1 and 2, compared with 12% 
of stable working class men. As few as 3% of the stable middle 
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class are married to women in lower manual work, compared with 30% 
of stable working class men. The three mobile groups show very 
similar patterns, in between the two extremes, predominantly 
marrying women in the intermediate classes (mainly Class 3). 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 11.5: OCCUPATIONAL CLASS OF SPOUSE BY YOUTH CLASS 
---- 
Among childless men and women. 
Column percentages in bold type, and standardised residuals 
fmn a model of no association. 
------------------- -------- -------- --------- ----- -------------- 
OVJN YOUTH CLASS 
STABLE EDUC COUNTE R WORK DOWNWARD STABLE 
OCC CLASS M-C MOBILE M3BILE ROUTE M-C W-C ALL 
OF SPOUSE % 
-------------- 
$ 
-------- 
% 
------- 
% 
--------- 
% 
-------- 
96 
--------- 
% 
----- --- 
MIN 
(Wife's Class) 
1+2 57 58 18 18 16 12 24 
6.6 5.4 -1.0 -1.0 -1.6 -4.3 
3+4 40 32 68 65 67 58 56 
-2.1 -2.5 1.2 1.0 1.4 0.4 
5+6 3 10 15 17 17 30 20 
-3.8 -1.8 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 4.0 
- ----- ----------------- 
ALL(=100%) (99) 
-------- 
(62) 
------- 
(62) 
-------- 
(71) 
-------- 
(94) 
-------- 
(317) (705) 
Significance p= . 001 Cramer's V= . 32 
----------------- -------- ------- -------- -------- ---------- ---- 
WCUM 
(Husband's Class) 
1+2 66 45 28 22 17 18 31 
8.1 2.7 -0.2 -0.9 -3.0 -4.4 
3+4 27 44 56 72 68 60 54 
-4.6 -1.3 -0.1 1.4 2.5 1.6 
5+6 6 11 17 6 14 22 15 
-2.9 -1.3 0.1 -1.3 -0.4 3.1 
----------------- 
ALL(=100$)(158) 
-------- 
(104) 
------- 
(18) 
-------- 
(32) 
-------- 
(155) 
--------- 
(382) 
----- 
(849) 
Significance P=< . 001 
Cramer's V= . 30 
---- ------- -------- -------- --------- ----- ----------------- 
Source: GHS(79&80) 
---- 
File: 68 
----------------- -------- ------- -------- -------- --------- ----- 
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It seems that men who have been longer in education, 'regardless of 
class of origin, marry women who are in the higher occupational 
groups and probably have received more education. Educational 
level and current occupational class, rather than class of origin, 
appears therefore to be matched in these marriages. From a study 
of graduates, Kelsall et al. found that: 
... the decisive factors in the choice of marriage partners by these graduates were in fact their education and, in 
corisequeix e, their achieved social class. 
(Kelsall, Poole and Kuhn, 1972: 37) 
Similarly, men who did not receive continuous educatiai beyond the 
age of 18, seem predominantly to marry women in junior non-manual 
work, irrespective of class of origin. Again, the education level 
of the two partners is likely to be - matched. 
The picture for women is similar. The stable middle class and the 
education-route both marry men in occupational classes 1 and 2, 
tlxxigh here there does appear to be a difference according to class 
of origin. While 67% of stable middle class women marry men in the 
higher non-manual classes, 45% of the education mobile of working 
class origin cb so (and 44% marry men in the intermediate classes). 
Among counter-mobile middle class women, many of whom have received 
further education, there appears to be no relative tendency to 
marry men in any particular occupational class. A woman's 
educational level does not appear to overcome the effect of her 
class of origin to the extent that it does among men, at least in 
terms of marriage partners. 
Stable working class women are the most likely of all groups to 
marry men in the lower manual classes (22%, compared with 6% of 
stable middle class women). The mobile groups which left 
continuous education before the age of eighteen, the work-route and 
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the downwardly mobile, both tend to marry men in the intermediate 
Classes. 
Comparison of the work-route with the education route again 
suggests among both men and women, that educational level has an 
important effect on marriage partners. Those with longer in 
education are more than twice as likely to marry a spouse in the 
higher non-manual classes. 
When the standardised residuals are examined, both the stable 
middle class and the educationally mobile working class show a 
relative tendency to marry a partner in Classes 1 and 2. The 
stable working class tend to marry a partner in Classes 5 or 6. 
The other mobile groups show greater fluidity: except in the case 
of downwardly mobile women, the standardised residuals from a model 
of no association suggest that there is relatively no association 
between membership of these three Youth Classes and any particular 
occupational class of marriage partner. Downwardly mobile women, 
in contrast, show a clear relative tendency to marry men in the 
intermediate classes (3 or 4), rather than the semi-skilled or 
unskilled (like the wives of the male downwardly mobile). The 
pattern for women may therefore represent "counter-mobility" 
through marriage. 
Summary 
There is some evidence here that marital mobility could be a means 
of counter-mobility for women, though analysis is restricted by the 
data. It seem clear, however, that for some men or women who are 
upwardly mobile through work or educational routes, marriage might 
be seen as a factor which consolidates achieved class. The 
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education-mobile men from working class origins are the group which 
is most likely to marry women in Occupational Classes 1 and 2. 
Similarly, but more surprisingly, many downwardly mobile middle 
class men, far from retrieving their class position through 
marriage, appear to consolidate their loss of class status by 
marrying women in the lower manual classes. 
The study has shown that the class characteristics of the wife are 
as important as those of her husband or her father in a study of 
marital endogamy. The findings have confirmed hypotheses drawn 
from earlier research that the wife's education and own 
occupational class affect her choice of spouse as much as her 
class of origin. 
Marriage 'generally seems to occur between two partners of similar 
occupational class, and upward mobility through marriage, when it 
does occur, appears to be most associated with downwardly mobile 
middle class women. It is possible, then, that for some women, 
marriage compensates for the relative absence of mobility routes 
for women through work. For those who are unable to achieve upward 
mobility through education or the work place, mobility through 
marriage may represent an alternative means of improving their 
class position. 
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Chapter 12 
Marriage ard thildri 
For most people marriage marks a formal and ritualised ending of 
youth. Around 90% of women and 80% of men have been married by the 
age of thirty, though marriage patterns are affected by long-term 
trends, and there may be a current trend for fewer people to marry 
by this age (Kiernan, 1985a). For many, marriage marks a new phase 
in the life cycle, concerned with separation from the family of 
origin, setting up an independent home and establishing a family of 
one's own. When such a high proportion of the population is 
concerned with "settling down" to married life, those who do not 
may be regarded as deviant. 
Why Marry? 
In a recent study, Mansfield has described marriage as: 
the most obvious and natural means of validating adulthood in 
our society 
(Mansfield, 1985: 8) 
There has long been an assumption that marriage and adult status 
are linked. In particular, women were often seen as achieving 
adult status through marriage and having children, while men are 
seen as achieving adult identity through work (Roberts, 1984: 57). 
The increasing participation of women in the work force leads us to 
question this assumption, since it becomes more likely that women's 
adult identity can be associated with their starting work. 
Furthermore, though men partly assume adult identity through their 
work, many only form an independent adult household through 
marriage. 
It will be seen that the association between marriage and 
lMependence is waning, and marriage is no 1orxler the main means of 
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leaving the parental home and setting up an independent bousei»ld 
for either males or females. 
There are practical and economic reasons for marriage. Most women 
are discouraged from considering adult life as a single person 
because of their income levels, and their lack of employment 
prospects. Only professional, career women are likely-to earn 
sufficient income to manage on their own; most have to marry as an 
economic necessity. While it may be more economically viable for 
men than for women to remain single, they can still maintain a 
higher standard of living through marriage. The joint incomes of 
husband and wife may, for example, make the difference between 
tenancy and home ownership. Over and above the eccnomic advantages 
of marriage for men, it seems from the patterns of early housing 
careers, discussed in the next chapter, that some men need a home- 
maker (either mother or wife) to provision and support them. 
There are considerable economic pressures on young people to marry, 
as Leonard (1980) has pointed out. She sees marriage not as a 
partnership, however unequal, between two people in relation to the 
outside world, but as a labour relationship brought about by 
economic necessity on the part of the woman, in which the female is 
contracted into a position of virtual slavery in return for higher 
living standards than she would be able to maintain alone: 
The marriage ceremony thus emerges as having parallels with 
the signing of indentures, or even of the selling of oneself 
into personal, domestic slavery (... ). Marriage, however, 
differs from these other labour relations in being shrouded in 
love, companionship and sharing, and of "making a life 
together", so that the economic aspects of the agreement are 
more than usually occluded. It is therefore significant that 
the terms of the marriage contract are never spelled out. 
(Leonard, 1980: 261) 
If the notion of marriage as a state of semi-slavexy were foisted 
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on young women, it is doubtful that they would aspire to marriage. 
McRobbie and others suggest that instead, the reality of married 
life is "disguised" as domestic bliss through the ideology of 
romance which permeates girls' lives. Advertisements and magazines 
sell the notion of romance and marriage as a desirable achievement 
(McRobbie, 1978). The parallel ideology for boys, that of 
masculinity (Willis, 1977) similarly prepares boys for dominant 
male roles, though in this case, sex rather than marriage is seen 
as the goal. Family and peer group both lead the young into 
relationships with the opposite sex. Griffiths (1986) looks at the 
difficulty girls have in maintaining same-sex friendships when 
heterosexual relationships are expected and examines the strategies 
adopted by girls in order to resist pressures and keep their female 
friendships alongside relationships with boys. 
This is not to suggest, however, that marriage is the result of a 
patriarchal conspiracy or that no one chooses to marry, simply that 
there are strong social and economic pressures to do so. In 
consequence, people who are not married by the expected age may be 
regarded as breaking the rule or failing to obtain a spouse. As 
Lecnard has pointed out, according to public opinion, 
One does not choose not to get married, one fails to get 
married. 
(Leonard, 1980: 9, original enphasis) 
Marriage usually occurs at the end of a process of courtship in 
Western society. American research has suggested an orderly 
process, or "courtship career" along a continuum from dating to 
steady dating to courtship and engagement, with the stages defined 
according to the degree of commitment. From her research in the UK 
Mansfield (1985) questions this notion and suggests that: 
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The courtship career is an artificial ccnstruct, an artifact 
of research. 
(Mansfield, 1985: 7) 
She urges that marriage be examined not just in the context of 
courtship, but in the whole context of young people's lives: the 
climate of courtship, the motives for marriage, and the sometimes 
accidental triggers to marriage. Seeing courtship as a career is 
merely a retrospective idealisaticn. 
Consideration of the factors which contributed to the ending 
of previous serious relationships plus those factors which 
appear to have some significance in the success of the 
courtship with the spouse, suggests that the potential for 
marriage in any heterosexual relationship is a combination of 
the lovers' attitudes to marriage at a particular time, within 
a climate of events and circumstances. The climate may 
foster, provoke or hinder matrimony. 
(Mansfield, 1985: 16) 
She goes m: 
It is more realistic to construe modern courtship, not as a 
career but as a trail which leads to marriage -a trail which (... ) may have been quite haphazard. 
(Mansfield, 1985: 31, original emphasis) 
Marriage may not therefore represent the culmination of a courtship 
career. Nor, on the other hand, does it necessarily mark the start 
of childbearing. Dunnell (1979) sees 
... marriage as part of the family formation process rather than the assumed beginning of it. (Dunnell, 1979: 5) 
Just as the transition from school to work was seen to have no 
clear beginning and no clear end (Chapter 7), so it is with the 
transition from child to parent. Family formation is not an 
"orderly career" in itself. The stereotype of leaving home, 
getting married and having children in a clearly defined and time- 
spaced way does not hold good for most young people. 
imitation 
The number of couples cohabiting has almost tripled in the last 
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decade (General Household Survey, 1982). Research by Brown and 
Kiernan (1981) suggests that cohabitation takes two forms: most 
common is cohabitation of divorced women, with over 25% of divorced 
women aged 18-34 cohabiting, but in addition, and more relevant to 
the present study, there has been an increase in the extent of pre- 
marital cohabitation. 
Respondents to the General Household Survey are asked whether they 
are living as "man and wife". Kiernan has distinguished two types 
of cohabitation in the COLS: 
Whether single women represented themselves as "married" or 
not did not seem to be an arbitrary distinction in that 
"married" cohabiting women were more likely to have cohabited 
for a longer time (median length 28 months) and 50 per cent of 
them had children. The "living together" group had cohabited 
for about half as long as the "married" group and were 
predominantly childless. 
(Kiernan, 1983: 23) 
Cohabitation may therefore consist of two phases: an initial 
childless phase, when couples consider themselves to be living 
together, and a later phase, when, if children are born, 
cohabitation might increasingly be seen as "common law marriage". 
Dunnell's (1979) analysis of the Family Formation Survey similarly 
showed that meaning of cohabitation changed, according to the 
degree of commitment, and whether there were children and shared 
possessions. 
Kiernan has found that single teenage mothers were likely to be 
living with their parents rather than cohabiting, though many were 
likely to marry the putative father later. It was only among women 
above this age that illegitimate births were particularly 
associated with cohabitation, and even then the women were likely 
to have been previously married, or to be cohabiting with a 
previously married partner. Among the young, childbirth might 
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therefore be more associated with marriage than with the early 
phase of cohabitation. 
Cohabitation amaxj yoiuxg people is still largely a child-free 
transitional phase preceding a legal marriage. 
(Kiernan, 1983: 34) 
Kiernan does suggest though that young people are increasingly 
cohabiting before marriage, and this is one reason why the age at 
marriage is currently rising. This does not mean that cohabitation 
is replacing marriage in any way, but that it may be an 
increasingly common precurser to formal marriage. 
A recent study of cohabitation by Burgoyne supports the view that 
ccoiabitaticn is not an alternative to marriage: 
Although one of the main reasons why cahabitirx3 partnerships 
are seen to be potentially problematic and thus worthy of 
sociological investigation is that they lie outside the 
instituticnal framework for heterosexual couples relaticnships 
provided by marriage, in practice neither participants nor 
observers find that such partnerships differ very greatly from 
those of "ordinary" or "normal" married couples. 
(Burgoyne, 1985: 17) 
In the following analysis, cohabitation and marriage will generally 
be treated as a single phenomenon where respondents describe 
themselves as "living together as man and wife". Included in the 
phrase "married" will be, as Kiernan has pointed out, couples of 
longer standing and/or with children. 
Age at Marriage 
Between 1951 and 1970, the median age at first marriage of women 
decreased from 22.4 years to 21.3 years; subsequently, however, it 
has increased again to 21.9 years in 1981 (Kiernan, 1985a). Amax, 
men, the median age at first marriage was 24.9 in 1951,23.2 in 
1970 and 24.1 years in 1981. The recent increase in median age at 
marriage is believed to be associated with the above-mentioned 
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increase in cohabitation preceding marriage, rather than any 
decline in the prevalence or popularity of marriage itself. Modell 
(1978) looked-at the timing of marriage in the context of the life 
course, and located the lowering of the age at marriage until 1970 
in the decrease in obstacles to marriage (improved economic 
situation of young adults, less constraint in the marriage market, 
more birth control, and therefore more freedom to marry according 
to preference). The recent increase in the age at marriage may be 
associated with the current economic decline and increase of 
economic constraints. Writers have recently commented on the 
possible effects of youth unemployment on family formation 
(Wallace, 1986; Hutson and Jenkins, 1986). 
Haskey's (1983) analysis of social class patterns of marriage found 
clear class differences in the median ages at marriage among both 
men and women (both measured by their own occupational class). In 
general, the higher the social class, the older the man or woman at 
marriage; typically, husbands were two years older than wives, but 
there was greater variability among couples where husbands were in 
non-manual work. If the age at marriage is, as Modell suggests, 
associated with the level of economic constraints, then the middle 
class pattern of later marriage needs some additional explanation, 
since it might be assumed that they are less subject to such 
constraints, and might therefore be expected to marry earlier than 
the working class. 
Dunnell (1979) points out that class differences in the age at 
marriage only occur until 25 years, after which class patterns are 
less pronounced. She suggests that class differences may have 
widened as a result of the trend (until recently) towards ycxayjer 
age at marriage, since teenage marriage is largely a working class 
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FAY inner " 
Why should social class have such an effect cn the age at marriage 
and childbearing? Dunnell considered this issue and concluded: 
Extended education and comparatively high status jobs among 
both husbands and wives have been shown to be related to a 
higher age at marriage of the wife and to smaller chances of 
being pregnant at marriage. However, clearly these class- 
related education and employment differences du not completely 
account for the differences observed between non-manual and 
manual groups. This suggests that there are additional 
powerful cultural and attitudinal factors which lead women in 
the manual classes to marry earlier. 
(Dunnell, 1979: 21) 
It is unlikely that any model will completely account for variation 
in patterns of marriage (or anything else), but the following 
analysis will show that there is an association between social 
mobility and marriage patterns, which should be taken into account. 
The analysis is centred on the General Household Survey, since many 
of the 1958 art in the National Child Development Study have not 
married by the age of 23 years. The marital situation of 
respondents to the C HS is defined by the reslxxxlents" those who say 
they are living as man and wife are treated as married, whether or 
not they have had a formal wedding. It must be borne in mind that 
the analysis of marital situation by age is likely to be open to 
interference from time trend effects. 
Figure 12.1 is derived from Table 12.1 and shows, in the form of 
box plots, percentages married at each age. The box plots show 
estimated quantiles for age at marriage for each Youth Class. To 
move from an observation that 50% of men at age 25 (for example) 
are married to an assumption that 25 is the median age at marriage 
for men, requires "bending" of the data in a way which ignores 
cohort and time trend effects (the median age at marriage of the 
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Figure 12.1 PERCENTAGE EUER-MARRIED BY AGE AND YC *J H CLASS 
Box Plots based on data in Table 12.1 
MEN STABLE EIXX COUNTER WORK DOWNWARD STABLE 
M-C ROUTE MOBILE ROTE M-C W-C 
AGE 
2s 
24 
22 
21 
9U 
wcr4N STABLE UPWARD DOWNWARD STABLE 
M-C* W-C* M-C W-C 
AGE: 
27 
F- Mio°, 6 
26 
25 
24 
23 E-- 75% 
22 
21 
< 5o% 
10 
i9 
* See Table 12.1 
Significance: p C. 001 throughout 
File: MARAGE(63 and 64) 
Saurce: c 1579&80 
4-167. 
E- lo°%o 
F- 75% 
<-- So OX 
F- 25% 
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Table 12.1: PERCENTAGE MARRIED BY AGE AND YCUi'H CLASS, 
3-yr moving averages. 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
YOUTH CLASS 
STABLE EDUC COUN'T'ER WORK DOWNWARD STABLE 
M-C MOBILE MOBILE MOBILE M-C W-C 
AGE $$%%% %- 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Men 
16-18 - - - - - 2 
17-19 - - 1 - 3 3 
18-20 - - 6 2 4 8 
19-21 - 8 8 10 11 17 
20-22 3 10 14 17 19 29 
21-23 10 19 22 26 31 41 
22-24 22 35 35 36 39 53 
23-25 31 43 50 55 55 61 
24-26 43 53 58 66 66 67 
25-27 52 50 69 72 72 70 
26-28 58 60 70 78 77 76 
27-29 71 
------ 
66 
--------- 
78 
------- 
84 
-- - 
77 
-- --- 
78 
----- 
TOTAL 
----- 
----- 
(451) 
----------- 
(250) 
--------- 
(359) 
------- 
----- - 
(439) 
--------- 
- ---- 
(766) 
---------- 
-------- 
(2495) 
-------- 
Wo en 
16-18 - (2) 2 8 
17-19 2 4 9 14 
18-20 5 20 17 27 
19-21 13 31 33 41 
20-22 23 42 47 55 
21-23 35 53 61 68 
22-24 48 58 68 74 
23-25 55 60 74 82 
24-26 62 67 80 85 
25-27 65 74 87 89 
26-28 73 87 91 91 
27-29 81 87 91 92 
TOTAL (656) 
------ 
(498) 
--------- ------- --------- 
(902) 
---------- 
(2628) 
-------- ------ 
Note: 
---- 
Stable M-C and Counter-Mobile are combined; 
Education-route and work-route upwardly mobile working 
class are combined, for women. 
Sourrce: GHS79&80 
File: MARAGE(63 and 64) 
------------------------- ------- --------- ---------- -------- 
men currently aged 24 years may not be 25). Similar assumptions 
are, however, frequently made when cross-sectional data is used (as 
in much of the literature quoted above) to examine demographic 
trends. 
With regard to men, the box plots stow that the stable middle class 
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and the stable working class form the two extremes. The stable 
working class marry first, and the stable middle class marry last, 
with the estimated median age at marriage varying from around 22.8 
years for the stable working class, to 25.8 years for the stable 
middle class. Less than 75% of the stable middle class, compared 
with almost 90% of the stable working class, are married at age 28 
years. 
There are slight differences between the mobile groups, following 
the class gradient, with downwardly mobile middle class men 
marrying earliest, the two work-route groups (work-route working 
class and the counter-mobile middle class) marrying next and the 
education-mobile working class marrying last. 
It would appear that the later the entry into the labour market, 
the later the marriage, but that over and above this, where upward 
mobility has occurred, marriage has been later. Downward mobility, 
on the other hand, is associated with earlier marriage. This 
suggests that most men who are seeking upward mobility through 
education or training, are likely to defer their marriage until 
they have completed their training or until some visible measure of 
mobility has been reached. Such concerns do not affect downwardly 
mobile men. 
Figure 12.1 also shows box plots for women. The analysis is for 
all women, since if women with children were excluded, bias would 
be introduced. It is not possible, therefore, to separate out 
those who were downwardly mobile before marriage from those who 
were downwardly mobile after it. Because of small numbers, some 
groups have been combined: the counter-mobile with the stable 
middle class, and the work-route working class with the education- 
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mobile working class. The box plots show that estimated age at 
marriage follows the same Youth Class gradient as for men, although 
the median ages at marriage tend to be lower than those of men. 
The estimated median age at marriage or cohabitation for the stable 
middle class is 23.3 years, compared with 20.7 years for the stable 
working class, a difference of 2.6 years. The upper quartile 
varies even more than the median, from 27.3 years among the stable 
middle class to an estimated 23.1 years among the stable working 
class. 
Figure 12.2 shows the ages (to the nearest year) at which women 
first married or cohabited. It includes women with children. The 
two groups with longer in education, the stable middle class and 
the education-mobile, both stand out with later median ages at 
marriage or cohabitation (22 years and 21 years, respectively). At 
the other extreme, the stable working class clearly marry or 
cohabit much earlier (median age 19 years). The other mobile 
groups all show a very similar pattern in between, with a median 
age of 20 years. 
There appears to be an association between career involvement and 
later marriage; the stable middle class and educationally mobile 
groups, which are the most involved in work careers are the oldest 
when they marry. Among women, the direction of causality is 
problematic. Marriage, and particularly childbirth, affect women's 
work careers; it is possible also that single women may embark on 
work careers because they are not married. There could therefore 
be a two-way relationship, in which work patterns structure age at 
marriage, and lack of marriage, or bachelorhood (to use a more 
positive expression), may structure work careers. 
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Figure 12.2: AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE OR COHABITATION 
BY YOUTH CLASS, acrong women who have lived as married 
STABLE EDUC COUNTER WORK DOWNWARD STABLE 
M-C ROUTE MOBILE ROUTE M-C W-C 
Base: (293) (200) (50) (86) (449) (1487) 
AGE 
Significance: p< . 
001 
Source: ciS 79&80 
Fi1e: AGII1AR 
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Table 12.2: AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE OR iABITATICN 
Among NODS respondents, age in years at which first married 
or cohabited, expressed as median, quartiles and deciles; 
percentage married by Sweep 4 Interview (approx 23 years) 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
YOUPH CLASS 
PROPORTION STABLE EDUC COUNTER WORK DOWNWARD STABLE 
MARRIED M-C MOBILE MOBILE RWI'E M-C W-C ALL 
m2 n 
10% 21.3 21.8 20.6 20.1 20.3 19.4 20.0 
25% 22.8 23.4 22.2 21.8 21.9 21.0 21.1 
50% - - - - - 23.3 - 
% Married 
at Sweep 4 32% 
---- 
26% 
-------- 
42% 
-------- 
43% 
-------- 
42% 
-------- 
53% 
--- 
46% 
------------ 
Base 
------------ 
---- 
(676) 
-------- 
(236) 
-------- 
(331) 
-------- 
(610) 
-------- 
(810) 
-------- 
----- 
(2587) 
-------- 
------ 
(5250) 
------ 
Wanen 
10% 20.0 20.0 19.1 19.1 18.3 17.8 18.3 
25% 21.5 21.3 20.5 20.3 19.5 19.1 19.6 
50% 23.5 23.5 22.5 22.5 21.4 20.8 21.5 
75% - - - - - 23.3 - 
% Married 
at Sweep 4 51% 51% 59% 60% 73% 78% 69% 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
gase (703) (385) (236) (369) (1005) (2788) (5486) 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Significance: p= . 001 throughout 
File: MARcOH(71) 
Solirce: PFCDS 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 12.2 shows the data for the NCDS cohort at 23 years, and 
provides a check on the findings from the (-IS. By 23 years, 46% of 
the men and 69% of the women in the NCDS cohort had married or 
cohabited. The variation by Youth Class can be clearly seen. 
Thirty-two per cent of stable middle class men and 51% of stable 
middle class women are married or cohabiting, compared with 52% of 
stable working class men and 77% of stable working class women. 
The data show that educationally mobile working class men are less 
likely than other groups to be married at 23 years (26%). 
Table 12.2 also shows the age at which 10%, 25% and 50% of the 
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art began cohabiting or married. Quartiles of age at marriage 
for some groups are strikingly similar to those estimated from the 
GHS data. This suggests that for the counter-mobile, the work 
route, the downward middle class and the stable working class, the 
estimated median ages at marriage for men in the GHS may be 
acceptable. There are discrepancies between the quartile ages at 
marriage for the stable middle class and the education-mobile, 
however. According to the CIS data, the estimated lower quartile 
age at marriage is 23.3 years for the stable middle class and 22.4 
years for the education mobile, compared with an actual lower 
quartile of 22.8 years and 23.4 years respectively for the NCDS 
frt. This underlines the difficulty of making estimates from age 
comparisons in the G11S. 
The NCDS thus shows a slightly different picture to that observed 
in the GHS. It is the education-mobile, rather than the stable 
middle class who marry last, among men. In other respects, the 
quartiles for age at marriage among males in the NODS cohort follow 
the same class gradient as that observed in the GHS. Among women, 
the NCDS provides median ages at marriage for all Youth Classes, 
and these appear to be very similar to those estimated from the GHS 
in Figure 12.1. The only exception is again among the education- 
mobile, who for the GHS analysis, were combined with the work- 
route: The G HS appears to underestimate the median age at marriage 
for these groups. 
It has already been observed that women tend to marry at an earlier 
age than men. Table 12.3 shows the resulting age difference 
between spouses, by Youth Class, in the GHS. Forty-five per cent 
of all husbands are two or more years older than their wives. Among 
the stable middle class, 32% of husbands are two or more years 
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older than their wives, compared with 47% of stable working class 
husbands. The findings confirm those of Haskey (1983) that the age 
difference between husband and wife varies somewhat between social 
classes. The stable working class husband is likely to be older 
than his wife, while stable middle class couples are more likely to 
be the same age. Why should this pattern occur? 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 12.3: AGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SPWSES BY YOUTH CLASS 
The table is based cxi husbands. 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
HUSBAN D' S YCXM CLASS 
COMPARATIVE STABLE EDUC COUNTER WIRK DOWNWARD STABLE 
AGE OF M-C MOBILE MOBILE RCXJ E M-C W-C ALL 
HUSBAND $$$%$$$ 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
2 or more 
years older 32 39 40 40 50 47 45 
1 yr older or 
same age as wife 45 40 46 39 30 34 36 
1 or rrK)M 
years younger 23 21 13 21 21 18 19 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
ALL (=100%) (177) (102) (127) (172) (224) (940) (1742) 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Q S 
File: WC4VNAGE(61) 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
The answer must be in the extent to which young people are involved 
in careers. More educated couples may well meet at college, and 
delay marriage until they have completed their studies and started 
work. They may wait until they have achieved some measure of 
success at work. Though male manual workers may similarly have to 
wait until they have completed their apprenticeship and begun to 
receive adult wages before marrying, female manual workers have 
less reason to delay marriage, sirre their labour market position 
is less likely to improve as they get older. The suggestion here 
is that marriage is delayed where people are involved in a career 
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(whether long or snort term). Thus middle class men and women are 
both more likely to be older at marriage than working class men, 
who are themselves more likely to be older at marriage than working 
class women. 
Having children 
Youth most visibly diminishes as family responsibilities increase. 
Just as those who do not marry may be regarded as having "failed" 
to marry, so those who marry but do not have children may be deemed 
to have "failed". 
Childbirth tenäs to be associated with marriage rather than with 
cohabitation. Many cohabitees will marry if the woman becomes 
pregnant or when they want to have children (Kiernan, 1983). 
Dunnell (1979) found that 25% of women whose husbands were in the 
lower manual classes were pregnant at marriage, compared with 4% of 
the wives of higher Iron-manual workers. The association in time 
between marriage and childbirth varies, therefore, between 
different social groups. 
Table 12.4 shows the timing of first birth in relation to the year 
of legal marriage, by Youth Class, among legally married women with 
children in the GHS. The table shows that pre-marital birth is 
comparatively rare, but is mainly associated with the stable 
working class. Sixty-three per cent of the stable working class 
had their first child either before or within two years of 
marriage, compared with only 29% of the stable middle class. Among 
the stable middle class, 71% did not have their first child until 
more than two years after marriage (compared with 37% of the stable 
working class). The mobile groups all show a similar pattern 
between the two extremes. 
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-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 12.4: TIME RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRST MARRIAGE AND 
BIRTH OF FIRST CHILD, anx rg cnce-married waten with children 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
YOUTH CLASS 
TIMING STABLE EDUC (RUNTER WORK DOWNWARD STABLE 
OF FIRST M-C MOBILE MOBILE ROUTE M-C W-C ALL 
BIRTH -% % -% %$$$ 
Birth before 4978 11 11 10 
marriage 
Birth 0-1 yr 25 40 43 50 44 52 48 
after marriage 
Birth 2+ yrs 71 50 50 42 45 37 42 
after marriage 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
ALL(=100%) (118) (87) (30) (50) (275) (1015) (1575) 
Significance: p= . 001 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Q3S 
File: WIDCHILD(60) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 12.4 shows that marriage is closely associated in time with 
childbirth among the stable working class, but that the time 
relationship between marriage and childbirth is less close for the 
upwardly mobile and the stable middle class. It has been suggested 
that the recent increase in cohabitation may result in a closer 
association between marriage and childbirth: 
... as more people question the need to marry and see having 
children as the only justification for marrying, they are 
likely to see an even closer connection between marriage and 
having children than ever before. 
(Busfield and Paddcn, 1977: 254-5) 
Burgoygne too suggests that when cohabiting couples expect or want 
children, they are likely to many: 
... whilst cohabitation 
is mw much more widely accepted as a 
prelude to marriage, there is little acceptance of the idea of 
family-building on anything other than the foundation which 
legal marriage is seen to provide. 
(Burgoyne, 1985: 20) 
There is likely, then to be a close association between marriage 
and childbirth among couples who have previously been cohabiting. 
Other factors, as Busfield and Paddon (1977) point out, are also 
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Figure 12.3: AGE AT BIRTH OF FIRST CHILD BY YOUTH CLASS 
Among carmen aged 16-29 who have had a child 
STABLE 
AGE M-C 
21 
16 
25 
2L 
23 
22 
2; 
20 
ICI 
1% 
1-7 
Base (161) 
% of all wrxnen 
in Youth Class: 25 
UPWARD DOWNWARD STABLE 
W-C M-C W-C 
(156) (316) (1233) 
31 35 47 
Significance: p<. 001 throughout 
File: MARAGE(63 and 64) 
Source: Q-iS79&80 
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likely to affect the timing of childbirth in relation to marriage. 
These may include economic constraints, women's involvement in 
careers, the degree 'of control over fertility, and changing values 
in society. 
Figure 12.3 shows the age at birth of first child among women in 
the GHS who have had children, by Youth Class. Because of small 
numbers, the counter-mobile have been grouped with the stable 
middle class and the work-route and education-mobile have been 
combined as the upwardly mobile working class. The box plots show 
clear class differences. The stable working class have children 
earliest, and the stable middle class last (median ages 20 years 
and 24 years, respectively). The two mobile groups vary between 
these two extremes. 
------------------------------------------------- 
Table 12.5: PROPORTION OF MARRIED MEN WITH CHILD 
------------ 
IN HOLISEHOLD, 
BY AGE AND YOL7IH CLASS 
Percentage in each category 
------------------------------ -------- --------- --------- -- YOIiPH CUSS - 
STABLE EDLFC COUNTER WORK DOWNWAR D STABLE 
AGE M-C BILE 
------------ 
MOBILE 
--------- 
ROUTE 
--- - 
M-C W-C 
----------- 
16-21 - (1) (1) 
- --- 
(1) 
--------- 
40 
------ -- 
51 
22-24 17 32 44 43 45 56 
25-27 38 30 47 52 55 65 
28-29 56 58 
------------- 
59 
--------- 
74 
-------- 
73 
--------- 
78 
---- ---------- 
Base (186) (108) 
------------------- 
(137) 
--------- 
(188) 
-------- 
(255) 
--------- 
----- 
(1067) 
------ -- ---- 
Source: GHS 
File: KIDS(66) 
----------------------- --------- -------- --------- -------- 
Finally, Table 12.5 shrews the proportion of married men in the is 
with a child under 16 years of age in the household. This is the 
cnly way that prenartions of men with children can be examined in 
the GHS, since questions relating to childbirth were asked anly of 
women. The table shows the relativ ship between being married and 
having children, by age and Youth Class. The table confirms the 
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earlier findings for women, that among the lower classes, marriage 
occurs at a lower age and is closely associated with childbirth. 
Among the higher Youth Classes, marriage is later and less 
associated with childbirth. The mobile groups reveal a pattern 
between the two stable groups, but one which appears complicated.. 
Both the work-mobile and the counter-mobile are quite likely to 
have children early in marriage (43% and 44% of married men aged 22 
to 24 have children in these groups) but nevertheless married men 
aged 28 to 29 show a divergent pattern: of the work-mobile 74% have 
children by this age, whereas only 59% of the counter-mobile have. 
It seems that some of the counter-mobile show a pattern which is 
closer to that of the stable middle class, delaying family building 
perhaps for the sake of their work careers. 
These tables suggest an association for both men and women between 
involvement in work careers and deferred childbirth, particularly 
for the stable middle class. This appears to follow the pattern 
found for marriage, which also occurs later for this group. It is 
suggested that family formation patterns are affected by the social 
class and social mobility of both marriage partners. Where 
partners are involved in lang-term careers at work, or are involved 
in upward mobility, the process of family building is likely to be 
extended. In the case of the wife, the relationship is two-way: 
the sooner she has children, the less chance she has of being 
involved in a work career and achieving upward mobility in her own 
right. 
Mannheim has suggested that a career orientation at work was likely 
to be reflected in non-work areas and that those involved in 
careers may 
... in addition have their life-plan to a large extent imposed 
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in the form of a "cazx", in which the individual stages are 
specified in advance. 
(Mannheim, 1940: 56) 
Dunnell's (1979) study found that the timing of family formation 
was associated with career-orientation. Eventual family size was 
affected by the degree of planning of couples and their involvement 
in careers. Busfield and Paces (1977) have similarly indicated a 
relationship between social mobility and delayed family building. 
They suggest that where there is a prospect of upward mobility, 
pregnancy might be avoided: 
For example, in so far as economic growth within the society 
during the 1950s and 1960s may have created more opportunity 
to achieve social mobility, this would have meant that those 
anxious to improve their social status and that of their 
families, also felt the pressure to avoid an additional 
(Busfield and Paddon, 1977: 251) 
The data presented above appear to confirm the findings of Dumell 
(1979) and Busfield and Paddon (1977), in suggesting that these who 
are not involved in upward mobility or careers at work, are the 
least likely to space marriage and family building, but whether the 
patterns observed represent planning or not is a question this 
study cannot address. As Busfield and Pad&r themselves point out, 
though, there is no simple economic explanation for patterns of 
childbirth, since econ: xnic circumstances have a different meaning 
for different couples. 
Suanary 
In both this chapter and the last, data have been presented which 
suggest a close association between Youth Class and patterns of 
family formation, for both men and women. It seems that people 
choose marriage partners who may have a similar class trajectory to 
themselves, and that they may be matched in terms of social class 
and social mobility. The timing of marriage and childbirth should 
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be seen in the ccntext of social mobility and class-related career 
orientation. It would seem that those involved in career 
progression at work may extend their career orientation to marriage 
and family formation. Those who are not involved in upward 
mobility or careers at work, have no economic reason to defer 
marriage and childbirth. Their actions may result from lack of 
planning, or alternatively may be seen as the appropriate response 
to the reality of their situation, which offers them few prospects 
for a better future in terms either of status or of material 
benefit. 
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Chapter 13 
Establ i thi g an Iix3eperýöentIi* 
The transition from youth to adulthood in British society is 
complex. Research on this part of the life cycle has been 
fragmentary, some aspects of the transition process receiving more 
attention than others. While the transition from school to work 
has received a great deal of attention over several decades, 
marriage and movement towards family formation has only more 
recently begun to receive attention from sociologists. A third 
major area of the process of transition into adulthood, that of 
leaving the parental home and embarking on a "housing career", has 
not yet begun to receive serious attention. 
Research on Leaving Ibme 
To date, research on the timing or nature of leaving the parental 
home has been sparse. While there has been some historical research 
in Britain (Laslett, 1971; Wall, 1978; Anderson, 1983), and some 
current demographic research based on survey data in Melbourne, 
Australia (Young, 1974,1975,1983), there has been little else 
published, as Kiernan has pointed out in a recent survey (1985) of 
the scant literature. 'Irrere is, however, considerable concern in 
the present day about the effects of wide-spread youth 
unemployment on the transitions to adulthood and in particular 
household and family formation, and recent research has reflected 
this concern (Wallace, 1985). 
The historical research slows a relationship between entering work, 
leaving home and getting married which has changed considerably 
--------------------------------------------------------------- -- 
* "Leaving the Parental Home: An analysis of early housing 
careers", an earlier version of this chapter, 
_ 
is to be published by 
the Jamal of Social Policy in 1987. 
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over time and which is still charging. The general trend has been 
for these three aspects of the transition to adulthood to be more 
and more closely related. In pre-industrial times, according to 
Laslett (1971: 15), children left the parental home at an early age 
(often, he estimated, around the age of ten) to live as servants in 
another household; they may then have spent fifteen years or more 
with that family before marrying and forming their own xxiseholds. 
Anderson's (1971,1983) and Wall's (1978) research on patterns in 
the mid-nineteenth century show that a large proportion of 
adolescents left home to live in as servants or apprentices, or to 
move into the towns and take up board and lodging with a family. 
Again, marriage was likely to occur later in their twenties. , 
Research in the United States shows that the nineteenth century 
pattern there was similar to that in Britain. Modell and Haraven 
(1973) have examined the role of boarding in 19th Century America 
("the lodger evil" it was called by nineteenth century moralists 
who blamed the practice for the overcrowding of homes and for moral 
decline) and the decrease in its incidence by the end of the 
century. They infer, from the age differences between boarders and 
their landlords, that boarding was often chosen as a "family 
su=)gate" by men and women in their early twenties who moved into 
the towns. 
The historical research suggests, then, that young people, tixxigh 
leaving home at an early age, were not living in independent 
housing. Leaving home was therefore not necessarily related to 
adult status, but more probably was associated with adolescent 
status. Adult status then, as largely now, was gained through 
marriage and family foarmation. 
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The study by Richard Wall (1978) of patterns of leaving home has 
suggested that although children of both the gentry and pre- 
industrial workers left home at an early age before the eighteenth 
century, class differences developed over time as the children of 
the gentry became increasingly likely to stay longer in the 
parental home. Early historical patterns are however difficult to 
assess, partly because of the unreliability of many of the 
statistical sources. Comparing data for years between 1697 and 
1841, Wall found it difficult to detect any general trend towards 
children leaving home at a later age, but concluded (concurring 
with fin, 1971) that 
... the conditions of life in large towns did give rise to 
situations in which children would remain longer in the 
parental household than they had either in pre-industrial 
England or in rural areas in the mid-nineteenth century. 
(Wall, 1978: 193) 
Oommentiryj on the close link between leaving home and marriage in 
the present day, Wall concludes that it is the gradual nature of 
the process of leaving home in the past which distinguishes it 
(Wall, 1978: 200). Anderson (1983), too, has suggested that whereas 
in the nineteenth century and earlier, the passage between 
childhood status and household headship was protracted, the 
situation by the late 1970s was greatly different. He estimates 
from 1979 GHS data that the average age gap between leaving home 
and entering headship was one year. The data presented here, 
though, will show that this estimate does little to help us 
understand the patterns of leaving hone in the present day. 
There have been further changes in the last few decades. As noted 
in Chapter 12, marriage patterns in particular have charged in the 
last twenty years, with the age at marriage first getting lower, 
and then higher again, as it was increasingly preceded by 
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cohabitation (Kiernan, 1983; Kiernan and Eldridge, 1985). Research 
suggests however that in the present day the age at leaving home 
has been closely associated with the age at marriage. Young 
comments that: 
Marriage has maintained a long-standing dominance as the 
principal, traditional and acceptable reason for leaving home. 
(Young, 1984: 53) 
It has therefore been commcn practice until recently to associate 
leaving home with marriage, and the age at marriage has 
occasionally been used in survey analysis as a proxy variable for 
the age of leaving home, as Kiernan (1985) has pointed out. 1985b). 
It is estimated that during the 1960s there was indeed a close 
relationship between the age at marriage and the age at leaving 
home, partly because the age at marriage was lower and the rented 
housing stock was becoming more plentiful. In the last decade, 
however, the age at marriage has increased again, and unfurnished 
rented accommodation has become more difficult to obtain. More 
people, and in particular more women, are going on to higher 
education. For all these and no doubt other reasons, there is 
likely to be less association now than before between the age at 
marriage and that of leaving home. 
This means that the length of time that people are in an 
intermediate household situation between being the child of the 
household and the head (or spouse of head of household) has 
shortened. By the middle of the twentieth century, people no 
langer entered living-in apprenticeships or servant positions, and 
were less likely (in comparison with the nineteenth century) to be 
boarding or in some other intermediate or long-term housing 
situation between the parental hone and the marital one. 
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The current trend, it has been suggested (Harris 1983; Young, 1984) 
is that young people are increasingly leaving their parental heroes 
and moving into independent living situations prior to marriage. 
This would mean that the numbers of young people in single or peer 
group housing have increased, and that there may have been a change 
in the nature of the parent-child relationship and 
... in the significance of familial status as a component of 
adult status. The young adult would no longer depend for the 
attainment of adult status (fully independent of his parents) 
upon founding his/her own nuclear family. Rather, the 
foundation of a family is made possible by the prior 
emancipation of the young adult from parental ocntrol and the 
creation of a period early in adult life when the individual 
defines him/herself independently of their familial status. 
(Harris, 1983: 221). 
This underlying trend is likely to be modified again, because of 
the greater likelihood of unemployment among the young nowadays. 
Wallace's study of young people on the Isle of Sheppey showed that 
access to employment crucially affects patterns of transition; 
respondents who had suffered unemployment were more than twice as 
likely to be living as dependents in the parental home, as the 
regularly employed respondents (Wallace, 1986: 18, derived from 
Table 3). This suggests that lack of access to employment may 
delay the transition to independent noising. The importance of the 
family as a source of job information was described in an earlier 
chapter, and it seems likely that where other family members are in 
employment, young people may be more likely to hear of jobs if they 
remain in contact with their parents (the converse may however be 
equally true, and where parents are unemployed, the young may gain 
no advantage through remaining at hone). 
The most thDrough analysis of the ocntemporazy pattern of leaving 
home has been done in Melbourne, Australia, by Christabel Young 
(1974,1984). From survey data, she concluded that the age at 
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leaving home was closely related to the reason for leaving, with 
people leaving home later for marriage, and early if they were 
doing so for a job or educational reasons. Only 45% of girls and 
31% of boys first left home in order to marry. Young (1974) found 
ccrsiderable sex differences: in general, girls left home two years 
younger than boys, mainly because of the younger age of women at 
marriage, and the two-year age difference which is prevalent 
between spouses. Her more recent (1984) survey showed that the age 
gap had diminished: the median age at which daughters left hone in 
Melbourne in 1974 was 19.5 years, while the median age for stns 
was 20.7 years (Young, 1984). 
young distinguishes between those who leave home for marriage and 
those who leave home for other reasons, suggesting that when people 
leave home for non-marriage reasons they do so at a younger age, 
and are more likely to return again to the parental home. One of 
Young's main findings from her recent survey (1984) was that around 
fifty per cent of men and around forty per cent of women who had 
left home later returned to live with their parents. This mainly 
occurred among those who had first left home for reasons other than 
marriage, and who later left home once more in order to marry. 
Young's studies have shown the need to clarify the definition of 
"leaving home"; her earlier study was based on mothers' answers to 
questions about when their children left home, while the more 
recent survey, which shows the more complicated pattern of leaving 
home and returning, was based on questions asked of the young 
adults themselves. Parental and children's definitions are clearly 
likely to vary. In particular, Young asks: 
Which is the more significant event, the first or the final 
departure fron home? 
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(Young, 1984: 74) 
Young's research suggests that just as leaving home for non- 
marriage reasons (to become servants or apprentices) in the 
nineteenth century did not constitute a true break from parental 
authority, so in some situations in the modern age, leaving home 
for reasons other than marriage should not be interpreted as a move 
towards adult independence. Diana Lecnard, in her study (1980) of 
courtship and marriage in a South Wales town, questions whether 
independence is really sought by the adolescent or young adult or 
really "desired" by child or parents. Leonard draws a useful 
distinction between "leaving home" and "living away from home", the 
latter being reversible, while the former constitutes a one-way 
definite breach. So, for example, leaving home to study or get a 
job would constitute "living away" with "home" still regarded as 
the parental home. She points out that "to make a home" alone or 
with peers is a contradiction in folk terms. Living away from hone 
is to be associated with a forced migration, for education or 
employment, to another town (and might therefore be seen as a 
modern version of the boarding phenomenon of earlier times). 
Leonard's fieldwork was in 1972, and it is likely that 
circumstances have changed since then. At that time, most young 
people in South Wales who lived away from home did so in hostels or 
with relatives, rather than in bedsits or flats shared with peers. 
However, like Young, she found that many absences from the parental 
home were short-term, and many of the respondents in her sample 
returned to their parental homes after a while. 
To summarise from this research, it would seem that the 
relationship between the age at leaving home and the age at 
marriage became closer as the intermediate stage of living in as 
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servant or boarder disappeared. However, with the increase in the 
numbers going cn to higher education, in cohabitation preceding (in 
many cases) marriage, and for other reasons, it is likely that a 
new type of single independent living is emerging among young 
people. In many cases, however, this may represent only a 
transitiv al housing stage. 
Research Questions 
The questions, then, are not only when, why and how people leave 
the parental home, but how all three questions inter-relate. The 
reason for leaving home is likely to govern the age at leaving and 
the means by which it is d1ne. The primary issues to consider are 
whether the process of leaving home is one way or reversible, how 
the reversibility of the process might affect the type of housing 
situation entered, whether single independent housing exists on a 
large scale, and whether it can be distinguished from typical 
marital housing situations. For each of these questions there 
exists a further question: how do social class and gender affect 
the process. 
The age at leaving home 
It is not a simple exercise to look at the age at which people 
leave their parental home. Young's study in Australia showed that 
many young people there leave hone more than cnce. Simple cross- 
sectional analysis based on age comparisons of the proportions 
currently living in the parental home, such as can be obtained from 
theCS, are not therefore sufficient, since any previous history 
of leaving home will have been lost. The NODS, in contrast, allows 
an analysis of the age at first leaving home and of whether the 
respondent has ever returned. 
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Figure 13.1: AGE FIRST LEFT PARENTAL HOME BY YC JI'H CLASS 
AND SEX 
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Figure 13.1 shows the age at first leaving home in the NODS data, 
represented in the form of box plots. By the age of 23 years, 65% 
of men and 84% of women had left the parental home. The median age 
at leaving home for the first time was 21.9 years for men and 20 
years for women, rather higher than the medians reported by Young 
(1984). Among men, the stable middle class, education-mobile and 
counter-mobile first leave home at a younger age than the other 
three classes, and this will be seen to relate to the reason they 
left home - to go to college. In other respects, there seem to be 
no major class differences in ages at first leaving home. By the 
age of 23, between 62% and 74% of men had left the parental home at 
least once. 
Figure 13.1 shows that there are gender differences in the age at 
leaving home. For each youth class, the median age at leaving home 
among women was lower than that for men. This relates to the 
earlier age of women at marriage, as seen in the previous chapter. 
The patterns of leaving home among women generally stow a less even 
distribution than among men: the stable middle class and the 
counter-mobile middle class both leave home "in a rush" with 40% in 
the stable middle class leaving between the ages of 18.4 years and 
19 years, and 40% of the counter-mobile leaving between the ages of 
17.4 years and 18.8 years. In contrast, the education-mobile 
working class show a far less peaked distributicn. This suggests 
that among both the stable middle class and the counter-mobile, the 
age pattern at leaving home is much the same whether the reascn for 
leaving home is for marriage or for study. The educaticn-mobile, 
in contrast, are more likely to leave home for the purpose of study 
than marriage and to delay marriage for the sake of their careers, 
as Figure 12.1 irxUcated. 
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Young (1974,1984) and Leonard (1980) have both shown that leaving 
home is not necessarily a permanent move. Many young people move 
back to the parental home. The NODS provides both cross-secticnal 
and retrospective data and thus can be used to lock at the current 
household situation of the respondents and then see whether they 
have ever left home. 
Table 13.1 shows household status by youth class and sex, for the 
NODS sample. Forty-seven percent of men and 2596 of women are shown 
to be living with their parents, with little variation by youth 
class among males, though more among females. Among men, the 
Table 13.1: HOUSEHOLD STATUS BY YC = CLASS AND SIX 
STABLE EDUG COUNTER WORK- DOWNWARD STABLE 
HOUSEHOLD MIDDLE MOBILE MOBILE I JPE MIDDLE WORKING ALL 
STMUS 
------------- 
MUES 
$ 
--------- 
$ 
------- 
% 
-------- 
% 
------- 
$ 
-------- 
-% 
-------- 
% 
------ 
WITH PARENTS 46 45 45 46 52 47 47 
WITH OTHERS 10 12 10 7 6 5 6 
HCUSIIOLDER 
---------- 
44 
-------- 
43 
------- 
44 
---- 
47 42 49 46 
---- 
ALL (=100%) 
-------------- 
F 
(656) 
-------- 
(232) 
------- 
---- 
(324) 
-------- 
------- 
(605) 
------- 
-------- 
(791) 
-------- 
-------- 
(2557) 
-------- 
------ 
(5165) 
------ 
WITH PARENTS 29 33 21 33 25 23 25 
WITH OTHERS 10 9 10 4 4 3 5 
HOUSEHOLDER 
-------- 
61 
-------- 
59 
------- 
70 
------ 
63 71 74 70 
------ 
ALL (=100%) (675) (378) 
-- 
(220) 
------- 
(349) 
-------- 
(988) 
-------- 
(2771) 
----- 
(5381) 
Source: NCaS 
File: 106 
downwardly mobile middle class are the most likely to be still 
living with their parents (52%) while the education mobile and the 
counter-mobile are the least likely (45$). Of those currently 
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living in the parental home, 30% of males and 38% of females have 
at some stage moved away from their parents (Table 13.2). 
Furthermore, there are considerable class differences in this 
table; among the stable middle class currently living in the 
parental home, 43% of men and 56% of women have at one stage moved 
away (and moved back), whereas among the stable working class, only 
26% of men and 29% of women have moved away and back again. There 
appears then to be evidence that the process of leaving home varies 
between classes in its reversibility. It seems that it is the 
middle class who are likely to leave the parental home earliest, 
not the working class. While the middle class "live away" at a 
younger age, the working class "leave home", later but more 
permanently, in Leonard's terms (1980). 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 13.2: HAVE THOSE LIVIM WITH PARENTS EVER LEFT? 
percentage of those currently living with parents, 
who have ever moved away for six months or more since 
the age of 16 years, by youth class and sex. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
y()UH CLASS MALES FEMALES 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
STABLE MIDDLE 43 56 
EDJCATION-MOBILE 31 28 
OaJNTER-MOBILE 45 67 
WORK-ROUTE 20 45 
DOWNWARD MIDDLE 31 42 
STABLE WORKING 
-------------- 
26 
------------- 
29 
----- -------- 
ALI, 30 
----------------- 
38 
Base 
---------------- 
(2423) 
------------- 
(1337) 
---------------------- ------ 
Source: ISS 
File: 117 
---------------------- ------------- ---------------------- 
Table 13.2 shows interesting patterns axn g the mobile groups. In 
general, all those of middle class origins are more likely to have 
been away from tome and returned, than all those from working class 
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backgrounds. ' Of all youth classes, among both men and women, it is 
the counter-mobile who are the most likely to have returned home 
after having left (45% of men, and 67% of women in this class). 
This may be further evidence to suggest that this group relies on 
family help in order to achieve counter-mobility. In contrast, 
among men, the work-route are the least likely (20%) to have 
returned home (and among women the education-mobile), suggesting 
that upward mobility of those from working class families may be 
more of an individual, rather than family, achievement. 
Reason for Leaving 
The next question to ask is why young people leave home. The reason 
that people leave the parental borne will be seen to be associated 
with both the age at which they leave and whether they are likely 
to reverse the process and return to their parents again. 
The NcDS asked respondents who had ever left home the main reason 
why they left the home they were in at the age of 16. Table 13.3 
shows the relationship between the reason for leaving home, and the 
age at leaving home, for each sex. The question people were asked 
has inherent difficulties: for instance, it is more acceptable 
perhaps to say you left home in order to take up a job, than to say 
that you left home because your parents made you leave, or there 
may be several reasons for leaving home and the choice of main 
reason could be problematic. Those who left home because they were 
told to go may prefer to say that they left in order to set up on 
their own. 
Overall, 39% of men and 52% of women said that they first left bane 
in order to live as married. This does not suggest a very close 
association between the age at leaving home and the age at 
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marriage, therefore. The table shows, however, that the reason 
given for leaving home varies among men with the age at leaving 
home. Among men who left home before they were 18,50% said it was 
to take up a job; among those leaving at 18-19,49% said it was to 
begin studies; among later leavers, 63% said it was so that they 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 13.3: REASON LEFT DOME BY AGE FIRST LEFT HOME BY SEX 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
AGE FIRST LEFT HOME 
REASON UNDER 18 18-19 20-23 ALL 
FOR MOVE %%% -W 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
MMES 
LIVE AS MARRIED 9 19 63 39 
BEGIN STUDIES 13 49 4 21 
TAKE Up JOB 50 15 11 19 
SET uP ON OWN 5 5 13 9 
"NEGATIVE" REASONS 23 12 8 12 
----------------- 
All(=100%) 
----------------- 
----------------- 
(660) 
----------------- 
-------- 
(1412) 
-------- 
---------- 
(2016) 
---------- 
------- 
(4088) 
------- 
FIIA1L 
LIVE AS MARRIED 32 40 74 52 
BEGIN STUDIES 13 32 4 18 
TAKE UP JOB 20 12 6 11 
SET UP ON 0WN 9 7 9 8 
"NEX ATIVE" REASON S 25 9 7 11 
----------------- 
All(=100%) 
----------- 
----------------- 
(863) 
----------------- 
-------- 
(2283) 
-------- 
---------- 
(2010) 
---------- 
------- 
(5156) 
------- ------ 
Note: "Negative" Reasons combines the fol lowing values 
-Wanted to leave because of friction at home 
-Was asked to leave because of friction at hone 
-No lodger allowed to stay there 
-Accommodation poor 
Source: ISS 
File: 115 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
could live as married. Among women, the predominant reason at all 
ages was so that they could marry, though the second most common 
reasons were to take up a job, in the younger group, and to begin 
studies in the middle group, in a pattern similar to that of men. 
Most women leave home on average about two years before most men, 
mainly because they marry earlier (Chapter 12), as Young (1974) 
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has suggested. 
Class differences become apparent when the reason for leaving hone 
is examined. Table 13.4 shows the main reason for the first move 
from the parental home, by youth class and sex. It can be seen 
that 54% of stable middle class men leave home in order to begin 
studies and only 19% do so in order to marry; among stable working 
class men, 55% leave home to marry. The "mobile groups" show, in 
general, patterns which are between those of the two "extreme" 
groups, with the exception of the education-mobile working class 
men, who mainly leave home in order to study or take up a job, and 
Table 13.4: MAIN REASON FOR FIRST MOVE BY YO= CLASS AND SEX 
STABLE IDUC- COUNTER WORK- DNWARD STABLE 
REASON MIDDLE MOBILE MOBILE IWI'E MIDDLE WORIG ALL 
FOR MOVE 
---------------- 
$ 
------- 
% 
------- 
% 
------ 
$ 
-------- 
$ 
------ 
$ 
--------- 
$ 
----- 
MALES 
LIVE AS MARRIED 19 12 26 39 42 55 42 
SET UP ON OWN 6 7 11 13 11 10 10 
BEGIN STUDIES 54 54 40 13 17 3 19 
TAKE UP JOB 15 22 15 19 17 16 16 
"NE 3" REASONS 6 6 9 17 14 16 13 
---------------- 
All (=100%) 
---------------- 
M 
------- 
(499) 
------- 
------- 
(163) 
------- 
------ 
(247) 
------ 
-------- 
(378) 
-------- 
------------------- 
(512) (1660) (3459) 
-------------------- 
F 
LIVE AS MARRIED 20 32 27 37 58 67 53 
SET UP ON OWN 3 7 6 8 10 9 8 
BEGIN STUDIES 59 45 37 23 8 2 16 
TALE UP JOB 12 11 23 20 12 8 11 
"NEG' REASONS 6 5 8 13 12 14 12 
All (=100$) (605) (295) (223) (302) (856) (2312) (4593) 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: N1CDS 
File: 118 
------------------------------------------------------ 
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rarely to marry (only 12%). Among women, there is considerable 
variation according to class: stable middle class women are most 
likely to leave home to study (59%) rather than marry (20%), while 
stable working class women mainly leave home to marry (67%). The 
overall picture shows women generally more likely than men to leave 
home for marriage and less likely to leave home in order to take up 
a job. 
--------------------------------------------------------------- -- 
Table 13.5: REIURNED TO PARENTAL HOME BY REASON FOR FIRST MOVE 
Proportion who have returned to parental tome for six months 
or more 
- - ----------------------- 
REASON FOR LEAVINIG 
------- - - 
$ 
-------- 
N 
------------------------ 
LIVE AS MARRIED 
---------- 
11 
-------- 
(4151) 
SET UP ON OWN 27 (800) 
BEGIN STUDIES 48 (1679) 
TAKE UP JOB 52 (1286) 
"NEGATIVS" REASONS 45 (1076) 
------------------------ 
TOTAL 
----------------- 
---------- 
29 
-------- 
(8991) -- 
-- ----- 
SQ. irce: NCaS 
------------------------ 
---------- 
---------- 
-------- 
-------- 
The temporary or permanent nature of the move from the parental 
home is largely determined by the reason for leaving. Leaving home 
for the purpose of marriage or cohabitation appears to be more of a 
one-way process than leaving home for other reasons. When 
percentages of those returning home having made a move, are locked 
at in relation to the reason for the first move (Table 13.5), it 
can be seen that while only 11$ of those who left home to marry 
returned home for 6 months or more, 48% of those who left to begin 
studies went back home again, as did 52% of those who left to take 
up a job. This suggests that many of those who left home for 
particular reasons might return home when the reason for leaving 
has disappeared, i. e. when the job or the studies are over. This 
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pattern has been found in another recent study (Rauta, 1986). In 
contrast, people who left home to marry are unlikely to return 
unless the marriage ends. 
This points again to a fundamental difference in the class patterns 
of leaving home. The middle class youth who leave home earlier, and 
principally to go for further education, may not really have "left 
home" at all, as Leonard (1980) has suggested, but may only have 
"gone away" temporarily, regarded by parents and perhaps themselves 
as "living away". It may only be later, when they marry, that the 
middle class are regarded as living in fully independent housing, 
but with a higher median age at marriage among the middle class 
(Dunnell, 1979; Haskey, 1983), some form of intermediate stage 
between being the child in a household and forming a marital 
household appears to have become common. The working class, who are 
likely to leave home when they are older and marry younger, are 
more likely to leave home in order to marry than for any other 
reason, and leave home more permanently. 
So marriage is a main rear for leaving the parental home (though, 
surprisingly perhaps, was the reason for first leaving home for 
less than half of the NODS cohort). Marriage is also a major 
determinant of the reversibility or otherwise of the leaving home 
process, since those who left home to marry were seen to be the 
least likely to return to the parental home. 
Housing snaps and dest3naticYLs 
The next question is where do people go when they leave the 
parental home, and how is their new living situation affected by 
their age at leaving home, their reason for doing so, and their 
marital status. In the following analysis "married" means all who 
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living as married or who have ever been legally married. 
Table 13.6: HWSE1OLD STATUS BY MARITAL STATUS AND YOUTH CLASS 
Among those over 21 years of age 
------------------------------------ -------- ------------- ----- STABLE MIDDLE CLASS STABLE WORKING CLASS 
HOUSEHOLD MARRIED SINGLE MARRIED SINGLE 
STATUS 
------------------ 
$% 
----------------------- 
$ 
-------- 
$ 
------------- 
mum 
HOUSEHOLDER 97 39 94 8 
WITH RELATIVES 2 53 6 89 
WITH OTHERS 
--- 
18 
----------------------- 
0 
-------- 
3 
------------- --------------- 
A11 (=100%) 
------------------ 
(186) (215) 
----------------------- 
(1017) 
-------- 
(616) 
------------- 
FIILES 
HOUSEHOLDER 98 30 96 16 
WITH RELATIVES 2 55 4 77 
WITH OTHERS 
------- 
1 15 
------------ - ----- 
0 
-------- 
8 
--- ----------- 
All (=100%) 
------------------ 
- ---- 
(288) (203) 
----------------------- 
(1414) 
-------- 
---------- 
(316) 
------------- 
NOTES: 
1. Mobile groups are excluded from this table 
2. Householder means Head of Household or Spouse of Head 
3. Married means "ever-married' 
Source: c iS(79&80) 
File: 105 
------------------ ----------------------- -------- ------------- 
Class patterns of household status appear similar until marital 
status is controlled for. Table 13.6 shows clearly how household 
status varies with marital status, class and sex. Among single men 
over 21 years, 53% of the stable middle class live with parents or 
other relatives, compared with 89% of the stable working class. 
Among single women, class differences are less striking, with 55% 
of the stable middle class and and 77% of the stable working class 
living with relatives. Single women of all classes are more likely 
to be head of household or living with others than are single 
working class men. One possible interpretation of this gender and 
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class difference could be that the more rigid adherence to 
traditional gender roles of the working class, leads to an 
expectation on the part of the working class male of having his 
needs catered for, rather than of being self-sufficient in the 
home. This has been observed elsewhere (Wallace, 1985: 19; Rauta, 
1986: 4). 
The GHS data also shows that, while for the working class there is 
a direct transiticn from the parental home to the marital home in 
most cases, reflecting the pattern among the working class of 
leaving home to marry, the middle class are more likely to be in a 
living situation which is neither as child in the parental home, 
nor as Head of Household, i. e. among the middle class, there is an 
intermediate household status of "living with others". This may be 
because many of the middle class will already have shared 
accommodation while away at college. Table 13.7 shows that among 
full-time students aged eighteen and over in the GHS, 12% of men 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 13.7: HOUSEHOLD STATUS OF FULL-TINE STUDENTS 
p morg those aged 18 years and over currently in full-time education 
---------------------------------------------------- 
HaTSEHOLD MALES FEMALES 
STATUS $% 
HOMEHOLDER 30 26 
WITH RELATIVES 57 61 
WITH OTHERS 12 13 
--------------------------------------------------- 
pLL (=100%) (235) (201) 
--------------------------------------------------- 
So urce: GHS File: 105 
--------------------------------------------------- 
and 13% of women were "livirwj with others", and these figures are 
probably an underestimate, because the C HS excludes all those who 
are living in institutions. Sharing with peers would appear 
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therefore to be associated particularly with full-time higher 
educaticn. 
The NCDS allows an examination of the living situations of the 
sample in the homes to which they moved on first leaving the 
parental home. The analysis is restricted to those who were 
described as currently single and childless in 1981, and Table 13.8 
shows class and gender comparisons. The table shows that while 
shared accommodation is most common for both men and women, there 
are considerable class and gender differences. Among men, the 
stable middle class are more likely to live alone or with friends 
than the stable working class, while the latter are more likely to 
have been living with a partner or with kin. Women are slightly 
less likely to live alone than men (only 15% of all single women, 
compared with 19% of all men). Among women, the middle class are 
considerably more likely to be in accommodation shared with 
friends, while working class women are (like working class men) 
more likely to be with kin or to have moved in with (ex)partners. 
The most striking class differences revealed in this table are in 
the proportions living "with kin" and those living with friends. 
The data suggest that many of the working class who leave the 
parental home for reasons other than marriage move in with 
relatives. This phenomenon seems particularly related to the 
working class (16% of single working class men lived with kin, 
compared with only 5% of stable middle class men, and 22% of single 
working class women, compared with 7% of stable middle class 
women), and would appear not to be a move towards independent 
living at all, since the respondent is still likely to be in a 
dependent relationship with the relative who is the head of 
household. The pattern recalls the nineteenth century patterns of 
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I 
Table -13.8: FIRST HWSEBOLD STATUS BY YOUTH CLASS AND SEX 
Household status in the first living arrangement an first 
leaving home, among currently single respondents, without children 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
YC Jm CLASS 
STABLE STABLE ALL 
MIDDLE WORKING GROUPS* 
HOUSEHOLD STATUS $$$ 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
IAIES 
ALONE 21 16 19 
WITH PARTNER/CHILD 5 21 12 
WITH KIN 5 16 12 
WITH FRIENDS 68 47 57 
OTHER COMBINATIONS 1 1 1 
---------------------- 
ALL (=100%) 
---------------------- 
------------ 
(120) 
------------ 
---------- 
(226) 
---------- 
-------------------- 
(604) 
-------------------- 
FEMALES 
ALONE 10 12 15 
WITH PARTNER/CHILD 1 14 8 
WITH KIN 7 22 14 
WITH FRIENDS 80 51 62 
OTHER COMBINATIONS 21/1 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ALL (=100%) (88) (133) (431) 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Including mobile groups 
source: NCDS 
File: 119 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
working class migration to areas where t here was employment, and 
dependence on kin for both accommodation and job information. In 
contrast, the stable middle class more frequently leave the 
parental home to live with friends in shared housing which is 
independent of the family of origin and the extended family. Sixty- 
eight per cent of stable middle class men and 84% of stable middle 
class women shared accommodation with friends, compared with 47% of 
stable working class men arxl 51% of stable working class women. 
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The pattern which is now emerging is of working class young people 
leaving the parental home usually on a permanent basis, for 
marriage (in which case they move into the marital home). Among the 
middle class, the picture is different, with temporary moves away 
from the parental home which are not associated with marriage and 
which result in most young people sharing with their peers some 
form of intermediate independent housing, unless the initial move 
from the parental home is for the purpose of marriage. When the 
stable working class leave home for reasons other than marriage, 
they follow a pattern which is similar to that of the stable middle 
class, but are more likely to live with kin. 
The intermediate household status of living alone or with friends 
can be associated with intermediate housing. While the marital and 
parental homes are likely to be unfurnished tenancies (probably in 
the public sector) or owned by respondents or their parents, 
intermediate household status usually means bedsitters, hostels, 
furnished accommodation and in rare cases unfurnished accommodation 
in the private sector. All these homing situations can be seen as 
intermediate stops, rather than destinations, and associated with 
the independent housing of the single or recently-married. 
Table 13.9 cross-tabulates housing situations by reduced youth 
class (stable middle class and stable working class only) among 
respondents aged 20-24 years in the GHS. Overall, most single 
people are living with their parents and most married are in 
ccx=il housing or owned accommodation. The stable middle class are 
more than twice as likely as the stable working class to be in 
"transitional" housing situations, among the single. Among married 
respondents, most are in "housing destinations", i. e. public sector 
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rented or owned housing, though a sizeable proportion of married 
men and women of both classes (ranging between 14% of stable 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 13.9: HWSIM SITUATION BY YOUTH CLASS 
Among those aged 20-24 years 
------------------------------------------------------- 
HOUSING STABLE STABLE ALL 
SITUATION MIDDLE WORKI GROUPS 
Single Men 
LIVING WITH PAREN'T'S 67 89 85 
TRANSITIONAL 27 9 13 
COUNCIL RENTED 1 1 1 
OWNED 6 0 2 
------------------------------------------------------- 
All (=100%) (143) (527) (1152) 
------------------------------------------------------- 
MaYried Men 
LIVING WITH PARENTS 0 8 6 
TRANSITIONAL 21 15 18 
Oa ncIL RENTED 7 32 29 
OWNED 72 44 47 
All (=10(A) (29) (359) (568) 
---------------------------------------------- 
Single Women 
LIVING WITH PARENTS 67 82 76 
TRANSITIONAL 30 12 19 
CQJNCIL HOUSING 25 4 
OWNED 
--------- 
11 
----------------- 
1 
--------------- ------------ 
All (=100%) 
----------------- 
(154) (337) 
----------------- 
-- 
(754) 
----------------- ---- 
MarriedWcien 
LIVING WITH PARENTS 05 4 
TRANSITIONAL 14 14 14 
COUNCIL HOUSING 9 40 32 
OWNED 
------- 
77 41 
----------------- 
49 
----------------- -------------- 
All (=100%) 
--------------------- 
(85) (618) 
----------------- 
(1002) 
----------------- 
NOTES: 
1. * Includes all groups (inter-generationally mobile 
classes are otherwise excluded from this table) 
2. TRANSITIONAL housing includes furnished rented 
and unfurnished rented in the private sector 
Source: CHS 
File: 104 
------------------------------------------------------- 
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working class women to 20% of stable middle class men) are in 
"transitional housing". 
Ineichen's study of recently-married couples in Bristol found that 
the establishment of an independent household at marriage was 
achieved by only 66% of his sample. The remaining 34% of couples 
were living with relatives, usually the wife's parents, though all 
but 10% had moved out within eighteen months (Ineichen, 1981: 253) 
It has not been possible to restrict an analysis to recently 
married couples in the GHS, but from Table 13.9 it would appear 
that among married respondents aged 20-24, only 6% of males and 4% 
of females are living with parents after marriage. 
Housing destinations vary considerably between classes. Table 
13.9 shows that among married men, aged 20-24 years, 72% of the 
stable middle class are home owners, compared with 44% of the 
stable working class. Among women, the figures are 77% against 
41%. Conversely, very few of the stable middle class become 
council tenants, in comparison with the stable working class. 
Transitional housing might be seen as the first step in a homing 
career for some (mainly single and middle class) people. Some 
indication of the direction of housing careers can be gleaned from 
the CAS, since it is possible to cross-tabulate the current dousing 
situation by the last housing situation among all respondents who 
are currently heads of households, and Table 13.10 shows these 
results. People who have moved straight from the parental home are 
marginally more likely to be in bought acvommodaticn than are those 
who have been in intermediate accommodation. Is this because they 
have benefitted from family support and been able to save in order 
to buy? 
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------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 13.10: CURRENT TENURE BY PREVIWS TENURE 
Amoaxg all respondents (aged 16-29) who are currently heads of 
household (includes female heads, but excludes spouses of hea 
PREVIOUS TENURE 
WITH RENTE D RENTED RENTED OWNED/ 
CURRENT FAMILY FURN UNF(PR) UNF(PU) BUYING ALL 
TEMJRE % % %% % $ 
---------------- 
RENTED FURN 
-------- 
13 
-------- 
36 
------------------ 
30 
------- 
2 
------ 
13 
RENTED UNF (PRI) 8 8 17 2 3 7 
RENTED UNF (PUB) 30 22 40 74 10 33 
OWNED 49 35 40 25 85 48 
---------------- 
All (=100%) 
-------- 
(1229) 
-------- 
(394) 
------------------ 
(225) (327) 
------- 
(344) 
------ 
(2519) 
Source: GS 
File: 103 
The data (Table 13.10) show that generally the progress is towards 
"better" accommodation - that is, towards what I have referred to 
as housing destinations, rather than from ownership to 
"transitional accommodation", and makes the concept of a housirwg 
"career" seem valid, at least in some situations. The transitional 
nature of furnished and private rented accommodation, in comparison 
with council housing and home ownership, is apparent from the low 
proportions who remain in the "transitional" sectors after a 
housing move. Only 36% of those in furnished rented accommodation 
and 17% of those in unfurnished private sector rented accommodation 
stayed in the same type of accommodation. In contrast, 74% of 
Council tenants and 85% of home owners stay in the same housing 
type after a move. Those in furnished accommodation, probably the 
most geographically mobile group of all, appear to move equally 
into other furnished accommodation or home ownership. Those in 
unfurnished private sector rented accommodation moved equally into 
public sector rented and ownership. 
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The table also shows some movement from public sector rented 
accommodation to home ownership. One quarter of those whose 
previous accommodation was "Council housing" are now living in 
owned housing (but it should be noted that a lower proportion of 
council tenants became owners than people in transitional housing 
situations). The data do not show, furthermore, whether owners who 
were previously council tenants bought tomes on the open market or 
the homes in which they were already living as tenants. There may 
be two distinct types of home-ownership combined here, concealing 
two different strata among home-owners (as Saunders has suggested, 
1982). The extent to'which home-ownership is a meaningful status, 
associated with enhanced life chances, will depend to some extent 
on the stratum to which a home-owner belongs. Ownership of an ex- 
council home on an ex-council estate is likely to provide access to 
lower grade local amenities (such as schools) than ownership of a 
home elsewhere. 
The finding that 25- of council tenants became owners, contradicts 
the findings of Payne and Payne (1977) who doubted that there was 
movement between the two, and who suggested that the direction of 
housing careers was determined at an early stage, since renting and 
ownership were separate housing markets, rather than separate 
segments of the same market. Their contention was that young 
couples face the choice between home-ownership and early 
childbirth. Because of the different means of access to different 
housing destinations, entry to the one tends to preclude entry to 
the other. Their research preceded the recent trend towards the 
sale of council housing, however. 
Murphy and Sullivan (1983) have re-examined the findings of Payne 
and Payne, and of Ineichen (1981), in a study of the relationship 
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between fertility and housing tenure (finding that low fertility is 
associated with homeownership, and high fertility with public 
sector housing). Conclusions are hard to draw from cross-sectional 
data, and it is likely that tenure affects fertility as much as 
fertility affects tenure, in a complex relationship. They 
distinguish between "choice" and "constraint" explanations of the 
housing market: 
... whether there is a general normative consensus on the 
values attached to, for example, housing tenure categories, 
with access then restricted by resources and power, and an 
association of deprivation through disappointed aspirations 
with high fertility (as suggested by the "constraint" 
hypothesis) or, alternatively, whether different social groups 
have differing normative values with respect both to child- 
bearing and tenure, with access to tenure depending largely 
upon volition (as suggested by the "choice" hypothesis). 
(Murphy and Sullivan, 1983: 67-8) 
The notion of housing career, as with careers in employment, is 
based on a combination of choice or constraint. The intention to 
improve one's housing status or employment status meets varying 
degrees of constraint, in the form of access to opportunities. 
Social class is a major indicator of the extent to which ccnstraint 
may structure opportunity. 
Differential access to housing opportunity is clearly shown in the 
data presented. Table 13.11 shows the extent to which tenure 
varies by youth class amcng recently married women. While 65% of 
all recently married women are home-owners, 87% of stable middle 
class (including counter-mobile) women are in this category, 
compared with 54% of stable working class women. The stable 
working class are over four times as likely as the stable middle 
class to be in public sector rented accommodation. Housing 
destinations are closely related to social class. 
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-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 13.11: FIRST MARITAL HOME 
Housing situation of married women who moved to their present 
address within a year of their marriage, by youth class 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
YOITIH CLASS 
STABLE UPWARD DOWNWARD STABLE 
HOUSING MIDDLE WORKING MIDDLE WORKING ALL 
SITUATION $%%%% 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
TRANSITIONAL 7 14 13 14 12 
PUBLIC RENTED 7 12 15 32 23 
OWNED 87 74 73 54 65 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
All (=100%) (165) (129) (198) (602) (1094) 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: Stable Middle here includes Ctiunter-Mobile 
upward working combines the Education-Mobile and Work-Route 
Source: GHS(79&80) 
File: 100 
------------------------------------------------------- ----- 
Finally, Table 13.12 shows how home-ownership varies by youth class 
among the NCDS cohort. It is only when marital status is 
controlled for that class comparisons are possible. Among ever- 
married respondents, home-ownership is clearly related to youth 
class, with 33% of stable middle class men as home owners 
(including those with mortgages) compared with 15% of stable 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 13.12: TENURE BY YOUTH CLASS, OOIJPI LLING FOR MARITAL 
STATUS AND SFB{ 
Percentage in each getup who are home owners 
MARRIED SINGLE 
MEN WOMEN MEN WOMEN 
YOUTH LASS 
---------------- 
% Base % Base $ Base % Base 
-- 
STABLE MIDDLE 
--- 
32 
------- 
(88) 
---- 
38 
------- 
(106) 
---- 
33 
------ 
(88) 
------ 
22 
-------- 
(82) 
UPWARD WORKING 29 (83) 36 (88) 33 (72) 11 (46) 
DOWNWARD MIDDLE 26 (84) 22 (163) 41 (34) 14 (43) 
STABLE WORKING 15 (390) 17 (599) 29 (63) 9 (97) 
----------------- 
Significance: p= 
----------------- 
----------- 
< . 001 
----------- 
----------- 
4.001 
----------- 
--- 
--- 
------- 
(NS) 
------- 
-------------- 
(NS) 
-------------- 
File: TE JRE(120) 
Sairce: NODS 
----------------- ---- ------- ---- ------- --- ------- ------ -------- 
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working class men. Gender differences occur because women tend to 
marry earlier, and are therefore on average two years ahead of men 
in their housing careers. 
Britain has one of the highest levels of owner-occupation among 
young people in the world, according to a recent survey conducted 
by the Building Societies Association (BSA Bulletin, July 1985). 
Thirty per cent of all householders under 25 years of age were 
home-owners in Britain compared with 18% in the United States and 
7% in France. The report suggests that the reason so many young 
people buy housing is through the shortage of available rented 
accommodation rather than through choice, and indeed points out 
that home ownership is not ideal for an age group which may need 
geographic mobility, since the cost of moving home is so high. 
The notion of housing opportunity may need to be modified, in this 
case. Home ownership may for some result from constraint rather 
than choice. The suggestion is that young people may need a larger 
period between leaving home and settling into long-term housing 
destinations. The narrowing reusing market, with decreasing stock 
of rented accommodation, may be forcing young people to make 
housing decisions which will affect their work and family building 
prospects. By taking oa mortgage, and limiting their geographic 
mobility, they may also be limiting their potential in the labour 
market. 
Summary 
Patterns of leaving home vary between classes in terms of the 
reason for the move, the reversibility of the process and the type 
of accommodation entered on leaving the family of origin. Class 
differences in the patterns of leaving home are closely related to 
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class differences in access to educational opportunity. While the 
working class may typically remain in the parental home until 
marriage, when the move away will be permanent, one way, and into a 
marital home, the middle class may leave home for educational 
reasons, at a younger age, return to the parental home after having 
ostensibly left it, and live in temporary, intermediate forms of 
living accommodation. While the working class are likely to 
maintain a continuous physical attachment to the parental home, or 
to the extended family, the middle class are more likely to be 
nominally distanced from the parental home, trough returning to it 
for long periods of time. While the working class show a greater 
dependence cri their kin, the middle class even when their education 
is complete display a pattern of living with their peers. 
It seems useful to distinguish between housing destinations and 
transitional housing, when examining the housing careers of young 
adults. Transitional housing was seen to be used by those in full- 
time education, the single middle class and by some recently- 
married couples, representing for all of these groups perhaps a 
temporary living situation prior to permanent independent housing 
in the public sector or home-ownership. Among the married, 
transitional housing may represent a very brief period in their 
housing careers, while for the single, it could represent a lciger- 
term housing situation (since the public sector is not an option 
and for the single, house purchase may be difficult). 
Harris (1983) has suggested that the proportions of young people 
moving into independent single housing may have increased over 
recent years. If this is so, then it represents a new trend, and 
should not be confused with nineteenth century and earlier patterns 
of leaving home before marriage. If the trend continues, then the 
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implications for housing policy are immense, and it may well be 
that more rented accommodation in both the public and the private 
sector will be needed to cater for the bcusing requirements of the 
geographically mobile young. From this analysis, it seems that 
although around 60% of males and around 50% of females leave bane 
for reasons other than marriage, around half of these move back 
into the parental homes again at some stage and that the principal 
need at present is for temporary homing which allows geographic 
mobility to take place. 
When Anderson (1983) assumed from GHS data that the average time 
gap between leaving home and becoming head of household was one 
year, he could not have been aware of the class differences, which 
show that for the majority of the working class, there is no time 
gap between the two, compared with the middle class for whom the 
parameters (with going away and returning before leaving the 
parental home "for good") are ill-defined. 
Overall, the findings reported here ox firm that the ocncept of an 
ordered transition to adult independent status is too simple. 
While for some there may be a phased progress from living as a 
child in the parental kerne to setting up a marital home and forming 
a family, for the majority there is rarely such a clear order. The 
middle class are often in independent single housing before 
marriage, and may defer marriage and childbirth in order to 
purchase a marital home. For the middle class, leaving home, 
getting married and starting a family may thus be spread over a 
decade. In contrast, the working class move straight from the 
parental home into the marital one, and start family building at 
the time of marriage, the three-stage process occurring within a 
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year in many cases. This will be examined further in the next 
Chapter. 
The notion of a protracted period of youth may therefore be 
applicable only to the middle class, and those who have been in 
further education. For the majority, youth ends early. The 
average working class youth takes on family responsibilities at 
around 23 years, for men, and around 21 years for women, compared 
with middle or late twenties for the middle class. Perhaps this is 
why the adolescent period, with its peer group activities, seems so 
much more associated with the working class young than with the 
middle class. For the working class, adolescence may represent a 
very brief period of freedom before marriage and family formation. 
For the middle class adolescent, a protracted period of semi-youth, 
semi-adulthood stretches out before full adulthood responsibilities 
are assumed. 
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thapber 14 
'It Diffezent Roads to Adulthood 
In Part Two of this thesis, social mobility in youth was examined 
and a typology of youth class was developed, which took account of 
the mobility patterns observed. In Parts Three and Four; this 
typology was used as a basis for examining aspects of the 
transition to adulthood in work and home. The analysis so far has 
focused on the transitions and the way in which they are stratified 
by class and gender. The aim now is to change the perspective and 
distil from the previous findings a picture of the way in which 
different social groups take different roads to adult life. 
This penultimate chapter will examine each of the youth classes in 
terms of the process of transition, and will look at gender 
differences within each youth class. For each youth class, the 
basic pattern of transition will be described and the relationship 
between the different areas of transition examined. How do 
transitions in work affect patterns of family formation and housing 
careers, and vice versa? The exercise is made easier by being 
located in a model of social mobility which provides a theoretical 
basis for viewing the transitions as associated with one another, 
rather than as separate phenomena. 
Timing and Spacing of Key Transitions 
Before looking at each group, it is useful to start with a general 
view: Figure 14.1, based on data presented in Table 14.1, shows 
the median ages of key transitions, by Youth Class and gender. 
Basic patterns emerge in terms of the timing of transitions to 
adulthood and their spacing. or grouping. 
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Figure 14.1: MEDIAN AGES AT TRANSITICN MILEST NES 
BY YOUTH CLASS AND SIX 
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Table 14.1: MEDIAN AGES AT TRANSITION MILESTONES BY YOUTH CLASS 
AND SEX 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
YOM CLASS 
MEDIAN AGE STABLE IDUC C10UNTE t WORK DOWNWARD STABLE 
AT WHICH: M-C MOBILE MILE ROTTE M-C W-C 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
MN 
LEFT F-T EDUCATION 18.3 19.3 17.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 
STARTED FIRST JOB 18.8 19.5 17.4 16.5 16.4 16.3 
FIRST LEFT HOVE 20.6 20.9 20.9 22.6 22.4 22.3 
MI RRIID/C HABITID* 25.8 24.7 24.0 23.8 23.7 23.3 
HAD FIRST CHILD** 27-8 26-7 25-6 24-5 24-5 23-4 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
WITEN 
LEFT F-T IDUCTTIClf1 19.3 18.3 18.3 16.8 16.3 16.3 
STARTED FIRST JOB 20.2 18.8 18.3 16.8 16.4 16.3 
FIRST LEFT HCHE 18.9 20.4 18.9 19.8 20.1 20.3 
MARRIED/03i1BITID* 23.5 23.5 22.5 22.5 21.4 20.8 
HAD FIRST G1ILD** 25-6 24-6 23-5 23-5 22-3 21-22 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Age first married or cohabited: 
Among men, based on GHS except stable working class, where 
actual median age is available in the ISS Among women, based 
on actual median ages in the NCDS 
** Age at first child: 
This is estimated very roughly, and is based on observed time 
relationship between marriage and birth of first child (Table 
12.5); for men, the estimate is also based on observed age 
differences between husband and wife (Table 12.4), and an 
assumption (based on the findings in Chapter 11) that endogamy 
in marriage may occur between Youth Classes 
Other median ages are actual ages in the NODS data, i. e. the age by 
which 50- of the cohort has passed through each transition. The 
age left education refers to the age at which the respondent first 
left full-time continuous education 
Source: C HS79&80 and NCDS 
File: 137 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The pattern of timing of the transitions to adulthood appears to be 
set in the first instance by the age at which young people leave 
full-time education and enter the labour market. Figure 14.1 snows 
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clearly the relationship between two groups of transitions: those 
related to leaving school and becoming economically active, and 
those related to family formation. The second set of transitions 
appear to be in a clearly defined time relationship to the first. 
Table 14.2 shows that for all groups there is a standard period of 
time between starting work and getting married or cohabiting; among 
men, this is around seven years, while among women it is around 
four years. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Table 14.2: TIME IN YEARS BETWEEN FIRST JOB AND 
FIRST MARRIAGE OR COHABITATION 
Based on Table 14.1 
- ------ --------- - --------------- ---------- 
YO[iIH CLASS 
---------- 
MEN WIEN 
-------------------------------- 
STABLE MIDDLE CLASS 
----------- 
7.0 
--------- 
3.3 
EDUCATION-MOBILE 5.2 4.7 
COUNTER-MOBILE 6.6 4.2 
WORK-ROUTE 7.3 5.7 
DOWNWARD MIDDLE CLASS 7.3 5.0 
STABLE WORKING CLASS 
-------------------------------- 
7.0 
----------- 
4.5 
--------- 
The transition to independent housing clearly has different meaning 
for different classes. For the more educated, leaving the parental 
home means going away to college and living in hostels or bedsits, 
and is thus associated with the early set of transitions rather 
than with family formation. For the less educated, leaving the 
parental home is associated with family formation, and thus grouped 
with the later transitions. 
Transitions leading to family formation appear to be in a time 
relationship with the transition into employment which varies by 
gender more than by youth class, as Table 14.2 shows. The 
different gender patterns may be associated with women's 
expectations in the labour market, which are often characterised by 
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lack of career prospects and low pay. To an extent, of course, 
women's patterns of leaving the labour market in order to marry or 
have children have contributed to this lack of prospects. It must 
also be the case that marriage, housework and child care provide an 
attractive alternative to many women for whom the labour market 
holds few prospects. 
While the timing of transition may be related to entry into the 
labour market, and gender differences in labour market experience, 
the spacing of transitions also clearly varies, in this case by 
Youth Class. Family formation transitions to adulthood typically 
comprise three stages: setting up an independent home, marrying or 
cohabiting, and having children. While the stable middle class 
approach the three stages separately, with time gaps of several 
years between each phase, the stable working class, at the other 
extreme, appear to compress the three stages into a short space of 
time, sometimes reversing the ordering. So, the middle class might 
set up home as single people, and after a period of career-building 
at work, marry, then save towards buying a home before having 
children. The stable working class may move straight into a rented 
marital home and become parents within a year. 
There are therefore considerable differences between social groups 
in the general pattern of transition to adulthood. Timing and 
spacing of the transitions vary. The major interest, however, it 
not in this discovery alone, but in understanding why such 
variation comes about. By describing typical transitions to 
adulthood for each of the Youth Classes, some understanding of the 
reasons for variation can be gained. The following descriptions 
are of "ideal typical trajectories", aggregate experiences of the 
various groups defined in the typology. 
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The Stable Middle Class 
Less than half the children of middle class fathers are represented 
in this group. Between one third and two fifths of sons and 
daughters from middle class families stay in education beyond the 
age of 18, and then have (as far as can be ascertained) ccntirwous 
careers in non-manual work (Figures 5.6 and 5.7). They represent 
the stable middle class, having shown both inter-generational and 
intra-generational class stability. Class transmission has been 
achieved through inheritance of privilege and often also indirectly 
through education. 
The transition from education to employment has been delayed for 
most of this group. Nearly half of the men and two-thirds of the 
women went on to full-time post school education, and generally 
received grants to finance this. Over half of those who had grants 
also received additional financial help from their parents. (Tables 
9.5,9.6). The stable middle class therefore often obtain both 
formal and informal financial help to further their education. 
Age at entry into the labour market varies for this group because 
of the wide variation in ages at leaving continuous full-time 
education. Median age of leaving education is 18.3 years for men 
and 19.3 years for women. The median age at starting first job is 
18.8 years for men and 20.2 years for women (Table 14.1). It is 
curious that there is a time gap between median ages of leaving 
ccntinuous educaticn and median ages of starting work amcng this 
group. It is unlikely that they will experience unemployment 
before starting a job, since as a group, they tend not to have 
suffered much unemployment (Table 7.3). Perhaps it is common 
practice for the stable middle class to spend some time travelling 
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or doing voluntary work before taking up employment? 
Entering the labour market later, after college and sometimes after 
further qualifications have been gained, means that age barriers to 
recruitment for certain jobs are less likely to exist than in the 
case of the early school leaver. Career aspirations are also 
likely to be more realistic and more clearly defined. Once in work, 
the stable middle class male is likely to embark on a long-term 
non-manual career. Women are likely to face the conflicting 
demands of work and marriage. 
Many of those who went away to college will already have left home, 
at least temporarily, and will have had experience of living semi- 
independently of their parents (Figure 13.1). They often maintain 
some link with the parental home, however, returning to it to live 
after their studies in many cases (Table 13.3). There may be 
instrumental reasons for maintaining this link with the parental 
home; it has been seen that they often receive financial help fznm 
their parents. They do however have a degree of geographic 
independence from their parents that most of the other social 
groups lack. It is therefore important to distinguish here between 
geographic independence and financial independence. Though they 
may be "living away" from home, they have probably not left it. 
They may still see the parental home as their base and their 
parents as a financial resource. 
When they start to look for work, the stable middle class can 
capitalise on the geographic independence they have already had. 
They are not restricted to the area in which their family lives for 
labour market sties, but have skills which are needed on a 
national rather than local level, and are recruited to jobs via 
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national networks rather than local ones. They are not dependent 
of their families for job infonmaticn, and do not need to be. They 
get their jobs through advertisements, for the most part (Table 
7.11). Their contact with the labour market is formal. 
The kind of jobs the group will enter will be less threatened by 
recession or structural unemployment than the jobs of the stable 
working class, and many will move into management, sometimes (in 
the case of males) after an initial spell as a junior non-manual 
worker (Table 5.2). Stable middle class men are more likely to 
receive job-training (47%) than other groups (Table 9.3) and often 
further their education through courses after their entry into the 
labour market (Table 9.5). Both these routes will help the male 
stable middle class to gain promotion,. and career advancement. 
Squally, and perhaps because of the "perks" they get in their jobs, 
they are likely to be stable employees (Table 8.1). 
Stable middle class women are less involved than men in work 
careers, even before they have children. Table 5.5 shows that 
middle class daughters are less likely than sons with the same 
educational level to be upwardly mobile infra-generaticnally. They 
enter a gender-segregated labour market, which holds fewer 
opportunities for women. The jobs available to them are 
restricted, tend not to offer training (Table 9.3) and often hold 
few career prospects. Perhaps because of lack of career 
involvement, stable middle class women show a high degree of 
occupational mobility (Tables 8.1 and 8.2) in compariscn with other 
getups. There seem, then to be considerable gender differences in 
the work experience of the stable middle class. 
Being involved in long-term careers, which are associated with 
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long-term prospects rather than immediate gain (cf the stable 
working class), stable middle class men may be work-centred in 
their attitudes (Goldthorpe et al., 1969). They may need to 
achieve a sufficiently prestigious job, with sufficient earnings, 
in order to marry according to the normal patterns of their class. 
They do not marry on entering the labour force, but delay marriage, 
even though they are older than most other groups when they enter 
employment. Furthermore, for the stable middle class, marriage is 
not the primary reason for setting up an independent home. 
They are likely to share accommodation, either when at college or 
later, when they start work and before they marry (Chapter 13). The 
median age at which they first leave hone is 20.6 years for men and 
18.9 years for women. Their independent housing careers thus begin 
earlier than those of the stable working class, but in a different 
way, and for different reasons. The stable middle class are more 
likely to leave home to go to college, and to have lived in 
transitional housing before marrying and/or buying a permanent 
home. 
For the stable middle class, then, the transitions to adulthood are 
likely to be delayed by extended education, which seems to involve 
a "rehearsal" for adult independence, with semi-independence in 
terms of housing and finance. Thereafter, each transition is quite 
clearly defined and separate from the last. 
The median age at marriage is estimated at around 25.8 years for 
men and is 23.5 years for women (Table 14.1). Though median ages 
vary by gender, the stable middle class are more likely than other 
groups to marry partners of the same age as themselves (Table 
12.4). The time difference between the median ages at first job 
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and at marriage is seven years for men and 3.3 years for women 
(Table 14.2). This is partly because women are more likely to stay 
longer in education, and therefore marry after fewer years in the 
labour market, but may also be the result of women's restricted 
career opportunities in the work place. 
The stable middle class mainly marry spouses who are in the higher 
occupational classes (Table 11.5), and therefore of a similar type, 
as well as similar age, to themselves, and this may for some be the 
result of marrying college friends (Kelsall et al., 1972). 
The timing of childbirth and marriage are also likely to be 
associated with the husband's earning potential. In the case of 
the stable middle class, there is an expectation of earnings 
continuing to rise until middle age, while among the stable working 
class, earnings peak earlier (New Earnings Survey, 1982). For the 
stable middle class, the financial responsibility of children 
becomes easier as the husband gets older. 
Marital housing is closely associated with the timing of 
childbirth, tl ugh the direction of the association is not clear. 
Stable middle class women are likely to defer childbirth, generally 
for more than two years after marriage (Table 12.5). It may be 
that by deferring childbirth, and extending the wife's period of 
continuous employment, the couple is helped in the purchase of 
their home. It may also be that having bought a home, the wife is 
unable to contemplate interrupting her career in order to have a 
child, because of the loss of earnings which would occur. 
Fertility, labour force participation and mousing are all closely 
linked. 
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A major feature of stable middle class transitions lies in the 
extent to which the family of origin is involved. Though often 
geographically distanced from their parents, stable middle class 
children receive financial support. Even this physical separation 
is likely to be temporary. The middle class emphasis on 
independence and "standing on your own two feet" may not 
necessarily be borne out by events. Parents provide support to the 
young person growing up, and in so doing they may encourage a 
career orientation to develop in young adulthood as well as further 
educational ambition in the school child. 
Stable Working Class 
At the other extreme of the class structure are the stable working 
class, comprising around two thirds of the sons and daughters of 
working class fathers. Men are in manual work; women may be in the 
lower levels of non-manual work or in manual work. They left 
continuous full-time education before the age of eighteen, went 
straight into manual work (and for convenience female junior non- 
manual work is included in this category) and stayed there, as far 
as we can tell (Figures 5.6 and 5.7). 
Chapter Five indicates that, within this group, there are some sons 
who show short-range intra-generational mobility into skilled 
manual work as they gain skills and experience. Others, in 
unskilled work and generally the sons of unskilled workers, show no 
evidence of "working class careers". Among women, even short-range 
intra-generational movement is difficult, because most women's 
manual jobs are not graded as skilled, and the means of achieving 
work-related qualifications, such as apprenticeships, are less 
likely to exist. 
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The stable working class leave school at 16 or 17 years, and enter 
the labour market. For many this will not be the first experience 
of employment since around half of the stable working class will 
have experience of paid work before leaving school (Table 7.1). 
Leaving school therefore marks the end of formal education and the 
start of formal employment, for those that can get a job. It is 
the stable working class who most risk unemployment during their 
early work careers (Table 7.3). Early working experience before 
the age of sixteen may reduce the risk of unemployment among school 
leavers (Table 7.2). 
Entry into the labour force depends on the openness of the local 
labour market, on which this group (in contrast to the middle 
class) depends for work, especially when young. Local labour 
markets vary in their openness by industry and region. Access to 
jobs and to information about jobs therefore varies both regionally 
and by industry. For men in particular, access to information 
about jobs depends on personal contact. The lower their 
occupational class, the more likely they are to have heard about it 
through friends or relatives (Table 7.11). Perhaps as a 
consequence of local labour market limitations, and the importance 
of the family as a source of job information, the stable working 
class show generational attachment to particular jobs and 
industries. This ensures further stability of the working class 
and transmission of class values relating to work. 
One reason why the working class lack geographic freedom of 
mobility may well be this dependence an local information networks. 
If they move to a new locality, such information will be closed to 
them, unless they are staying with relatives (anti it appears that 
16% of men and 22% of women do - Table 13.9). Problems are likely 
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to arise when the relatives or immediate family of a young person 
are not in employment (Table 7.12). They will therefore lack 
access to job information. There then seems little advantage for 
the young person in staying at home, though he or she might be 
financially constrained to do so. 
The stable working class lack (by definition) the educational means 
to upward mobility. The main mobility route to which they have 
access, apprenticeship, only helps the male working class to gain 
respectable working class jobs, rather than middle class ones 
(Table 9.2). Job training and part-time further education are 
relatively rare among the working class (Tables 9.3,9.5). The few 
who do get cri a full-time course of post-school education are less 
likely to gain a grant than other groups, and unlikely to get any 
financial help from their parents to subsidise a grant. Perhaps as 
a consequence, they are more likely than other groups to work their 
way through college (Table 9.6). For women in this group, there is 
little chance of apprenticeship and only 6% started one (Table 
9.1); access to mobility routes for stable working class women 
seems even more restricted than for men. 
Despite (or perhaps because of) the lack of opportunity for upward 
mobility, the stable workirx3 class are less likely to charge jobs 
than those in other groups (Chapter 8). It was seen that around 
two-thirds had been an average of more than two years in their 
jobs. When job-changing does occur among this group, it may be a 
consequence of the age structure of occupations, rather than 
"drifting". Some jobs cannot be entered immediately on leaving 
school. There is therefore a youth labour market, consisting in 
part of jobs which fulfil a temporary function for the young school 
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leaver. This youth labour market tends to provide insecure and low 
paid work. For the young person living in the parental home, and 
waiting to enter an apprenticeship or age-related work, such 
employment may be acceptable. A component wage, rather than full 
adult wage, may meet their immediate requirements (Chapter 8). The 
structure of the youth labour market therefore encourages young 
workers to stay in the parental home until they are able to enter 
the more stable adult labour market and earn "full" adult wages. 
In theory at least, as the stable working class reach the age of 
eighteen, they begin to earn adult wages and adult jobs become 
more accessible. The exceptions are those in apprenticeships which 
will not be completed for another two years. The apprentice must 
continue to live on low wages while learning skills, when his or 
her contemporaries may be earning more in the labour market. The 
temptation to abandon apprenticeship must be great at this stage, 
and indeed many do so: while 52% of the male stable working class 
started apprenticeships, only 38% completed them. 
It has been suggested that the working class are home-centred 
rather than work-centred in their attitudes (Goldthorpe et al., 
1969). The careers of the working class are likely to be short, 
earnings reaching their peak in the mid-thirties, and earlier in 
the case of women (New Earnings Survey, 1982). The working class 
thus have a much shorter period than the middle class during which 
they can expect increasing earnings. Their family building patterns 
appear to reflect this short "career". 
The stable working class tend to live in their parents' home until 
they marry (Table 13.5) whereupon they move into a marital home and 
begin to build a family (Tables 12.5 and 12.7). The three-stage 
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process is greatly compressed in the majority of cases. Sixty- 
three percent of stable working class women have their first child 
either before or within a year of marriage (Table 12.5). 
Like the middle class, the working class show endogamy - they marry 
each other (Chapter 11). This may be less threatening to the 
stability of the marriage and kin relations than marriage into a 
higher social class (Komarovsky, 1967; Thornes and Collard, 1979). 
Marriage and employment patterns therefore both increase the 
stability of the class and allow working class culture to be re- 
inforced and reproduced in the next generation. 
The stable working class of both sexes leave home, marry and have 
children at an early age. Table 14.1 shows the median ages for 
first leaving home, first marrying or cohabiting and having the 
first child to be 22.3 years, 23.3 years and around 24 years 
respectively, for men, and 20.3 years, 20.8 years and around 21 
years for women. 
The working class may have no eccz mit reason to defer marriage and 
childbirth beyond these ages. Table 14.2 shows that they have 
already been in the labour force for almost the same length of time 
as the stable middle class before marrying (7 years among men and 
4.5 years among women). They may already therefore have reached 
their maximum potential in work. They are more likely to be able 
to obtain public sector rented accommodation if they start a family 
and are married. Unlike the stable middle class couple who may 
need dual incomes in order to buy a home, the stable working class 
couple may not have such aspirations cr opportunities and therefore 
start family building when younger. Marriage is, for many, the 
main way of leaving the parental home. It is still relatively 
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unusual for the working class to set up an independent home, alone 
or with peers, prior to marriage. They are far more likely than 
the stable middle class to be living either with their family of 
origin or with other kin (Table 13.9). 
Unlike the stable middle class, once the working class have left 
the parental home, they are unlikely to return to it (Table 13.3). 
This is mainly because they are more likely to leave home in order 
to marry. The period of semi-attachment to the parental home 
observed among the stable middle class does not apply to the 
working class. On the other hand, the young working class couple 
is very likely, because of the constraints of the labour and 
housing markets, to live in the same locality as their parents, and 
to maintain close kinship networks after marriage. It has been 
observed that while the middle class provide financial support for 
the young, the working class provide help in kind (Young and 
Willmott, 1957; Bell, 1968; Harris, 1983). 
The Education Route 
These are the children of manual workers, who have achieved upward 
mobility through education and whose work lives have been in ncn- 
manual jobs. Only 13% of sons and daughters of manual workers 
continue in education beyond the age of eighteen (Table 4.2), and 
even fewer enter non-manual careers. In all, only 7% of working 
class sons and 17% of working class daughters enter this youth 
class (Figures 5.6 and 5.7). They therefore represent a small 
elite of the working class. 
In many respects, the educationally mobile working class follow a 
similar pattern of transition to that of the stable middle class, 
despite their different class of origin, in so far as both are 
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greatly affected by having longer in education and consequent later 
entry into the labour market. There are, however, some 
differences which may be associated with class of origin. Though 
educated like the middle class and in middle class jobs, there are 
some signs of working class patterns of family formation. 
on average, the educationally mobile enter the labour force later 
than the stable middle class: median age at start of first job is 
19.5 for men and 18.8 for women (Table 14.1). Men in this group 
are the least likely to have had term-time jobs while at school 
(37%), though 48% of women had had school time work. This suggests 
that the motivation to succeed academically (arid defer immediate 
financial gain) was important for this group. By definition they 
are the most education-oriented group. Nevertheless, they are more 
likely to have suffered unemployment than the stable middle class 
(Table 7.3), particularly if they are male. 
since the group has been upwardly mobile in relation to their class 
of origin, they may be in different industries as well as different 
occupations from their fathers. When they leave education, they 
are the group least likely to hear of their jobs through informal 
channels (Table 7.11). It is unlikely that they could get much 
- help in this respect from their families, since their relatives 
would lack access to information about non-manual, middle class 
jobs. 
Once in their jobs, the educationally mobile are likely to be 
stable workers (Table 8.1), and like the - stable middle class, they 
are involved in long-term careers. Their upward mobility is 
primarily achieved through full-time education. Fifty percent of 
men and 59% of women had full-time post-school education (Table 
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9.5). Subsequent work-related routes are not commonly used by this 
group: only the men have much job training (41%, compared with only 
28% of women), and part-time further education is rarely 
undertaken. 
Funding during full-time courses appears, however, not to be as 
available for the educationally mobile as it is for the stable 
middle class. Furthermore, they are far less likely than the 
stable middle class to have had parental help in addition to a 
grant. Not surprisingly, then, the education-route working class 
were more likely to work their way through college (Table 9.6). 
The education route working class therefore receive less financial 
help from either the state or their families when they are on full- 
time courses than the stable middle class, as well as less 
assistance from their families in obtaining work than any other 
group. 
The educationally mobile appear to consolidate their upward 
mobility through marriage. Fifty-eight per cent of men and 45% of 
women choose a spouse in occupational classes 1 or 2 (Table 12.5). 
Table 11.1 shows a very high degree of endogamy among those in the 
higher non-manual classes, where the education-mobile are located. 
Marriage appears for many to be a means of crystallising their 
newly achieved class status. It is possible, though cannot be 
tested here, that by marrying a partner in a high occupational 
class, they may be marrying into a middle class family and this be 
able to receive help from their in-laws which they cannot gain from 
their own families. 
Male patterns of family formation in marriage, childbirth and 
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leaving home are all similar to those of the stable middle class 
(Table 14.1). Educationally mobile and stable middle class women 
show different patterns, however. Firstly, educationally mobile 
women have their first child sooner after marriage, though they 
marry at the same age as the stable middle class. This may reflect 
a continuation of working class tradition in their pattern of 
fertility. Secondly, the age of leaving home varies between the 
two groups, with educationally mobile women leaving home later than 
the stable middle class, and being far less likely to return home 
after leaving. This may well suggest that the educationally mobile 
women continue to live at home while in full-time higher education 
(and thus be an example of the family of origin providing help in 
kind, rather than financial help as provided by many stable middle 
class parents). 
In all, the education route appear to be relatively disadvantaged, 
making transitions into adulthood with less help from their 
families than either the stable middle class or the stable working 
class, though it should be stressed that there may be many ways in 
which they receive help from their families, which this study 
cannot identify. 
The Counter-Mobile and the Work Raste Working Class 
There are similarities-and differences between these two groups 
which make it appropriate for them to be ocnsidered together. The 
counter-mobile are those of middle class origin, whose work careers 
have taken them from manual to non-manual work, and who have thus, 
since entering work, regained their class of origin. Many of them 
left full-time education before they were eighteen. Nineteen 
percent of middle class scns and 13% of middle class daughters have 
been identified as belonging to this group (Figures 5.6,5.7). The 
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work route consists of those of working class origin who have been 
upwardly mobile inter-generationally through work routes rather 
than educational ones. Most follow a career pattern from manual to 
non-manual work like the counter-mobile, but some have been in non- 
manual work, despite their lower educational level, throughout 
their work lives. The work-woute constitute 18% of working class 
sons and 13% of working class daughters (Figures 5.6,5.7). 
Though in many ways the counter-mobile might be expected to follow 
patterns which are similar to those of the work-route working 
class, there are areas in which the two groups diverge because of 
different constraints, different opportunities, and transmission of 
different class patterns. 
Both the counter-mobile and the work-route are likely to have had a 
paid job while they were still at school, the work-route being the 
most likely'-of all (Table 7.1). It seems therefore that unlike the 
educationally mobile, many may have opted for upward mobility 
through work rather than educational success at an early age. 
The families of the counter-mobile appear to help them gain upward 
mobility, while the families of the work-route are less able to do 
so. Thirty-nine per cent of counter-mobile men heard of their 
first jobs through family or friends compared with 28% of work- 
route men, and the figures for women are similar. As a group, the 
counter-mobile are more likely than any other to have informal 
access to job information. They may therefore be less 
geographically mobile than the stable middle class and the 
educationally mobile, if they depend on local labour market 
information through informal channels. 
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Once in the labour market the two groups achieve upward mobility 
into non-manual work. For the counter-mobile, this may involve 
changes of job, and the counter-mobile appear to be the most 
frequent job-changers, among both men and women. In contrast, the 
work-route are the most stable group of workers, among men at 
least. Sixty-eight per cent of work-route men had been in their 
jobs for an average of two or more years, though patterns among 
women show less stability. (Table 8.1) 
When other potential routes to upward mobility are examined, 
further differences emerge between the counter-mobile and the work- 
route working class. Neither group is particularly associated with 
apprenticeship, which appears rarely to be a route to mobility out 
of the manual classes. Work-route men and women receive job- 
training more than any other group (tying, in the case of men, with 
the stable middle class). Counter-mobile women are also 
particularly likely to receive job-training. Part-time further 
education is only taken by small numbers of both groups, but full- 
time post-school education is far more common for the counter- 
mobile than the work-route working class (partly by definition). 
In order to undertake full-time study leading to their highest 
qualification, more of the counter-mobile than work raute working 
class received a grant, and considerably more in addition had 
financial help from their parents, among both men and women. The 
male counter-mobile are also more likely than the work-route to get 
an income from paid work while attending post-school education 
(Chapter 9). 
Among women, upward mobility through the work route is 
comparatively rare both for working class and middle class 
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daughters, and-the data suggest few means by which it can be 
achieved. They are therefore more likely to take available 
educational routes to upward mobility. However, among both the 
counter-mobile and the work-route, women are less able to obtain a 
grant than men, and as a result, perhaps, are more likely to work 
their way through college. Many women in these groups may be 
involved in nursing training, which is undertaken during employment 
as a nurse; this would explain low receipt of grants and the 
apparent need to finance further education themselves. 
Counter-mobile men are more likely to receive financial assistance 
from their parents while oa course than counter-mobile women, but 
among the work-route, women are more likely than men to get help 
from their parents. 
The counter-mobile (particularly the men) seem then to obtain a 
great deal of help from their families, in terms of obtaining a job 
and in terms of help through college, in comparison with the work- 
route working class. 
on marriage, members of both groups are likely to choose a spasse 
who is an intermediate occupational class (Table 11.5). They 
and their families of orientation appear then to be far more 
borderline middle class than the more educated groups. It is 
possible, however, that they are on a class trajectory which will 
take them into a higher occupational class in time, and that both 
their own class position and that of their spouse is therefore 
temporary. 
Age at marriage is similar for the two groups. Among the work- 
raute, couples are more likely to have children earlier, however, 
with 50% having their first child within a year of marriage (Table 
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12.5). By the time work-route husband is in his mid-twenties, the 
couple will have had their first child (Table 12.6). These 
different patterns of family formation may be a continuation of the 
patterns of the classes of origin of the counter-mobile and the 
work-route. 
The work-route working class and the counter-mobile also show 
different patterns of leaving home. Because the work-route are 
less likely to have gone to college, they leave the parental home 
mainly in order to marry, and among men leave later than any other 
group. Among the work-route, women are more likely than men to 
leave home to take up studies, though most still tend to leave home 
in order to marry. Median age at first leaving home among the work 
route is 22.6 years for men and 19.8 years for women, while among 
the counter-mobile the median age at first leaving home is 20.9 
years for men and 18.9 years for women (Table 14.1). Because the 
work-route leave home mainly to marry, they tend to leave home 
once; those who are still living at home are the least likely ever 
to have left (Table 13.3). Thus, although they appear to receive 
little practical or financial help from their parents, the work- 
route working class nevertheless often maintain a physical 
attachment to the parental home until they marry, and may well gain 
support from their parents in other ways. In contrast, the 
counter-mobile men and women appear to leave the parental home and 
return again more than any other group (Table 13.3). This may 
reflect the counter-mobile's dependence on their families in terms 
of financial assistance and help with getting suitable jobs, an 
important feature of this group. 
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The Downwardly Nbbile Middle class 
It is worth considering the downwardly-mobile middle class only 
briefly here, since as was noted earlier they are not a homogeneous 
group. The downwardly mobile are those of middle class origin who 
have been downwardly mobile inter-generationally and have not 
retrieved their class position through subsequent intra- 
generational mobility. They consist, in all probability, of two 
groups: those who will remain downwardly mobile in relation to 
their fathers, and those who are in the process of achieving 
counter-mobility but have not yet done so. In most respects they 
show patterns of transition to adulthood which are very similar to 
the stable working class (Table 14.1). Indeed, those older members 
of this group, who are unlikely after many years in manual work to 
achieve upward mobility back to their class of origin, might be 
considered working class. Younger, and still socially mobile, 
members of the group are, in Wright's terminology, in "pre-class 
positions° 
one aspect of the downwardly mobile is, however, worthy of specific 
mention here. While with respect to work, and work-related routes 
to mobility, the downwardly mobile and the stable working class are 
often identical, they show different patterns of marital mobility. 
Middle class daughters who have been downwardly mobile 
inter-generationally tend to marry husbands who are in a higher 
occupational class than themselves (Table 11.3). It seems then 
that for downwardly mobile women, marriage might be a means of 
mobility, where other routes to upward mobility do not exist. This 
does not appear to be the case for downwardly mobile men. Though 
they are less likely than the stable working class to marry women 
in lower manual classes, they nevertheless appear to be likely to 
317 
consolidate their loss of status through marriage rather than to 
use marriage as a means of regaining their class of origin (chapter 
Eleven). 
If many downwardly mobile women are themselves in a lower 
occupational class at the time of their marriage than their 
husbands and their fathers, then their social class positions are 
unlikely to be reflected accurately in their own occupational 
class. This is not the case for most women, however, since there 
is considerable congruity in general between the occupational class 
of a wife at marriage and that of her husband. 
Suimazy 
Class patterns are imposed to a great extent, and result from the 
unequal opportunities accorded to different classes in the labour 
market and the housing market. Much of the structure of the 
transitions may come from these outside constraints, rather than 
from class patterns which may be passed down from generation to 
generation. Young people vary in the extent to which they get 
formal help in their upward mobility. For some, upward mobility is 
assisted by the institutions of the education system and the labour 
market, while for others, individual and family solutions are 
found. Where transitions to adulthood must be integrated into a 
career perspective at work, then the family. formation transitions 
to adulthood are likely to be affected by the success of the 
transitions at work. Where work holds few career prospects, the 
transitions to adulthood are subject to constraints imposed by the 
difficulties of access to the labour market and the housing market. 
Transitions in work and transitions in family formation appear to 
be linked. 
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Within the general patterns, there are class differences which may 
reflect differences in class cultures, as well as structural 
inequality. The main variation seems to be related to the extent 
to which families are able to give help to young people, and this 
may affect both the social and geographic dependence of the young 
on their family of origin. Some young people maintain a close 
relationship to their parents and get help from them. Leonard 
(1980) has commented on this reciprocity, suggesting that parents 
give to their children in order to maintain the closeness of the 
parent child relationship: the data here suggest that the 
arrangement is equally advantageous, and even necessary, for the 
child. Successful counter-mobility of the middle class seems in 
particular to depend on family support and help. Upward mobility 
of the working class, whether through work or educational routes, 
seems on the other hand to involve more individual strategies and 
solutions on the part of the young upwardly mobile, since their 
families are less likely to be in a position to give practical 
help. 
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Chapter 15 
On Youth, Class and Gendez 
The sociology of youth has tended towards two major and divergent 
perspectives over the years. The first sees youth as a prospect 
for change in society. This generational perspective has led to a 
view of youth as classless and homogeneous. Adolescents have been 
seen as segregated from the adult world (Coleman, 1961), marginal, 
rather than integrated into the adult eocnomic structure (Parscns, 
1973; Eisenstadt, 1956). The transitions to adulthood are expected 
to cause problems resulting from anomie (Mex-bon, 1964) because of 
the lack of consensus between the young and adults in their 
expectations of the adult world. The problems of youth are thus 
located in youth itself. Youth culture develops out of interaction 
between young people and adults. 
The second perspective takes the class structure, rather than the 
age structure of society as its basis. Youth, according to this 
approach, is heterogeneous, and 
the problems of young people are 
the problems of the wider society. Youth cultures and sub-cultures 
are therefore rooted in the class structure, not in age relations 
(Willmott, 1966; Willis, 1977). Change in society is produced 
through class conflict and the oppositional stance of youth should 
be seen in this light. 
Recently, this second approach has been extended. As ycurx3 women, 
previously ignored by many sociologists, have 
increasingly become 
the subject of study (McRobbie, 1980), a second dimension to the 
social structure has been examined: gender relations. The actions 
of the young can be seen in terms of a response to patriarchy in 
society as well as to the constraints of the class system. It is 
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therefore also important to examine the 'ow in the context of the 
gender structure. 
Nevertheless, these approaches are deficient. The generational 
approach to youth over-emphasises age and generation, and neglects 
to study inequalities which result from the class structure of 
society. The study of youth sub-cultures has tended to focus on 
the most visible and dramatic aspects of youth behaviour, but while 
locating this behaviour in the context of the class structure, or 
gender structure, has neglected to locate youth in a context of the 
life course. Both approaches have tended to concentrate on the 
problematic aspects of youth, ignoring young people who are 
"conventional", and often failing to study the middle class and 
young women. In consequence, we know relatively little about the 
process of becoming adult in our society. 
This study rejects the emphasis on youth as problematic, but has 
sought to integrate the notion of process which is the basis of the 
generational perspective, and the notion of structure which forms 
the basis of the class perspective. Youth is seen as a process of 
transition to adulthood which takes place in the social structure, 
and is thus stratified according to all the dimensions by which 
society is stratified. In this study, I have examined only two 
dimensions of stratification: class and gender. 
The Met1xxk logy 
Though survey methods have been used before to study youth, 
most studies tend to be small scale and qualitative. By making use 
of large data sets, this study has been able to examine youth in 
Britain with nationally representative samples. A broad picture of 
the transitions to adulthood has thus been produced. Instead of 
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being limited to specific social groups, as most previous studies, 
this study has been able to examine representative samples of young 
people and been in a position to consider how youth is stratified. 
The notions of process and structure which are inherent in the 
conceptual framework for the study are reflected in the 
methodology, which uses both a cross-sectional survey and a 
longitudinal art study. The value of using both these data sets 
has been apparent thr ugixout the study: often the one has been used 
to cross-validate the other. In particular, the NCas cohort study 
has provided valuable longitudinal data which has allowed some 
findings based on cross-sectional data to be questioned. An 
example of this occurs in Chapter Eight, when job-changing studied 
longitudinally was seen to produce very different results from a 
study based on cross-secticnal data which was biased towards recent 
job changers. 
The lesson here then is that analysis of any process through the 
use of cross-sectional data needs to be validated if possible with 
longitudinal data. It is interesting, though, that the original 
hypotheses on social mobility in this study, based on age 
comparisons in the GHS, were later confirmed by the longitudinal 
data. 
Stratification in Youth 
Any study of social class in youth must be aware of process, since 
social mobility is a central dynamic in youth. Young people are 
highly mobile, both inter-generationally and intra-generaticnally. 
The transiticns to adulthood are therefore stratified according to 
this dynamic cu ept of social class. 
During youth, the social class of young people can . 
increasingly 
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be defined by their own occupational class, rather than that of 
their families of origin. There is movement from "ascribed" class 
to "achieved" class, though there is no inference here that groups 
have equal chances or that a higher social class will be reached 
(cf Blau and Duncan, 1967). 
If youth is to be examined in the context of the social structure, 
this dynamic approach to social class must be understood and the 
complexity of class in youth recognised. Young people are embarked 
on "class trajectories" between their class of origin and their 
class of destination (Wright, 1978), and stratification in youth 
needs to take account not only of their current class position, but 
also of the trajectory on which it is situated. 
By applying these concepts to social class in youth, the study has 
developed a typology of "youth class". Young people were grouped 
according to their class trajectories, as defined by their inter- 
generational and intra-generational social mobility. The upwardly 
mobile working class were further divided according to the route by 
which upward mobility appeared to be achieved. Analysis of the 
transitions to adulthood by this typology produced very different 
patterns which varied by class and gender. In addition, though, the 
study produced findings which are relevant to the study of class 
reproduction in society, although the primary focus was to form a 
concept and measure of class in youth, rather than to study social 
mobility as such. 
Class reproduction was found to be a complicated process, 
particularly for the middle class. Often, inter-generational class 
stability among the middle class involved complicated intra- 
generational class movement among the YOUiger gerAwaticgi. Cbunter- 
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mobility (Goldthorpe, 1980) was thus identified, among those 
(mainly less educated) children of middle class fathers whose work 
careers began in manual jobs, but who through a process of intra- 
generational mobility, regained their class of origin. Inter- 
generational class stability among the middle class was frequently 
achieved in this way. Less than half of middle class sons and 
daughters could be described as stable middle class in terms of 
both inter-generational and intra-generaticnal mobility. 
The highest degree of inter-generaticnal class stability occurred 
at the highest and lowest extremes of the class structure, while 
the sons and daughters of those in the middle range of the class 
structure were the most likely to have been inter-generationally 
mobile either up or down. 
Inter-generational stability among the middle class largely 
depends, though, an the greater extent-of educational opportunity 
afforded to the children of middle class parents. It is the 
"educationally failed" who are most likely to suffer downward 
mobility on entry into the labour market. For these, the main 
routes back up into the non-manual classes are through part-time 
further education and training at work. These routes are, however, 
primarily open to men. Among women, counter-mobility is less 
common through work, and might be achieved instead through 
marriage. Class stability among the middle class thus depends on a 
combination of upward mobility through education, work and marriage 
routes. 
Class stability is more common among the working class. The few 
who achieve upward inter-generational mobility cb so through work 
or educational routes, men mainly through the former, and women 
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through the latter. Mobility through marriage is less likely among 
this group, though the educationally mobile working class seem to 
consolidate their new class position through marriage to a partner 
in a high occupational class. Marital mobility might here be seen 
as a secondary means to upward mobility for both men and women, 
with education and work as the primary routes. However, it should 
be stressed that upward mobility is more rare among the working 
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class than is downward mobility among the middle class. 
Of major significance is the extent to which families appear to be 
actively involved in maintaining class stability. Counter-mobility 
of the middle class, in particular, seems to depend to a great 
extent on the help given by the family of origin. It is suggested 
that class stability among the middle class is achieved partly 
because of the degree of help from parents and partly because the 
structures of formal organisations such as the education system and 
the labour market allow differential access to opportunities for 
nobility. 
In contrast, the upwardly, mobile working class are less likely to 
get help from parents, because parents lack the facilities to 
subsidise the working class young who go on educational courses, 
and lack information about the sort of jobs which would help them 
to be upwardly mobile. The upwardly mobile working class therefore 
appear to receive little help, either formally through the labour 
market and the educational system, or informally through their 
families, to enable them to be upwardly mobile into the middle 
class. Upward mobility may therefore be more of an individual 
achievement. 
The class structure is therefore perpetuated. Though the young are 
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more socially mobile than older groups, they have differential 
access to the means by which mobility is achieved. Much of the 
successful mobility in youth is in fact counter-mobility of the 
middle class, which is not inter-generational upward mobility at 
all, and serves only to achieve greater stability of the class 
structure. 
Gender Inequality 
The above resume of findings in relation to social class in youth 
has already indicated some of the ways in which youth varies by 
gender. The study found that within class differences, there was 
further differentiation by gender. in particular, it appears that 
the class positions of women are more likely than those of men to 
be determined prior to their entry into the labour market, by their 
class of origin and their educational level. This is largely 
because subsequent work routes to upward mobility are less 
available to women than to men. Intra-generational mobility is 
thus less common among women than it is among men. 
perhaps as a result of this lack of opportunity for upward mobility 
through work, it seems that some downwardly mobile women of middle 
class origin who left education early, may beocme counter-mobile 
through marriage back into their class of origin. Some women, who 
lack access to upward mobility routes in education and work may use 
marriage as a route to upward mobility or counter-mobility. This 
is apparently not the case for men. 
Most of the gender differences in youth seem to revolve around the 
central point that women are more likely than men to lack 
opportunities for upward mobility through the labour market. This 
is clearly related to the likelihood that they will interrupt their 
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work careers to have and to raise children. The study of social 
mobility among women was limited to women who had not yet had 
children, to maximise comparability with men, but nevertheless 
patterns seen among women are still likely to be affected by the 
prospect of interruptions to their work careers. 
Transitions to Adulthood 
The second set of findings in this thesis relate to the 
differing experience of youth of different social groups. The 
typology of youth class enables the study of transitions to 
adulthood in the context of social class and mobility patterns. 
It was suggested earlier that youth should be seen as an age- 
related process, but is riot of itself an age. The findings confirm 
this early hypothesis. The significance of age varies in youth, 
according to social class and gender. While the middle class have 
an extended period of transition to adulthood, its start delayed by 
longer in education, and its "ending" following spaced transitions 
to marriage and family formation, the working class in contrast 
have a youth which starts and "ends" earlier in terms of family 
formation. It seems that it takes longer for the middle class to 
become economically and social independent. 
In any general sense, therefore, age is a meaningless concept in 
youth. The transitions to adulthood are age-related but it is the 
age variaticn between classes and genders which provides the more 
sociological interest. 
Each area of transition to adulthood is stratified by class and 
gender. The entry into work, subsequent movement in the labour 
market, access to work-related routes to upward mobility, the 
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choice of marriage partner, the timing of marriage and childbirth, 
and the patterns of leaving home and early housing careers, all 
vary by class and gender. - 
The study has shown that there is differential access to 
occupational choice. The lower the social class, the more 
dependent a young person is on local industry and informal job 
information, and the less likely they are therefore to be 
geographically mobile and in a position to choose their 
occupations. 
Once in the labour force, there is also differential access to 
career opportunities. The work routes to upward mobility are more 
accessible to those in the higher social classes and more open to 
men than to women. Women therefore depend more heavily on 
educational routes. Education too seems to be a major means of 
upward mobility for the working class; work routes may be limited. 
Apprenticeship, for example, is unlikely to be associated with 
upward mobility into the non-manual classes unless it is linked 
with part-time further education. The labour market is 
stratificatory, but would appear to further the stratification 
already achieved by the educational system, giving greater 
opportunity to the more educated. 
The young worker has a reputation for being unstable, frequently 
changing jobs. The study examined movement in the labour market, 
and suggested that much of this job movement was associated with 
upward mobility, and attempts to improve labour market situation, 
rather than "floundering". This is underlined by the finding that 
the counter-mobile were the most frequent job changers, when 
longitudinal data on their job histories was examined. The stable 
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working class were in contrast relatively stable workers. Cherry's 
(1976) suggestion that job movement might be regarded in a more 
positive light is thus supported by these findings. 
Patterns of family formation (marriage, having children and 
establishing an independent home) also vary by class and gender. 
The study examined endogamy and marital mobility, and found that 
most people marry a spouse of the same occupational class as 
themselves, rather than the same as their class of origin (although 
the class of origin was slightly more important in the case of 
women). Thus those who had been upwardly mobile, marry a partner 
who is in the same class as their achieved current class, and thus 
crystallise their new-found class position. The same occurs for 
downwardly mobile men, who marry women who are in the lower manual 
classes. 
In contrast, downwardly mobile women are more likely to marry into 
a higher occupational class and thus may be retrieving their class 
positions. Marital mobility may be seen as a means of counter- 
mobility for women who have been unable to maintain their class of 
origin through education and work routes. 
Ages at marriage and child birth vary. While those who are in the 
higher classes and likely to be involved in a long-term work career 
have an extended period of family building, those in the lower 
classes show a compressed pattern, which starts and ends sooner. 
This would appear to be associated with expectations in the labour 
market and associated with levels of constraint, rather than 
planning and non-planning. 
Patterns of leaving tome vary mainly according to whether the young 
have received post-school education or not. For those who have, 
329 
leaving home is often a temporary arrangement representing semi- 
independent housing. For those who do not go away to college, 
leaving home is more likely to be associated with marriage, and 
represents setting up an independent home. Single independent 
housing is mainly associated with the middle class, but may be 
becoming more common, as it is believed that more people are 
leaving home for reasons other than marriage. Leaving home might 
thus become a more important step to adulthood. 
Gender differences in marriage and family formation are mainly 
associated with the earlier age at which women pass through these 
transitions. In general, women have a briefer period of youth than 
men. The study has shown at all stages how a woman's own class 
trajectory (rather than her father's class alone) affects her 
patterns of becoming adult, choosing a marriage partner and setting 
up an independent home. 
The varying role of the family in helping the transition to 
adulthood has been one of the major findings of this study. In 
particular, the family have been seen to help the counter-mobile 
(the educationally "failed" middle class) to retrieve their class 
position; in contrast to the limited help which the working class 
can give to their upwardly mobile sons and daughters. 
The study aimed to examine the way in which young people achieve 
adult status in our society, to explain the experiences of young 
people in the process of achievement, and to account for the ways 
in which the process of becoming adult varies. These were 
ambitious aims. No one study could fulfill them all. Yet the 
research reported here has contributed a conceptual framework for 
the study of youth, and a benchmark for the further study of 
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transitions to adulthood. The picture has been not of the young as 
social problems, but as people becoming independent adults who will 
one day have children of their own. By studying the conventional 
rather than the flamboyant, the middle class as well as the working 
class, young women as well as men, transitions in the home as well 
as those at work, the study has built a model of youth. Such a 
study can usefully inform current research on aspects of youth, 
such as the effects of unemployment on transitions to adulthood. 
And within this study there are many areas where further research 
is needed. Young adulthood is particular deserves more attention 
from sociologists and is a fruitful area for study. 
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APPENDIX 1 
OOGUPATI( 1L CLASS SCHEMA 
The occupational class schema which has been used throughout this 
thesis is derived from the socio-economic groups used in the 
Census. The socio-economic groups in the GHS 1979 and 1980 data 
are based on the 1971 Census classification, while the socio- 
ec=xnic groups in the NODS (1981) are based on the classification 
in the 1981 Census (OPCS, 1980). 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table A. 1: OCCUPATIONAL CLASS SCHEMA 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
a-iS NCDS 
CLASS OCCUPATIONS SEG SEC; 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
1 Higher Professionals: 5,6 3,4 
Accountants, medical practitioners, 
lawyers 
2 Intermediate Aloe-manual and Lower 1,2 1,2 
P=fessicr ai s: 3,4 5* 
Managers, self-employed business men, 7,16 13 
teachers, nurses 
3 Junior Non-manual: 8,9 5*, 6* 
Office Supervisors, typists, clerks, 
telepInists, shop assistants (in GHS) 
4 Skilled Manual: 11,12 8,9 
Foremen, drivers, craftsmen, skilled 15,17 12,14 
production workers 
5 Semi-skilled Manual: 10,13 6*, 7 
Personal service workers, bar and 18 10,15 
restaurant staff, strop assistants (in 
NCDS), lower-skilled production workers, 
assemblers and packers 
6 Unskilled Manual: 14 11 
Labourers, cleaners 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
* From the KOS (Key Occupations for Statistical Purposes) 
Classification in the NCDS, Occupational Groups 5 and 6 were 
recoiled, both in order to make the data sets more compatible and to 
produce a class schema which was more meaningful for women: 
SDG5 uzet professionals were coded as occupational class 2 
SEG6 Shop Assistants were coded as Occupational Class 5. 
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It was not possible to assign shop assistants to Class 5 in the 
CRIS, as KOS was not available. It was, however possible to assign 
lower professionals to Class 2 in the GHS because they form a 
separate group in the SDG classification in the QIS. 
The Occupational Class schema thus derived has been used in the 
construction of the following variables: 
Current or Last Occupational Class 
Occupational Class of First Job 
In addition, the basic principle of assigning lower professionals 
to Class 2 has been followed where data permits in the constriction 
of variables relating to Father's, Mother's and Spouse's 
occupational Class. 
For the dichotomised class schema, Occupational Class was recoiled 
(l, 2,3=l)(4,5,6=2) into non-manual and manual classes. For the 
three-class schema, used for gender comparisons, Occupational Class 
was recoded (l, 2=l)(3,4=2)(5,6=3) into higher, intermediate and 
lower classes. 
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APPENDIX 2 
TY1OU GY OF YQTßi (LASS 
The typology of Youth Class which has been developed in the 
research varies between the GHS and the NCDS chiefly because the 
variable Occupational Class in First Job is available in the NmS 
and has been incorporated in the typology. There are also other 
minor variations. 
The main variables used in the typology are: 
Father's Oocupatia a1 Class 
This has been dichotomised into rnn-manual and manual classes. In 
the GHS 1979 and 1980, father's current occupational class was 
asked of respondents aged 16 to 29 years. For older respondents, 
therefore, the father's occupational class may be a poorer 
indication of their class of origin than it is for younger 
respondents. Father's occupational class was omitted from the 4th 
Sweep of the NODS, but was included in earlier Sweeps. Where the 
data on fathers' occupational class was missing from the 1974 
Sweep, it has been taken from the 1968 Sweep. The respondents age 
is not a constant factor, therefore, in the measurement of father's 
class. 
Educational Ievel 
Both the GALS and the ISS contain variables relating to the age of 
leaving continuous full-time educatiaz. The sample is dichotomised 
into those who left full-time education at 17 years or younger, and 
those who continued in full-time education beycrxd their eighteenth 
birthday. The variable has ben dichotomised in this way for the 
sake of higher cell frequencies in the second group. It is 
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recognised that the group of early school leavers will be more 
homogeneous than the group with 1cxiier in education, which includes 
both late school leavers and college graduates. 
The GHS typology excludes those who are still in full-time 
education, and under 18 years, since their eventual educational 
level is not known. The NCDS typology assigns missing values to 
those who are still in full-time education at 23. 
Respondents to both surveys may have returned to full-time 
education after their first period of continuous education. The 
NCDS discounts gaps of up to six months in full-time education; 
school leavers who spend six months in employment before taking up 
a college place will therefore not have this fill-in job counted as 
their first job. 
Oocupatianal Class in First Job 
This variable is only available in the NODS; for the C HS typology, 
educational level has been used as an indicator of occupational 
class in first job. In the NCDS, the variable has been derived as 
described in Appendix 1, giving six occupational classes. For male 
respondents, these six classes were then dichotomised into non- 
manual (classes 1,2 and 3) and manual (classes 4,5, and 6). For 
female respondents, who are concentrated in class 3, a different 
method of dichotomising was used. Class 3 was divided according to 
the educational level of the respondent; those with full-time 
education beyond the age of 18 were grouped with classes 1 and 2 
into non-manual classes, while those who left education earlier 
were grouped with classes 5 and 6 into manual classes. 
The reason for the different treatment for men and women lies in 
the fact that not only are women concentrated in Class 3, but those 
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in this class have different characteristics to the men in class 3, 
being less likely to be embarked upon a career of upward mobility, 
less educated and more poorly paid. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Table A. 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF OCQJPATIa L CLASS 3 
Among NODS respondents at 23 years 
---------------------------------------------------- 
AGE LEFT FULL-TIME EDUCATION MALE FEMALE 
& FATHER'S OC UP CLASS $$ 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Middle Class Under 18 27 24 
18 and over 23 14 
Working Class Under 18 34 51 
18 and over 16 11 
--------------------------------------------------- 
All (=100%) (821) (2452) 
--------------------------------------------------- 
The table shows that among the comparatively small number of men in 
Class 3, more are educated and come from middle class backgrounds, 
than is the case for women. 
Qzrrmt or Last Ooc upatianal Class 
In the GALS, Occupational Class is derived from current occspaticn, 
or last occupation if the respondent is not currently working. In 
the NODS, the variable current or last occupational class excludes 
those who have only had one job and whose current class is 
therefore the same as the occupational class in their first job. 
The variable was therefore re-derived to take account of this. 
For men, current occupational class was then dichotomised into non- 
manual and manual classes, and for women was divided into two 
groups as for occupational class in first job (Classes 1 and 2 and 
those in Class 3 with higher educational level; and Classes 5 and 6 
and time in Class 3 with less education). 
It should be noted that holiday jobs are excluded ui the analysis. 
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------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table A. 3: CONSTRUCTION OF TYPOLOGIES 
1. GIS TYPC14M 
FATHER'S OCCUPATIONAL CLASS NON-MANUAL MANUAL 
AGE LEFT FULL-TINE EDUCATION 18 18 18 18 
OCCUPATIONAL CLASS 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
NON-MANUAL 3142 
MANUAL 5566 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
2 
FATHER'S OCCUPATIONAL CLASS NOdd-MANUAL MANUAL 
AGE LEFT FULL-TINE EDUCATION 18 18 18 18 
CURRENT JOB FIRST JOB 
CLASS CLASS 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
NON-MANUAL 1142 
NON-MANUAL 
MANUAL 334 4* 
NON-MANUAL 5566 
MANUAL 
MANUAL 5566 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
KEY: 
1 Stable Middle Class 
2 Educatioaz-Mobile Working Class 
3 Q)unter-Mobile Middle Class 
4 Work-Mobile Working Class 
5 Downward. Mobile Middle Class 
6 Stable Working Class 
* Combination of education and work mute 
-------------------------------------------- 
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APPENDIX 3 
(ZASSIFICN=N OF IMX STRIES 
Industrial groups were classified according to the 1968 Standard 
Industrial Classification in the GABS 1979 and 1980, and according 
to the revised 1980 Standard Industrial Classification in the NODS 
1981 (Central Statistical Office, 1980). There are therefore 
differences in the titling and classification between the two data 
sets. 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table A. 4: INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION IN THE GHS 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION INDUSTRIES 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
1 CONSUMER GOODS Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 
Food, Drink and Tobacoo 
Leather, Leather Goods and Fur 
Clothing and Footwear 
Paper, Printing and Publishing 
Other Manufacturing Industries 
2 RAW MATERIALS Mining and Quarrying 
Coal and Petroleum Products 
Chemicals and Allied Industries 
Metal Manufacturing 
Textiles 
Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Cement, etc. 
Timber, Furniture, etc. 
3E INEERIM Mechanical Engineering 
Instrument Engineering 
Shipbuilding and Machine Engineering 
4 OONSTRUCrION ccnstructicn 
5 UTILITIES Gas, Electricity and Water Supply 
Transport and Q mmication 
6 DISTRIBUTIVE Wholesale and Retail Distribution 
Miscellaneous Services 
7 PROFESSIONAL AND Insurance, Barking, Finance and 
FINANCIAL Business Services 
Professicnal and Scientific Services 
8 ADMINISTRATI N Public Administraticri and Defence 
AND DEFACE 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
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b) INDUSTRIAL CLASS: 
--------------------- 
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION 
--------------------- 
1 AGRICULTURE 
2 ENERGY AND WATER 
SUPPLY 
3 MINERALS, METALS 
AND CHEMICALS 
CFICATION IN THE NCDS 
------------------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY 
------------------------------------------- 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 
Coal Mining and Fuel Manufacture 
Nuclear Fuel Production 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 
Metal Manufacture 
Mineral Extraction and Manufacturing 
Chemical Industry 
4 ENGINEERING Mechanik Engineering 
Instrument Eng na,, 
Electrical Engineering 
Shipbuilding, Motor Vehicle Manufacture 
5 CDNSUMER GZODS Food Drink and Tobacco 
Textiles 
Leather and Leather Goods 
Footwear Clothing and Fur 
Timber and Wooden Furniture 
Paper and Paper Products 
Other Manufacturing Industries 
6 CONSTRUCTION Construction 
7 DISTRIBJIION AND Vdjolesale and Retail Distribution 
TOURISM Hotels and Catering 
Repair of Consumer Goods and Vehicles 
8 TRANSPORT AND Road Rail Sea and Air Transport 
OCNvUNICATION Postal Services and Teleoomnnmicaticns 
9 FINANCIAL SERVICES Banking and Finance 
Insurance and Business Services 
10 OTHER SERVICES Public Administraticn and Defence 
Health, Education and Welfare 
Recreational and Cultural Services 
------------------------ 
Personal and Domestic Services 
--------------------------------------- 
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